THE

WEST-INDIA COMMON-PLACE BOOK:

COMPILED FROM

PARLIAMENTARY AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS;

SHEWING THE

INTEREST OF GREAT BRITAIN

IN ITS

SUGAR COLONIES,

&c. &c. &c.

BY SIR WILLIAM YOUNG, BART. F.R.S. M.P.

SIC VOS NON VOBIS, MELLIFICATIS APES.

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1807.

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TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE EARL TEMPLE,

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF HIS MAJESTY'S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR TRADE AND PLANTATIONS.

MY DEAR LORD,

THE high official situation which gives to your Lordship a superintendance of the Commercial Interests of these Kingdoms, suggests the expediency and advantage of addressing to you the following Dissertations on the Trade of the British Sugar Colonies.

The propriety of this Dedication, however generally acknowledged, will be best appreciated by those who, in the exercise of your official or parliamentary duties, have witnessed the industry of your inquiries, the extent of your information, and the enlightened policy of your measures, for the advancement of British Manufacture and Commerce, and the enlarging and strengthening those foundations of revenue and naval power.

650929

The encouragement given to the Fisheries of Newfoundland, and the regulation of Intercourse and Trade between the British Plantations and America, are in example of that discrimination of the real interests of this Country, in its commercial relations, however intricate or remote, which distinguished your services to the public, during the last Sessions of Parliament; and which more particularly induce me to offer further matter for your consideration, respecting the West India Colonies and their trade.

The coincidence of circumstances is too gratifying for me to neglect, which justifies the official propriety of this Address, and at the same time allows me to put on record the sincere affection and esteem, resulting from a long and happy intimacy with those qualifications which ensure attachment and regard from all who have the happiness of your acquaintance, and ever from

MY DEAR LORD,

Your most faithful Friend and Servant,

W. YOUNG.

PREFACE.

A DISTANT province of empire can only be wisely and well governed, in proportion as the interests and condition of the people, and the resources of the country, are known and understood.

When all the circumstances which are requisite for the giving a beneficent and prudential direction to the measures of Government are exhibited truly, and without reserve, the colonies dependent on a mother-country, such as Great Britain, will be assured of a just and liberal dispensation of power and protection: in proportion as Government is acquainted with their wants and necessities, those wants will be relieved; in the degree that their industry is shewn to be zealous and productive, it will be encouraged; on exposition of undue burthens and checks on that industry, they will be removed; and on default shewn of safety and defence, it will be supplied.

It is with confidence in the wisdom of the Legislature, and in the enlightened policy of the Executive Government of Great Britain, that I shall presume to make known the state and condition of its Sugar Colonies; and intimate grievances, actual,

or in just apprehension, from schemes of injurious regulation and law, which have been instituted in Parliament; and on other points which have been agitated, and are yet intended, by powerful parties in the State, who set up their own narrow and mistaken interests of trade, in competition with the safety and subsistence of a people.

If it be urged by mercantile bodies, of great and alarming influence in the national councils, that the very life and food of our colonists should be confided exclusively to their speculations of impracticable adventure, surely the fallacies and mischief of the scheme should be exposed: if it is a declared purpose of the Legislature to withdraw from the colonies an ordinary resource of industry and labour, and if, in the necessary result of such measure, the very tenure of freehold property on the plantations will be changed, and shaken to the very foundation;—surely a respectful remonstrance from the proprietary whose rightful possessions are so endangered, will be urged with effect:—if, further, the produce of those plantations at this time, and for several years past, has been declining in value to the owner, and new burthens and imposts have progressively kept pace with, and aggravated, the depreciation,—surely relief may be solicited and given. Lastly, if the protection afforded hath been found partial and incompetent, whether of the colonies, or of their communication with the mother-country; and the entire produce of the Windward and Leeward Islands hath, for successive seasons,

been under embargo, and debarred a passage to the markets of Great Britain;—surely a representation of all that, under these circumstances, is felt or feared by the British Colonists, should, in earnest but respectful terms, be made known to those, who are enabled to quiet their alarms, and to redress their grievances.

It is but due to the high and patriotic character of the persons who administer the Executive Power of the Sovereign State, to presume, that a clear and just exposition of such matters requiring relief, prevention, or active reform, will be received with favour and regard, if set forth in terms which shew it to be made, as it professes to be, with views of benefit to the empire at large, from an improved condition of its distant provinces.

Addressing such men as I have in view, it cannot be necessary to expatiate on the topics of national advantage, as implicated in the prosperity of every branch of industry and property throughout the realm.

It will appear, from official documents inserted in this work, how largely the Sugar Colonists contribute to the wealth and power of Great Britain; but they can only so far contribute, as for themselves they are rich and safe: they are tenants within the paramount manor of the State; and their rents will be considerable, and punctual in the payment, according to their means; and those means will and must depend on the conduct of the authority to which they are in vassalage:—on collections without exaction; on forbearance from officious interference with their

labourers, and process of culture; on the insurance and security of their homesteads; on the keeping open and protecting their roads to market; on the liberal grant of repairs in occasional disaster and distress; and on all other kindnesses and regulations which the stewards of their Lord and Sovereign may devise for the benefit of his estate, and for the comforts of his people.

I propose in this Compilation to shew what the "West India Estate" is to Great Britain, and what the condition of its tenantry: engaging in this task, I shall briefly explain the circumstances which seem to have imposed it on me as a work of duty, and which may allow me to make such plea for its publication.

For eight years past, a regular and progressive depreciation of the staple articles of sugar and rum, and a consequent diminution of income, hath come home "to the business and bosom" of every planter, in the annual accounts tendered by his merchant. For a while, the embarrassment and loss of private fortunes were kept within each circle of family and friends, as subjects of reform and relief, by an economy of present resources, or by an anticipation of those in future: in the latter and more frequent instance, the maintenance of domestic establishments and subsistence, however temporary, was shortened by a failure of the very means assumed in expectancy: but even the most timely and close reform in every expence of life, and the most rigid management, could not long avail to defray yearly increasing

charges from yearly decreasing means; and the aggregate of distress hath finally burst forth, as a general and public calamity.

Brief but clear and able statements of the wretched and oppressed condition of the Sugar Colonies, and of their just claims on the mother-country for attention and relief, were, some time past, circulated in print by Mr. Simon Taylor, of Jamaica, and since, by Mr. Hibbert, of London, and by other respectable individuals, who, from the heights of commercial eminence, observing all that passed within the extensive pale of their dealings and business, saw the West India interest in decline, and verging to ruin, and became its generous and public advocates.

The accredited Agents of the Islands presented frequent memorials to the Ministers of the Crown, successively representing the many subjects of oppression and grievance under which their constituent colonies suffered, and by them prayed redress.

The Legislatures of the several Islands have, at different periods, by their committees, set forth the exigencies of their state, and particularly in 1803-4, the Council and Assembly of Jamaica published a Report, exhibiting that great island as a scene of general distress, and foreclosure of property.

The numerous body of West India Planters and Merchants resident in London, have, at several public meetings, expressed the like opinions and fears of actual or impending ruin. At a most numerous and respectable Assembly held in March last, the Lord Penryhn presiding in the chair, various matters then pend-

ing in Parliament, relative to a partial abolition of the slave trade, to additional duties proposed on sugar, and to restricting the supply of provisions and lumber from America, were discussed at large; and the general state and condition of the Sugar Colonies was clearly shown to form so urgent a case, that relief could no longer be delayed; and that measures of immediate effect were indispensable, not merely for the interests, but for the safety and existence, of the West Indies, as yet valuable and productive dependencies of the British Empire. The general impression of this numerous meeting was, that an ignorance of their actual situation could alone account for the neglect it had hitherto experienced: it was not conceived to be possible, that a wise and beneficent Government, if duly apprised of so much distress and injury resulting from financial or other measures, should not repeal or rectify what was oppressive and wrong: and it was the unanimous opinion of those present, that "a clear and full exposition of their case" was what they owed to themselves, to their fellow West Indians, and to their country!

It was then, in the first instance, resolved, "that a representation of the distressed condition of the Sugar Colonies, and especially from the exorbitant and yet accumulating imposts on their produce, should be made to Ministers, and to Parliament:" and a select committee was appointed to prepare the same. I was named to be a member of this committee; but residing at a considerable distance from the place of its meetings, and having

much business at the time in Parliament, I could not attend: yet strongly impressed with the subject under their consideration, as explained at the general meeting, it was at no time out of my mind; and I devoted every leisure hour to the selecting and arranging such Parliamentary Documents of the West India Trade and Revenue, as might be useful for the general purpose. Perhaps no one possessed a more complete series of Parliamentary and other Official Papers relative to the matters under consideration, than I had then before me.

When I first took my seat in the House of Commons, now more than twenty-two years past, I carefully observed the course and succession of parliamentary business, with the view of chalking out some line of industry, rather than of talent, in which I might qualify myself to be humbly useful to my country; and I selected the Poor Laws, the British Fisheries, and the Commerce of the kingdom, as the leading subjects on which my attention was to be fixed, and my attendance given on every Committee.

From that time (June 1784) I kept a Common-place Book, in which I entered, under distinct heads, whatever occurred on these matters in debate, or I could collect from the Statute Book, and other reading; and at the same time I carefully arranged, and preserved, every document returned to Parliament; and some which were not printed by order of the House, I copied in the Journal Office.

When, in 1796, a Committee was selected to inquire into the

means "of accommodating the Thames, and Port of London, to the increased and increasing Trade of the Kingdom," I was appointed Chairman of that Committee; and, as such, had an immediate correspondence with the Custom-house in every quarter, which brought before me *the whole commerce of the kingdom, actual and past:* and for eight weeks (I might say much of the night as well as day) I was incessantly engaged in the hearing and examining evidence, or in arranging the commercial materials for the voluminous Report soon after printed by order of the House of Commons; under the representations of which, originated the distinction of passage and port, the clearance of the Thames, and the system of London Docks, of whatever description, since erected.

I have thought proper thus far to shew the premises on which my work has been raised, with the view of engaging a confidence in the foundation "*of that earnest plea to the public consideration and regard which, on the part of the British Colonies, I have to prefer.*"

If aught from me,—if any part of the superstructure which I may rear on this foundation, shall appear to be weak or unsound, I humbly point out a retreat to the basement floor, as where the judgment of the reader may safely rest. I have, however, endeavoured to add what might be of service and effect; and in the use of my original materials, I have studied method, and so to arrange a series of Tables in Account, as to keep each head

of inquiry distinct, and yet connect the whole, as matter for general inference and decision.

Where estimate has appeared necessary, I have studied a general accuracy, rather than the nicely attending to fractions, which might load and perplex more than elucidate the results, which I seek to simplify and enforce: but I trust that no essential error will appear in any computation, or such as to affect the inferences I draw, or the general argument of my text.

As the matter opened to my consideration, I have inserted comments on the several articles of commercial entry; and on the important subjects of the Intercourse of America with the West Indies, and on the Navigation Acts, and Shipping Interest of Great Britain, I have discoursed more at large. These will again, and soon, be matters of legislative deliberation; and the argument on one side having been intruded on the public, and yet continuing in the form of printed memorials and representations by Ship-owners and others, I have thought it proper that the argument should not remain *ex-parte;* but the subject be fully and fairly discussed, before error and prejudice had taken root.

The latter Chapters of this Miscellany will treat of the Naval and Military Defence of the West Indies, the mortality of troops, and the regulation of limited service, as applicable to regiments on that station: the first of these Essays, touching the safety of property and people throughout the Colonies, comes within the immediate scope and design of this work: should other topics appear

less relevant, I rest my apology on the interest of each subject, and on the intentions of service to the British Soldiery which have directed me in the investigation.

Having for my own use, or for purposes of merely private communication, gradually made up, and finally completed this Compilation; on inquiry, I was informed, that, from whatever cause, "no General Report from the West India Committee in London was ready, or likely soon to be presented:" whenever such Report appeared, its character and authority would ensure an attention from the public, which could in no degree be prejudiced by any anticipation of the subject from a private pen; and meanwhile, I have been induced to suppose, that the present publication might be timely and useful.

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THE

WEST-INDIA

COMMON-PLACE BOOK,

&c. &c.

CHAP. I.

The African Slave Trade.

HAVING, in the Preface to this Miscellany, explained the nature of the compilation, and of the materials from which it has been formed, the order of its arrangement, the authorities on which it rests, and the purpose of its publication; I would leave it as a book of reference, without any introductory remarks, or comments, further than are necessary for the connecting, or explanation of, the contents.

Some articles in this Common-place Book may require to be treated of more at length; but generally, and in all cases where

a regular and suitable arrangement of the materials may lead to a just and necessary inference, and "*the subject speak for itself,*" I shall avoid any interference with the judgment of the reader, by introducing any argument or opinions of my own.

On the subject of the slave trade, first in question, the following series of tables will give a full and clear understanding of its progress, actual extent, and probable decline. The moral and political questions affecting this most important and interesting subject, are, from frequent and late discussions, so familiar to the public mind; and, from a sense of public duty, myself have taken so leading a part in those discussions, that I cannot consider any further opinions or argument on these general topics, coming from me, as either necessary or proper on the present occasion.

I proceed then to an immediate entry of the tables exhibiting the trade for African slaves carried on with the sugar colonies, taking as my premises, the return of population in the West Indies, reported by the Committee of Privy Council in 1788.

Population of the British West Indian Isles.

	1787. Report Privy Council, 1788.			1805*. Edwards's Hist. & Ret. H.C. &c.		
	European White People.	Free People of Colour.	Slaves.	White People.	People of Colour.	Slaves.
Jamaica, ...	23,000	4093	256,000	28,000	9000	280,000
Barbadoes, ...	16,127	2229	64,405	15,000	2130	60,000
Antigua, ...	2590	1230	37,808	3000	1300	36,000
St. Kitt's, ...	1912	1908	20,435	1800	198	26,000
Nevis, ...	1514	140	8420	1300	150	8000
Montserrat, ...	1300	260	10,000	1000	250	9500
Tortola, &c. &c.	1200	180	9000	1300	220	9000
Grenada, ...	996	1125	23,926	1100	800	20,000
Dominica, ...	1236	445	14,967	1594	2822	22,083
St. Vincent's, ...	1450	300	11,853	1600	450	16,500
Tobago, ...	1397	1050	10,539	900	700	14,883
Trinidad, ...	.....	.....	.....	2261	3275	19,709
Total, ...	49,762	10,569	465,276	58,955	21,967	524,205

N. B. The negro population, or number of slaves on each island, is no criterion of its produce and value; inferior lands and soil will require more labour, and give less returns.

* The table for 1787 is official; that for 1805 is founded on actual returns from Dominica, St. Vincent's, and Tobago, on Col. Draper's Report for Trinidad, &c. and for the rest, on estimates by Mr. Edwards, Mr. M'Kinnen, &c. and from general information. For Jamaica, the refugees from St. Domingo, white and mulatto, account severally for the increase in each class.

Estimate.—In Jamaica, &c. one-half hogshead sugar per acre; two-thirds per negro.

Dominica, the same.

Grenada, three-fourths hogsh. per negro and acre.

Antigua, one-third hogsh. per acre, and one-half per negro.

St. Kitt's, one hogsh. per acre; one-half per negro.

St. Vincent's, one hogsh. and one-fourth per acre and per negro.

Tobago, one hogsh. per acre and per negro, &c. &c.

Slave Trade, Coast of Africa.

Report Privy Council, 1788.

From what parts of Africa, by all Nations.

1788.	Slaves.	Price of each on Coast of Africa.
		£.
The Gambia,	700	
Isles Delos, and vicinities,	1500	16
Sierra Leone to Cape Mount,	2000	
Cape Mount to Cape Palmas,	3000	
Cape Palmas to Apollonia,	1000	15
Gold Coast,	10,000	
Quita and Papoe,	1000	18
Whydah,	4500	
Porto Novo, Epea, and Bedagrie,	3500	15
Lagos and Benin,	3500	14
New and Old Calabar, and Camerons,	21,500	13
Gaben, Loango, Melimba, and Cape Benda,	14,000	
Majumba, Amboin, and Mitsoules,	1000	10
Loango, St. Paul's, and Benguela,	7000	
	74,200	

1788. Of the above 74,200 slaves, it was estimated that

British traders took from Africa - -	36,000 slaves.
French, - - - - - - - - - - -	18,000
Dutch, - - - - - - - - - - - -	4000
Danes, - - - - - - - - - - - -	2000
Portuguese, - - - - - - - - - -	12,000
American, - - - - - - - - - - -	2200
	74,200

in the period of sixteen years, to 1805. The course of this trade has much changed: the *French* retain little or none; the *Americans* have taken it up: the British trade has rather, in the same period, increased.

Imports of Slaves to British West Indies, comparative in the Years 1787 *and* 1802.

	1787. Medium of Four Years, from Report of Privy Council.			1803. Medium of Two Years, from Return to H. C. Ap. 5, 1805.		
	Imports.	Re-Exports.	Retained.	Imports.	Exports.	Retained.
Jamaica, ...	10,451	3619	6831	7662	2402	5260
Barbadoes, ...	367	5	362	1050	28	1022
Antigua, ...	768	100	668	434	100	334
St. Kitt's, ...	658	102	556	971	124	847
Nevis, &c.	544	.....	544	228	.....	238
Tortola, ...	120	.....	120	438	259	179
Dominica, ...	6203	4960	1243	550	34	516
Grenada, ...	2583	170	2413	1097	2	1095
St. Vintent's, ...	182.	300	1525	1540	.....	1540
Tobago, ...	1400	.....	1400	172	.....	172
	24,919	9256	15,862	14,142	2949	11,193
Bahamas, ...	.....	.....	.....	2323	2230	297
Trinidad, ...	.....	.....	.....	4516	33	4483
To conquered colonies,	.....	.....	.....	7164	.....	7164
Total slave trade, ..	24,919	9256	15,862	28,355	5212	23,137

From the above returns it appears, that the slave trade by British traders has, in fifteen years, from 1787 to 1803, *increased* in Africans imported, to the number of 3436 slaves; and, deducting the supply to the conquered colonies, Demerara, Surinam, &c. has *decreased* in the number of slaves to British islands, 3728.

It further appears, "that subtracting Bahama, made in 1791 a free port, and become a mere *depôt* of trade to foreign settlements; and further subtracting Trinidad, ceded to the British Crown by the Treaty of Peace, 1802," the *ancient British* sugar colonies, in the latter period, 1802-3,

	Slaves.
Imported less slaves from Africa, - - - - - -	10,271
Re-exported fewer slaves to foreign settlements, -	6307
Retained fewer slaves for cultivation, &c. - - -	4699
Total supply of slaves, 1787, retained for cultivation,	15,862
Total supply of slaves, 1802, retained for cultivation, *including* for *Trinidada* 4483 slaves, -	15,975

I have preferred the comparing returns made by the Privy Council, on an average of four years, to 1787, with the returns, 1802-3; because to the period of 1787, the abolition of the slave trade had not been so far agitated, as to have any influence on the trade. With other views of the subject, and especially as to the re-export of slaves in *foreign* or British ships, with reference to a future article of trade with the Spanish Main,

I will now insert the returns made to the House of Commons by the Inspector-General, Mr. Irving, for the years 1787 and 1788· when first, after the peace of 1783, Grenada, Dominica, and St. Vincent's, had recovered a full credit to re-people their plantations, ravaged by the hurricane of 1780; and when Grenada had commenced its valuable export trade to the Caraccas and the Spanish Main, and which I shall have further occasion to notice. Dominica was the slave-factor for Guadaloupe, and the French, &c. &c.

An Account of the Number of Ships, with their Tonnage, which have entered, in the Years 1787 *and* 1788, *in the several British West India Islands from Africa, with the number of Negroes which were Imported on board the same in each Year; together with the Number of Negroes which were Exported, distinguishing each Island, and whether Exported in Foreign or British Ships.*

Return House of Commons, March 18, 1790.

	Arrivals from Africa.			Negroes Exported.				
Countries.	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.	Total Number of Negroes imported.	To Foreign West Indies in Foreign Bottoms.	To Foreign West Indies in British Bottoms.	To the States of America.	Total Number exported.	Negroes retained for Cultivation.
Jamaica, ...	16	2696	5682	1659	92	29	1780	3902
Barbadoes, ..	7	831	713	.....	85	.....	85	628
Antigua, ...	5	388	562	.....	77	25	102	460
St. Kitt's, ...	5	645	1095	.....	185	.....	185	910
Nevis, ...	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montserrat, ..	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tortola, ...	2	273	143	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Dominica, ...	25	3640	5709	1655	233	130	2018	3691
St. Vincent's,	12	1767	3361	.....	660	.....	660	2701
Grenada, ...	13	1943	3715	257	279	.....	536	3177
Bahamas, ...	...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Total, 17 7,	85	12,183	20,978	3571	1611	184	5366	15,469

Return House of Commons, March 18, 1790, continued.

Countries.	Arrivals from Africa.		Negroes Exported.					
	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.	Total Number of Negroes imported.	To Foreign West Indies in Foreign Bottoms.	To Foreign West Indies in British Bottoms.	To the States of America.	Total Number exported.	Negroes retained for Cultivation.
Jamaica, ...	20	3862	6131	2391	66	10	2467	3664
Barbadoes, ...	8	801	1099	.....	356	6	362	737
Antigua, ...	3	311	570	.....	63	.....	63	507
St. Kitt's, ...	....	.....	.....	.....	300	.....	300	.....
Nevis, ...	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montserrat, ..	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tortola, ...	2	83	143	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Dominica, ...	24	4275	6383	3404	1249	.....	4653	1730
St. Vincent's,	10	1975	2522	.....	670	.....	670	1852
Grenada, ...	30	4484	7436	945	1598	.....	2543	4893
Bahamas, ...	1	130	211	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Total, 1788,	98	15,921	24,495	6740	4302	16	11,058	13,483

Ships Cleared Out from Great Britain for the Slave Trade on the Coasts of Africa, under Limitations, by Acts passed 1789-1799, *&c.*

Per Return House of Commons, Ap. 5, 1805.

	London.		Bristol.		Liverpool.		Total.		Each Ship.
	Ships.	Slaves allowed.	Ships.	Slaves allowed.	Ships.	Slaves allowed.	Ships.	Slaves.	Medium Slaves.
1787	26	.....	22	.....	73	.....	121	36,000	494
1795	14	5149	6	2402	59	17,647	79	25,198	317
1796	8	2593	1	393	94	29,425	103	32,411	315
1797	12	4225	2	801	90	29,958	104	34,984	336
1798	8	2650	3	1433	149	53,051	160	57,104	356
1799	17	5582	5	2529	134	47,517	156	55,628	356
1800	10	2231	3	717	120	31,844	133	34,722	261
1801	23	6347	2	586	122	30,913	147	37,846	259
1802	30	9011	3	704	122	31,371	155	41,086	266
1803	15	3616	1	355	83	29,954	99	24,925	253
1804	18	5001	3	798	126	31,090	147	36,899	244
10 years	.....	46,405	....	10,718	....	323,770	.....	380,893	.....

During the above periods, this table shows the greatest possible extent of the slave trade, as allowed by law; and supposing the whole numbers to be procured and taken from Africa, then for the years 1802-3, there will be freighted, average number, on board each ship, 260 slaves; which number will be carried in mind, for reference to the following table of arrivals in the West Indies, and the mortality in passage thereon to be computed.

From the above table it appears,

That Bristol has of itself nearly abandoned the slave trade:

That London, to the year 1798, was abandoning the trade; but that soon after, the consignees of the conquered colonies of Demerara, &c. began to speculate on extending those great continental settlements, and carried the same into effect, by the annual transport and supply to these *foreign* provinces, of 5336 African slaves in 1801, and of a much larger number in the preceding years; as we may justly infer from the sudden increase, and extraordinary extent, of the slave trade in the years 1798 and 1799*.

Lastly, it appears, That Liverpool, from 1787 to 1804, has more than doubled its share of the slave trade, and actually possesses six-sevenths of the whole trade, as carried on by British traders.

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* The policy of these settlements will be the subject of further discussion.

Arrivals from Africa, and Slaves Imported into the West Indies, 1802, 1803.

Return House of Commons, April 5, 1805.

	1801-2. War.				1802-3. Peace.			
	Ships.	Slaves Imported.	Slaves Exported.	Slaves Retained.		Slaves Imported.	Slaves Exported.	Slaves Retained.
Jamaica, ...	32	8933	2712	6221	.....	6391	2092	4389
Barbadoes, ...	4	684	.....	684	.....	1395	56	1339
Antigua, ...	3	578	.....	578	.....	289	200	89
St. Kitt's, ...	5	1187	158	1029	.....	755	189	566
Nevis, ...	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	238	.....	238
Tortola, ...	1	226	175	51	.....	649	442	207
Dominica, ...	4	603	.....	603	.....	497	67	430
St. Vincent's, ...	5	981	.....	981	.....	2098	.....	2098
Grenada, ...	5	1082	.....	1082	.....	1112	4	1108
Tobago, ...	1	172	.....	172	.....	.....	.....	.....
Trinidad, ...	18	4695	65	4630	.....	4336	.....	4336
Bahamas, ...	11	2845	2279	566	.....	2200	2181	19
	90	21,986	5389	16,597	78	19,960	5232	14,730
Conquered Colonies. Demerara, ...	13	5336	.....	5336				
Conquered Colonies. Surinam, ...	8	1549	.....	1549				
Conquered Colonies. St. Lucie, &c.	2	279	.....	279				
	122	29,160	5389	23,771	78	19,960	5232	14,730

From the former table, may be computed in each ship from

Africa, - - - - - - - - - - - - - slaves 260

By the above table on arrivals, each ship - - - - - - 245

Loss on passage, five per cent. as less on arrivals, - - - 15

In reference to the former tables, ships in the trade were,

1802,	155
1802, ships arrived in the British West Indies,	122
Remain ships to account for, as in direct trade to foreign settlements,	33
33 ships, carrying each 245 slaves, will carry direct to foreign colonies,	8085
To British West Indies,	21,986
To conquered colonies,	7164
1802, total trade arrived,	37,235

From the two returns of total slave trade, and of arrivals, it appears that, on the *peace* in 1802, the trade greatly decreased; and in 1804, in *war*, again recovered—a matter of curious speculation!

Slave Trade to Foreign Colonies by British Traders.

During the last war, and especially in the years from 1798 to 1800, the slave trade (per table, p. 8) appears to have been greatly extended, and which is to be attributed to the then speculations of settling the vast and rich plains of Demerara; which province, on the return to Dutch sovereignty by the treaty of 1802, carried with it a vested British capital of many millions, and the means of increased produce to supply Europe with sugar, portend-

ing rivalship and ruin in the foreign market, to the ancient British colonies.

British policy hath at length awakened to the mischief, and by an act of the Legislature, passed May 18, 1806, limited the supply to conquered colonies, and prohibited the trade in African slaves to foreign settlements. The portion of the foreign slave trade, by this act abolished, was at different periods, on a medium average of years, as follows:

1787.	The African trade, by the British, was for slaves,	36,000
	Of this number the British colonies retained -	15,862
	Supplied to foreign settlements, - - - -	20,138
1802.	The African trade by the British, was for slaves,	36,621
	Of which the British colonies retained - -	15,973
	Supplied to foreign settlements, - - - -	20,658

Details of foreign trade abolished, on estimate from 1802.

Per slaves direct to foreign settlements from Africa,	8085
Per slaves re-exported from British islands, -	5389
Per slaves to conquered colonies,* - - - - -	7164
	20,658

* As *continental* colonies *must* be given up on the return of peace, I comprise them as foreign: my reasons for so considering them, will be given in a future Chapter of this Miscellany.

General Abolition of the Slave Trade.

Since passing the act in May 1806, prohibiting the trade in African slaves to foreign settlements:—June 10, 1806, a resolution passed the House of Commons, by a majority of ninety-nine to fifteen, "by which Parliament declared the slave trade to be founded on principles contrary to those of justice, humanity, and sound policy, and engaged to institute measures for the total abolition of the same;" and the vote was transmitted to the Lords for their concurrence; which concurrence was soon after given by a majority of forty-one to twenty; and the same day an address to the King was moved and carried, praying his Majesty to negotiate with foreign powers, for their co-operation in a total abolition of the trade to Africa for slaves.

I venture on this subject no further comment, than to state an opinion, founded on long experience, of the perseverance of the abolitionists, and on a knowledge of the temper of Parliament now coinciding with the policy of the Executive Government;—and on these premises, my opinion is formed and decided, "that the trade for slaves from Africa will shortly, by act of the British Legislature, be wholly prohibited," and that the colonists cannot too early take precautions for obviating any mischief in the islands, to be apprehended from the measure."

CHAP. II.

On the Cultivation, Produce, progressive Improvement, or Decline, severally, of the British Sugar Colonies.

SECT. I.—JAMAICA.

THE purpose of this chapter is, from a view of the present and probable produce of each island, to suggest an estimate of the extent of markets required in Europe for an adequate reception and sale. If the market is over-stocked, the article will be depreciated, and if the price of the article does not compensate the labour of the production, it will no longer be produced to the same amount, but diminish to the quantity which may secure a competition in the buyers, and through which price and labour may again find their level. The cultivation and produce of any country, which are beyond, and more than commensurate with, the ordinary consumption, and means of disposal to advantage, may be artificially kept up for a short period, but must in course fall off, and droop to the standard of consumption and sale.

From the Report of the Committee of Legislature in Jamaica, December 20, 1799, there were then,

	Acres.
In coffee plantations, - - - - - - - - - - -	15,343
In sugar plantations, - - - - - - - - - -	105,232
In provision grounds, - - - - - - - - - - -	7771

These are the only plantations enumerated by acres in this report. Mr. Bryan Edwards, in 1792, states there were then worked by negroes,

		Negroes.
Sugar plantations,	767,	140,000
Coffee plantations,	607,	21,000
Breeding pens, and pastures,	1017,	31,000
On pimento and cotton plantations, and negroes in towns,		58,000
		250,000

Since Mr. Edwards wrote, the coffee plantations have increased tenfold in produce, and greatly, of course, in number; and the negroes in 1805, in Jamaica, may be taken at 280,000.

Jamaica is an island of so great importance, that it is matter of interest to consider its produce distinctively.

Exports from Jamaica.

Report House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

	Rep. House of Com. 1785.		Bryan Edwards.		H. C. 1806.	
	1773.		1787.		1805.	
	To Great Britain.	America.	To Great Britain.	America.	To Great Britain.	
Sugar, hogsh. 13cwt. of 112lb.	93,400	2400	64,000	700	130,000	
*Rum, punch. of 110 gallons,	17,280	8700	18,145	3000	18,000	
Melasses, ... gallons,	4140	5700	2316	4100	.....	
Coffee, ... cwt	3684	2863	3716	2676	189,161	
Indigo, ... lbs.	131,100	300	27,623	.....	35,000	
Cotton, ... lbs.	404,400	8800	1,905,000	1000	2,300,000	
Pimento, ... lbs.	557,970	55,200	609,794	6650	2,257,045	

America no Return.

* Jamaica, laying deep in the Bay of Mexico, to westward, does not supply the American colonies most to the north-east, and who in those latitudes use most of *rum*, proportionally with the Windward Islands.

Produce of Jamaica, comparative with the total Produce of the British West Indies.

Return to House of Commons, May 6, 1806, of Imports to Great Britain of Coffee and Sugar.

	Coffee. Cwt.			Sugar. Hogsh. 13 cwt. of 112 lb.		
Years.	Jamaica.	Other Islands.	Total Coffee.	Jamaica.	Other Islands.	Total Sugar.
1793	28,928	61,619	90,547	80,300	83,200	163,500
1794	35,307	101,034	136,341	89,800	73,500	163,300
1795	42,169	80,101	122,270	83,200	45,100	128,300
1796	33,870	68,357	102,227	83,400	47,800	131,200
1797	58,741	42,851	101,592	80,030	41,044	121,074
1798	70,823	74,029	145,042	83,350	67,350	150,700
1799	82,527	40,539	123,066	95,000	98,000	193,000
1800	106,223	66,251	172,474	110,300	67,530	177,830
1801	121,368	64,460	185,828	143,200	79,950	223,150
1802	155,661	59,323	214,984	144,100	117,350	261,450
1803	117,936	34,674	152,610	125,000	87,300	212,300
1804	176,531	No return.	.....	120,000	109,000	239,000
1805	189,161	No return.	.....	132,000	92,700	224,700

From the above table appear the following results:

First, That Jamaica alone, returns above one-half of the sugar produced by the whole of the British colonies.

Secondly, That Jamaica produces above three-fourths of the total coffee.

Thirdly, (and it is the most important result in views of this compilation), That Jamaica is yet a growing and improving colony, and that, its cultivation appearing progressive, and especially of coffee, a further increase of produce may yet be expected, and a further market in Europe become necessary, and to be provided.

Jamaica exports, and sends to Great Britain yearly, about 20,000 puncheons of rum, being about two-thirds of the total rum freighted home from the British colonies.

On the above table relating to sugar imported to Great Britain, and from Jamaica in proportion to the importation from all the other British West Indies, it is to be noticed, that from 1795 to 1798, a more than ordinary disproportion occurs, by a falling off in the produce of the Windward Isles, occasioned by ravage of the plantations in Grenada from insurrection, and in St. Vincent's by the Charaibs.

For six years to 1798, Jamaica returned a steady average of about 84,000 hogsheads of sugar.

The very high prices of sugar in the European market for four years preceding, and highest in 1798, excited speculations of extending the sugar plantations in Jamaica and other islands; and this, aided with the new and more productive Bourbon cane, accounts for the increase of sugar from Jamaica, progressive, to 1803; whilst (with the exception of St. Vincent's and Grenada, and above all, Tobago, *if British)*, the Windward Islands, having no extra, spare, and fertile lands, to do the same, yet in some degree profited, by planting the superior species of cane.

SECT. II.—WINDWARD AND LEEWARD ISLANDS.

The islands in detail are briefly adverted to, with a view to speculation on the probable future increase, or failure, of produce, and relative market in Europe to be provided.

		Hogsh.
Barbadoes.	To 1736, returned on yearly average of sugar, - - - - - - - - -	22,769
	To 1761, on average crops, - - -	25,000
	To 1787, only - - - - - - -	12,211
	To 1805, only - - - - - - -	9554

Barbadoes further produces a considerable quantity of cotton, and has in itself, and for its white inhabitants (more numerous, of the poorer sort than in other West India islands), a resource, from the culture of provisions, and raising stock for the supply of shipping, and other islands; and being the most to windward, and the first port of arrival from Europe, it has a further resource in a greater share of trade. But as to produce for the European market, it has greatly decreased; and as the decrease has been constant and progressive, it is to be apprehended that the cause is of certain and continued effect; namely, diminished and diminishing fertility; if not from exhausted soil, yet from the country being over-cleared and deprived of woods, and therewith deprived of moisture under their shade and covert, to form reser-

voirs for rivulets; and deprived too of the attraction to clouds and rain, which, in the tropical climates, are indispensable to fertility, and which the wooded hills of islands less cleared, constantly afford, and are in example of.

This remark applies to the Leeward Islands generally, with some exception for St. Christopher's, and applies especially to *Antigua*.

In *Antigua*, the drought for three years in four, stints, if not destroys, the sugar-cane; a fourth year of unusual rains produces a large and extraordinary crop. Mr. Bryan Edwards, in his History of the West Indies, states Antigua, in the years 1770, 1773, and 1778, to have exported no sugar whatever. This statement must certainly admit of qualification.

	Hogsh.
In 1779, Antigua exported sugar, - - - - - -	3382
1782, produced, - - - - - - - - - - -	16,200
1783, produced, - - - - - - - - - - - -	3900
1787, produced and exported - - - - - -	19,500
1792, four years' average, only - - - - - -	3900

I cannot estimate the average of sugar yearly produced by Antigua, at more than 9000 hogsheads of 13 cwt. at the King's beam, and this average, I have reason to think, is decreasing.

In brief, *St. Christopher's*, with its brimstone hill to attract

clouds, and its superior saccharine soil, may keep up, though not extend, its present average produce. But speaking of Barbadoes to windward, and the Leeward Islands generally, an increase of produce is not to be expected, but rather a diminution: the sugar market will not be over-stocked from that quarter. We come now to islands of a different description.

Grenada is a fertile island, well wooded in the interior and on the heights, well watered, and with promise of increased cultivation and produce. If this hitherto has not taken effect, it is to be attributed rather to political than to natural causes; and as these may not again so fatally operate, we may presume on a future increase of produce from Grenada. The expectation, however, leads not to any great extent, the island having been long and almost fully settled,—by the French to 1763, and from its surrender to Great Britain in that year, by an accession of British planters. Many families of the ancient French settlers are yet remaining on their properties in the island.

I recur in each case to the essential staple of sugar, as grounds of estimate.

Grenada produced in	1763, - - - -	11,000 *hogsh.*
	1776, - - - -	16,000
	1787, - - - -	13,500

The hurricane in 1780, the insurrection in 1795, and per-

haps other circumstances, have operated as an impediment to progressive cultivation and produce, which a view of this rich country seems to promise; but these, I doubt not, may be obviated, and Grenada export 20,000 hogsheads of sugar: it further, with its Grenadines, sends home 2,000,000 lbs. of cotton, besides coffee, &c.

Dominica, previous to its cession to the British Crown in 1763, was deemed a neutral island, but was, in fact, occupied and settled by many French intruders, and who, to the number of about 800, were permitted to remain, 343 Frenchmen then becoming lessees, and holding 10,541 acres of the British Crown. These lessees were generally engaged in coffee plantations, which, in 1787, returned 18,149 cwt. of coffee, and which have been since extended to the produce of 40,000 cwt. and may be further so in this great island to a considerable amount. The country is so rugged, and the soil generally (but with exceptions) so unfit or sugar, that although 94,346 acres were sold and apportioned, on Dominica coming under British Sovereignty, it has not, in thirty years, reached to the average produce of above 6000 hoghsheads of sugar yearly; nor, probably, will it do more; speculations in new sugar plantations being too expensive, for trial on soils comparatively poor and infructuous.

Trinidada is a vast, and in parts a rich country, which, if

fully settled, might produce a quantity of sugar equal to that of all the other Windward and Leeward Islands. Since coming under British Sovereignty, it has imported 4500 African slaves yearly, and already returns 12,000 hogsheads of sugar.

But if the trade for African slaves should in another year be prohibited, as the concurrent vote of the two Houses of Parliament, at the close of the last session, renders most probable, then, and in such case, the settlement of *Trinidad* will not only be checked in its progress, but its actual plantations must decline with the decrease of negro labourers: for, whatever may be the computation of births and of family increase in ancient and long settled colonies, the decrease of negroes in Trinidad, having no fresh supplies, is to be expected, and indeed morally certain, from the more than ordinary casualties and mortality in all newly-cleared countries of the West Indies, and from the disproportions of sex, and irregular and undomestic habits, of newly-imported Africans, precluding a natural recovery and supply of population.

St. Vincent's was only partially cultivated on a few leeward bays, by French intruders, previous to 1763, when it ceased to be a neutral island, and was annexed to the British Crown. The French settlers adverted to, in 1764, grew

Tobacco, - - - - - -	12,000 *andoulles.*
Cocoa, - - - - - - - -	7900 cwt.
Coffee, - - - - - - -	14,700 cwt.

On its cession to the British Crown, the windward moiety of the country of St. Vincent's was held by the black Charaibs, about 6000 people, of African origin and stock; and this portion of country was confirmed to them by solemn treaty in the year 1772.

The black Charaibs, savage, perfidious, attached to the French, and ever ready to attack the English, at different times ravaged their settlements; till finally, in 1797, it was found necessary, on their then subjugation, to expel them wholly from the island; and they were transported to Ruatan.

St. Vincent's, one of the most beautiful and fertile islands in the known world, has a soil suited to the producing sugar of the best quality, and with above twenty small rivers turning water-mills, is in every respect calculated for the manufacture.

Its produce was in 1800, 16,518 heavy hogsheads, and in 1801, 17,908 hogsheads of sugar. On the final settlement of the Charaib lands, I doubt not of the produce annually exceeding 25,000 hogsheads: and a further market to this excess will be required.

Tobago is, of all others, perhaps the island which admits of the most improvement. It is cultivable throughout, and is scarcely above a third cultivated. The soil is deep and rich, the hills covered with woods; and there is a river from the hills, running to the sea through every valley. Frequent capture in war,

and repeated cession to the French on peace, have been great impediments to the entire settlement of Tobago by British subjects. The fertility and advantages, from latitude and situation, belonging to this island, are so great, however, that Tobago must ere long be covered with plantations and people. Even in its present state of partial cultivation, it last year (1805) produced 15,327 hogsheads of sugar. I think Tobago, fully settled, may produce yearly 25,000 hogsheads of sugar, besides valuable returns of long-wool cotton, and of fustic and hard woods from its hills, &c. &c. The sugar market is then to expect a proportion of influx from Trinidad, from Tobago, from St. Vincent's, from Grenada, and above all, from Jamaica.

SECT. III.—VALUATION OF BRITISH PROPERTY VESTED IN THE BRITISH SUGAR COLONIES.

Report Privy Council, 1788.

Patented Estates, as taxed per Acre.		Negroes.	
Jamaica,	1,860,000	280,000	
Barbadoes,	106,470	60,000	
Antigua,	69,277	36,000	
St. Kitt's,	43,726	26,000	
Nevis,	30,000	8000	
Montserrat,	38,400	9500	
Virgin Isles,	25,000	9000	
Dominica,	100,000	22,083	
St. Vintent's,	25,000	15,000	
Grenada,	89,000	20,000	
Trinidad,	.....	19,709	Negroes each 50*l.*
Tobago,	28,000	14,883	
	2,414,873	560,375	28,018,750*l.*

In the preceding table, the value of negroes is taken at the lowest rate. The extent of patented land admits not of any accurate computation of medium value per acre. Much may be uncultivated, much scarcely cultivable. Besides which, islands and soils not only vary, as productive of the staple articles in quantity, but likewise in quality; inasmuch as 5 cwt. of sugar from St. Vincent's, is equal in value to 6 cwt. from Tobago.

Without, therefore, any attempt of new appraisement, I take the valuation, as estimated in the Report of the Privy Council, in 1788.

Value of 560,375 negroes, at 5*l.* each, -	£. 28,018,750
Value in lands, buildings, and stock, double that of negroes, - - - - - - - - -	56,037,500
Value in towns, stores, and shipping, - - -	2,500,000
	£. 86,556,000
Mr. Bryan Edwards, in 1792, valued the capital vested in Jamaica alone, at then	£. 39,000,000

Income gives other premises of valuation as follow:

On produce and net income of - - - - -	£. 6,944,142
At twelve years' purchase, - - - - - - - - -	12
	£. 83,332,970

The income on which this valuation is grounded, having from depreciation of produce been diminished, the estimate of capital may in this respect be too high; but having become yearly more uncertain, and the very property more precarious, from war and other circumstances, at this period peculiarly affecting the colonies, the number of years' purchase allowed in the official report further seems over-rated: in fact, many estates have been sold at ten, and even at eight years' purchase.

The speculative purchaser may then, for some very few years, receive twelve per cent.; but a season will shortly come of hurricane, insurrection, epidemic disease among his negroes, or ravage by war, and a single such probable contingency will at once and for ever reduce the computation of large interest for his purchase-money. The West India hereditary landholder who by himself, or family, has shared in the losses incident to the nature of his property in every course of years, does not (I will venture, on experience, to assert) receive four per cent. on the capital laid out in original settlement, adding sums of money since expended in occasionally restoring his estates.

The planters of Grenada and St. Vincent's have twice in sixteen years lost or paid a full third of the principal value of their estates;—first, in the year 1780, by purchasing a restoration of property from hurricane; and secondly, in 1795, from the ravages of insurrection by the Charaibs in St. Vincent's, and of rebellion by the negroes in Grenada.

CHAP. III.

General Produce and Export from the British Sugar Colonies.

THE bringing together and in one view, the whole export from the British islands in the West Indies, is a proper preface to the details of import to the mother-country, shewing the extent to which it enforces its system of colonial monopoly, and how far it relaxes, and especially in the article of rum. From the following tables, the further and important result of gradual and progressive cultivation and produce, and of coffee in particular, to an extraordinary amount, will suggest, in the growing value of the colonies, the good policy of a fostering care and liberal government by the mother-country. To the year 1805, a yearly export of about 6000 hogsheads of sugar was allowed direct from the islands to the United States of America. In the Intercourse Bill, passed this sessions of Parliament, sugar is expunged from the list of enumerated articles allowed to this trade. Great Britain may lose more in the event, by such over-cautious provision of law, than the value of duties on 6000 hogsheads of sugar.

Table of West India Exports: general and comparative of Four Staple Articles.

Return to House of Commons, 1806.

	Sugar. Hogshead 13 Cwt.			Average, 1805.			
	1789.	1799.	1805.	By Negroes.	Rum. P. 110 gal.	Cotton. Cwt.	Coffee. Cwt.
Jamaica, ...	75,000	94,500	126,000	260,000	62,000	35,002	189,161
Barbadoes,	9400	11,400	9000	62,500	6000	23,628	.....
Antigua, ...	12,500	8300	3200	36,000	2500	1533	.....
St. Kitt's, ..	11,000	9900	8000	26,000	6200	2965	.....
Nevis, ...	4000	3850	2400	9000	1000	251	.....
Montserrat,	3150	2595	2000	9000	800	1286	.....
Tortola, &c.	6100	3105	2500	8500	1200	1260	.....
Dominica, ..	5450	5200	4600	22,083	2000	9704	24,381
St.Vincent's,	6400	12,120	17,200	15,000	7000	11,724	784
Grenada, ..	15,000	12,000	14,000	21,000	6000	28,750	9654
Tobago, ...	5800	8800	15,327	14,883	9000	8000	.....
Trinidad, ..	.....	4500	12,000	19,709	7000	.....	.....
Total, ..	153,680	176,270	216,227	463,675	107,700	1,240,000	224,000

In 1805 the crops of the Leeward Islands were particularly low; but certain islands, in process of time, over-cleared, and deprived of woods, have therewith lost, in a great degree, their attraction of clouds and rain; and *moisture*, together with *heat*, being required to generate produce, these islands from year to year have become, and must become, less fertile and productive.

The wooded and rivered islands, on the other hand, greatly increase in produce; and of these the principal are, Jamaica, St. Vincent's, Tobago, and Grenada.

Antigua varies from 2500 hogsheads to 18,000 hogsheads.

St. Kitt's, - - 8000 - - - - - 17,000

Barbadoes, - - 6000 - - - - - 13,000

Whilst Grenada, St. Vincent's, and Tobago, vary only as from 12,000 hogsheads to 16,000 hogsheads average.

General Export and Disposal of the Four Staple Articles of Produce of the British Sugar Colonies.

From Return to Order of House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

I. SUGAR.

	To United States of America.	To British Colonies in America.	To Great Britain and Ireland.	Total Cwt.	Total Hogsheads, 13 Cwt.
	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.		
1773	49,088	2226	1,730,571	1,781,885	 140,754
1787	20,127	8320	1,926,791	1,955,238	 154,066
					Averages.
1793	9336	5106	2,115,308	2,129,750	} 2 years, 164,900
1794	37,606	4615	2,099,700	2,141,921	
1795	67,845	3320	1,672,774	1,743,939	} 3 years, 136,200
1796	100,033	7332	1,709,219	1,816,584	
1797	54,867	3893	1,577,921	1,636,681	
1798	47,172	4508	1,963,922	2,015,602	} 3 years, 181,000
1799	106,679	993	2,511,858	2,628,470	
1800	90,800	10,660	2,312,537	2,413,997	
1801	46,865	10,366	2,902,737	2,959,958	} 3 years, 238,700
1802	50,258	11,397	3,401,711	3,463,366	
1803	113,447	13,906	2,759,126	2,886,479	

The progressive increase of cultivation and produce of sugar, from 1773, for twenty years, is to be attributed to the further

settlement of the ceded islands, Grenada, St. Vincent's, and Dominica.

The falling off from 1795 to 1797, was the consequence of the ravage of St. Vincent's by the Charaibs, and Grenada by rebellion; those islands for three years returning no crop.

The progressive improvement and increase of crop, from 1798 to 1804, may be attributed in great part to the general adoption of the more productive Bourbon cane, and the incentive it held out to new plantations. But further, in 1802, Trinidada was added to the sugar colonies, returning 12,000 hogsheads of sugar.

Four Staple Articles of West India Produce.

Return to House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

II. RUM.

	To United States of America.	To British Colonies in America.	To Great Britain and Ireland.	Total Gallons.	Total Puncheons of 110 Gallons.	Proportion to Sugar Hogsheads.
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.			
1773	3,869,800	26,000	2,124,731	6,020,531	 54,700	140,754
1787	1,575,105	777,360	2,309,244	4,860,709	 44,300	154,066
					Averages.	
1793	536,353	613,898	3,756,800	4,907,051		
1794	2,265,177	525,720	2,806,623	5,597,520	2 years, 47,500	164,900
1795	2,106,883	204,965	1,861,886	4,173,734		
1796	3,267,280	307,124	1,993,350	5,567,754		
1797	2,197,450	486,706	1,595,008	4,279,164	3 years, 48,100	136,200
1798	1,972,985	384,953	3,866,138	6,224,076		
1799	3,201,209	664,258	2,404,982	6,270,449		
1800	2,761,384	186,449	3,283,392	6,231,225	3 years, 56,900	181,000
1801	3,638,021	569,691	3,940,859	8,148,571		
1802	3,925,595	584,673	4,166,113	8,677,381		
1803	4,198,154	792,474	3,790,868	8,781,496	3 years, 77,500	238,700

Adopting the general, though loose and uncertain estimate, of rum being made in quantity and proportion of one puncheon of rum to two hogsheads of sugar, a full third of rum remains to account for above the amount exported.

Rum is an article of home consumption in the islands, and for garrisons, shipping, and the inhabitants at large; and the export, by demand from America, or other quarters, falling off, the home consumption, from glut and cheapness of the article retained, will be greater among the negroes in the island: but in this view of the subject, a diminution of the export of rum is not only a detriment to the planter, by loss of money, but in corruption of his white servants and negro slaves. Further, the export, especially to America, is indispensable to the planter, rum being his medium of payment for the necessaries of American provisions and lumber: but of this further, in its place.

Export of Four Staple Articles of West India Produce.

Return to House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

III. COFFEE.

	To United States of America.	To British Colonies in America.	To Great Britain and Ireland.	Total Cwt.
	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	
1787*	3155	537	30,298	33,990
1793	866	603	90,547	92,016
1794	4586	80	136,341	141,007
1795	22,331	99	122,370	144,800
1796	21,828	514	71,744	94,086
1797	13,538	427	100,982	114,947
1798	19,421	802	144,852	165,075
1799	8093	1130	123,036	132,259
1800	7125	775	172,474	180,374
1801	12,596	935	185,828	199,359
1802	14,907	257	214,984	230,158
1803	19,916	1353	152,614	173,883
1804	No return.	No return.	232,809	.....
1805	Ditto.	Ditto.	245,439	.....

From the year 1795, the increased amount of coffee taken off by the United States of America, may, in part, have been for assortment of cargo, in their further trade with Europe.

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* In 1787, from Dominica, ... 18,990 cwt.
Grenada, ... 8812
Jamaica, ... 6395
All others, ... 634

To Great Britain, &c. .... 34,831 cwt.

Bryan Edwards's History of the West Indies, vol. i.

I am inclined, however, to consider the consumption of coffee in America to be great and increasing. To the Americans it is an article of breakfast and beverage, procured so near, and so readily and cheaply, that it must naturally have a preference in common use over teas from the East Indies.

Great Britain and Ireland together not yearly consuming more than 10,000 cwt. of coffee, the American, with other foreign markets, is accordingly to be encouraged.

Export of Four Staple Articles of West India Produce.

Return to House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

IV. COTTON.

	To United States of America.	To British Colonies in America.	To Great Britain and Ireland.	Total lbs.
	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	
1787	2250	500	9,427,765	9,430,515
1793	.....	8690	9,164,893	9,173,583
1794	74,369	6304	8,392,502	8,473,175
1795	49,282	1600	11,624,613	11,675,495
1796	47,400	1550	8,805,463	8,854,413
1797	86,817	12,850	6,818,486	6,918,153
1798	.....	18,250	7,891,582	7,909,832
1799	59,400	750	7,464,731	7,529,881
1800	31,800	4274	10,575,275	10,611,349
1801	12,350	500	11,248,164	11,261,014
1802	3000	14,950	8,781,941	8,799,891
1803	.....	3250	5,647,365	5,650,615
1804*	.....	.....	20,529,878	.....

* Return to House of Commons, March 8, 1805.

Observation on the variations of produce and export of cotton, will occur in the further details of this article in trade. The growth and produce of cotton do not appear to have increased in the last sixteen years.

The sugar colonies, besides the above four staple articles, produced and exported to Great Britain in 1804 (per Return to House of Commons, March 8, 1805),

	Ginger, - - - -	3377 cwt.
	Pimento, - -	2,240,606 lbs.
	Indigo, - - - -	54,397 lbs.
Woods:	Fustic, - - - -	3333 ton.
	Lignum vitæ, - - -	667 ton.
	Logwood, &c. - -	9358 ton.
	Mahogany, - - -	3545 ton.
	Nicoragua, - - - -	890 ton.

And melasses, cocoa, castor-oil, arrow-root, turmeric, &c. to no great amount or value, as will appear by further tables of detail.

CHAP. IV.

British Shipping employed in the West India Trade.

The Navigation acts, and particular restrictions on British ships navigated according to law, if freighted with colonial produce, will form several and distinct articles of consideration in the course of this compilation. The present short chapter will merely, from the arrangement of the official documents, shew the extent of British shipping employed in the West India trade; and its progressive increase not only in the number, but in the additional tonnage and dimension, of ships.

On this head, however, it may be proper to direct the reader's attention to the average size of the ships, and to the nature of their voyage, with a comparative view of other branches of British shipping and navigation.

The West India ships will appear to be of a size suited to the employment of seamen in the line of practice and knowledge of their business, which may best fit them for future service in ships of war; whilst yet the dimensions of the shipping are not such as to require the largest oak timber, and deprive the public dock-yards in any degree of that resource which, it is feared, is yearly diminishing, and more difficult to procure.

The navigation from five to eight weeks, or five months out and home, has the advantage over more distant voyages, by returning the crews at certain periods within the year, for national service, if eventually so required: at the same time carrying the seamen through various climates in so short a period, and in so frequent succession, enures their habits, and fits them to bear the fatigues of duty in every quarter of the globe.

Comparative Return for the Years 1787, *per Report to Privy Council,* 1788; *and for* 1804, *per Return to House of Commons, March* 8, 1805.

Shipping Inwards.	1787.			1804.	
	Ships.	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
For Great Britain, to London, ...	.....	252	70,418	326	104,312
Liverpool, ...	143	253	49,585	188	52,009
Bristol, ...	71				
Lancaster, ...	39				
Port Glasgow & Greenock,	.....	70	12,022	84	17,932
	.....	575	132,025	598	174,253
For Ireland, ... to Dublin, ...	.....	.....	.....	29	6526
Cork, ...	.....	.....	.....	18	2403
Belfast, ...	.....	.....	.....	5	752
From *British* West Indies,	.....	.....	.....	638	183,934

Comparative Tonnage, and Size of Ships, in the West India Trade, at different Periods.

	1787.			1804.			Results, 1804-5.		
	Ships.	Tons.	Medium Tons each.	Ships.	Tons.	Medium Tons each.	Increase No. of Ships.	Increase of Tonnage.	Increase of size of Ships in Tons.
London,	252	70,418	279	326	104,312	324	74	33,894	47
Out-ports,	253	49,585	197	188	52,009	277	D. 65	2424	80
Scotland,	70	12,022	170	84	17,932	242	14	5910	72
	575	132,025	.....	598	174,253	.....	23	42,228	.....

West India Shipping to Great Britain and Ireland, Inward, 1804.

Return to House of Commons, March 8, 1805.

Irish Trade with the West Indies.

	Inward.				Outward.	
	Ships.	Ships.	Tons.	Tons each.		Ships.
Dublin, ...	Irish, 12 British, 17	29	6526	224	Irish, 17 British, 10	27
Cork, ...	Irish, 10 British, 8	18	2403	134	Irish, 25 British, 95	120
Belfast, ...	Irish, ...	3	610	203	Irish, 5	6
Waterford, &c.	Irish, ...	2	142	71	British, 1	
		52	9781	.....	.....	153

The greater number of ships clearing outward from Ireland to the West Indies, is to be attributed to British ships *(viâ*

Cork especially) calling, on their passage to the sugar colonies, for their assortment of butter, salted beef, pork, &c.

Recapitulation of Shipping Inward in 1804, *from the Sugar Colonies.*

	Ships.	Tons.	Seamen.	Medium Tons each.
Great Britain, ...	598	174,253	13,256	288
Ireland, ...	52	9781	840	192
Total British West Indies, ...	650	184,034	14,096	
From conquered colonies, ...	82	13,746	1500	
General total, ...	732	197,780	15,596	.....

CHAP. V.

Imports of Colonial Produce to Great Britain and Ireland.

THE important considerations of relative produce and sale, with which I introduced a former chapter, will acquire force as we proceed in examining the details of import from the West Indies to Great Britain; and the yearly impoverished condition of those who furnish so large a contribution to the commerce, navigation, and revenue of the mother-country.

Private interest can alone support a public interest, in matters of trade. If the individuals engaged have a losing concern, the State will soon share in the loss, and finally be involved in the bankruptcy.

Let British statesmen attend to this sure and fatal result; and consider how far colonial produce may require relief from the too heavy imposts, which may discourage the consumption and sale in the home market, or in the alternative fall on the vender; and in either case, distressing the colonist must check his industry, and diminish the imports, on which so much of British wealth and power will be found to depend. These remarks apply more especially to the great staple article of sugar.

SECT. I.—IMPORTS OF SUGAR.

On this head, I shall have occasion to dwell at a length proportionate to its importance, and to the materials of proof which I have been enabled to collect and arrange, in clear direction to the inference, " of the charges on sugar being more and heavier than the article can altogether bear."

Should this continue to be the case, the cultivation must necessarily decline, or the commodity find its way in a direct course to other markets, where it is not surcharged with the like impositions, of whatever description. To this alternative the power of Great Britain will oppose the assertion of its colonial monopoly; but the power which cannot be resisted, may at times be evaded. It may be urged, that the contraband of so bulky an article as sugar is difficult; but then, under prevention of freely exporting their produce, the planters may transport themselves;—as some have already done, with their implements of husbandry and negroes, to Demerara and other provinces of South America.

Now these provinces, with all their settlements made by the means of British property, and by British planters, must again pass over to the dominion of a foreign power: on every principle of sound policy, Great Britain cannot, and should not, retain these countries on the return of peace. Great continental colonies are neither suited to the extent of British population, nor to the na-

ture of its power; which being of a naval description, can better command, or defend, islands and maritime posts; where inland regulation or force is little required. We can neither spare people for their cultivation, nor soldiers for their defence; nor can we well afford the charge and expence of either. The investment of capital yearly proceeding to, and locked up in, distant and extensive territories, would divert too much of our commercial resources from more active and useful circulation; and the scheme of power necessary for their good order and controul, would be corruptive of the habits of our people, and of the principles of our government. Having thus briefly intimated the decided opinion which I entertain on this important subject, I refrain from the further discussion.

Reverting to the imports of sugar, I must consider the decline as probable, from the immediate and progressive distress of the planter, continuing to work for returns inadequate to his labour, rather than from any general schemes of migration, or of other resource. He will struggle for a while to procure the means of subsistence, and of satisfaction to his creditors and consignees: he will be supported for a time by the latter, through liberality or from interest;—shooting forth another arrow, to follow and recover the arrow lost, till the quiver is exhausted, or the archer prudentially desists from further attempt.

From the following documents it will appear, that on the average of six years for each period, and for the like quantity of pro-

duce, the West Indian received in nett income, above 50 per cent. less to 1805, than he received to 1796; meanwhile the tax on his produce has been doubled, and the revenue to Great Britain accruing from its Colonies, hath proportionally increased.

The business cannot long continue on such terms of partnership between Government and any description of its subjects: the planter may for a time struggle to maintain his share, but must ultimately fail; and, losing its active partner, the State will have the dead and unprofitable stock on hand, of islands poorly cultivated, and of works and manufacture in decay. This is no extravagant speculation: let the reader examine the tables of produce, charges, and sale, contained in this chapter; observe the results, and compute the consequences!

Sugar Imported to Great Britain and Ireland.

Duties on Sugar, &c. per Cwt.							Drawbacks & Bounties on Export, per Cwt.			
Imposed.	Duties.		Price at Market.		Price of Duty paid.		Not exceeding Price Ex-duty.	Sugar, Muscavado.	Bounty on Lump.	Bounty on Refined.
	s.	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*s.*	*s.*	*s.*
1770	6	3	37	0	.....		35	22	25	40
1771	6	7	39	0	32	5	40	21	25	38
1781	11	8	62	6	50	10	45	20	25	36
1786	12	4	52	0	39	8	58	20	20	34
1794	15	0	77	0	62	0	60	18	18	31
1797	17	6	81	0	63	6	62	16	16	27
1798	19	4	86	0	65	8	64	14	14	24
1799	20	0	75	0	55	0	66	12	12	20
1803	24	0	67	0	40	0	68	10	10	17
1804	26	6	80	0	53	6	70	8	8	13
1805	27	0	76	0	53	0	.....	.....	.....	.....
1806*	30	0	72	0	45	0	70 & above.	.....	.....	.....

Vide Acts, 43 *Geo. III. cap.* 11, 45 *Geo. III. cap.* 93.

* The additional 3*s.* when it exceeds 50*s.* per cwt. ex-duty.

The duty laid, of 3*s.* in 1806, takes 50 per cwt. as a maximum. 51*s.* pays 1*s.*; 52*s.* pays 2*s.*; and 53*s.* pays 3*s.*;—so that the planter loses by fall of price, and does not gain by rise of price, at least to the amount of that 3*s.*

The bounties are computed on 112 lb. of raw sugar making 60 lb. of refined.

By chemical process and observation, 1 cwt. (of 112 lbs.) of raw sugar gives, boiled and manufactured, &c.

Refined lump, or loaves, - - - - - - - - -	56 lb.
Bastard, or ground, - - - - - - - - - - -	22
Melasses, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	29
Scum and loss, - - - - - - - - - - - - -	5
	112 lb.

At the same time that, from duties yearly imposed, the charge on sugar has become excessive on the planter and vender (for it will shortly appear that the consumer does not pay the duty, the price not advancing proportionally),—the freight, and other incidental charges, on sugar imported, have been increased within the last eight years to a degree which, operating with the duty, has diminished the income and fortune of every West India landholder, at least one-third.

Besides the duty on sugar of 27*s.* with loss per tare, and duty attaching on over-weight, 3*s.* on 12 lb. per hogshead deficient, or

3*d.* per hundred weight, making 27*s.* 3*d.* per hundred weight on sugars to 50*s.* price extra-duty; there is four and a half per cent. duty on produce, *ad valorem*, laid in Barbadoes, Antigua, and the Leeward Islands, equalling 1*s.* 4*d.* per hundred weight, and which duty was a composition to the King, in lieu of quit-rents, &c. on the dissolution of the proprietary governments in 1670.

Four and a Half per Cent. Duty.	Gross Revenue.	Charges on Collection.	Nett Revenue.
Three years' average, 1790, ..	£. 40,891	£. 16,480	£. 24,413
Three years' average, 1800, ..	71,500	19,960	51,540

The application of this revenue is to the payment of salaries to governors, &c. in the islands, 13,064*l.*; the rest in pensions from the Crown, &c.

	£.
To the Governor of Barbadoes, - - - - -	2000
To the Governor of Antigua, &c. - - - -	1200
To the Governors of the Windward Islands, each	1300
To the Governor of the Bahamas, - - - -	700
To the Governor of Bermuda, - - - - -	600
Chief Justices: Grenada, - - - - - - - -	600
Dominica, - - - - - - -	400

Mercantile Charges on Sugar Imported to Great Britain.

		In War.	In Peace.
		Medium Charge per Cwt.	Medium Charge per Cwt.
Freight, ...	.....	9*s.* 0*d.*	5*s.* 6*d.*
Insurance, ...	5 per cent. on 25*l.*	2 0	0 8
Dock dues, ...	.....	0 10	0 10
Brokerage, ...	.....	0 5	0 4
Commission, &c. &c.....	.....	2 5½	1 10
Loss by tare, ...	.....	0 3½	0 3
	.....	15*s.* 0*d.*	9*s.* 7*d.*
Charge on stores, 5*l.* per hogshead per cwt.	.....	8*s.* 0*d.*	7*s.* 0*d.*
		23*s.* 0*d.*	16*s.* 7*d.*

In the above table, the charges severally on *tare*, and for stores sent out, require explanation. The total war charges are:

Say on hundred weight, gross price, - - - - - 70*s.*

Duty, - - 27*s.*
Mercantile, 23 } - - - - - - - - - - 50

Nett to planters, - - - - - - - - - - - 20*s.*

On a hogshead of 13 cwt. 13*l.*

On weighing an hogshead of sugar, tare is allowed, as per following table: on *sale*, the allowance of weight for cask, &c. is not sufficient, the actual *sugar*, on average, being 10lb. less

weight in each hogshead; and on these 10lb. deficient, the planter has paid duty, 3*d.* per lb. and freight 1*d.*; being 3*s.* 8*d.* the hogshead, and for 13 cwt. 3½ the cwt.

Tare, from actual Weights, &c.

	Weights.			Tare allowed.			Tare deficient.	Gross Weights.		
	Cwt.	qr.	lb.	Cwt.	qr.	lb.	lb.	Cwt.	qr.	lb.
Antigua sugar, ...	13	2	0	1	0	20	9	14	3	1
St. Vincent's ditto,	14	1	0	1	1	20	10	15	3	2
Tobago ditto, ...	13	0	12	1	1	18	12	14	2	24

STORES.

It is generally computed, that the annual export from Europe of negro clothing and provisions, coppers and hardware, for use of estate, &c. &c. will cost, with freight, 1000*l.* for an estate of 200 negroes, and returning produce 200 hogsheads of sugar, or other produce of like amount and value: this being 5*l.* per hogshead, is charged 8*s.* per cwt.; and on recurring to actual account of stores for three estates, returning an hogshead per negro, the estimate is just.

But it is obvious, that when 200 negroes return but 150 hogsheads, the charge per hogshead must be greater; and, in truth, the planters of Jamaica estimate the charge for that island at (to account for stores from Europe) 12*s.* per cwt. making the total charge per cwt. 54*s.*

Besides stores sent out, even from the most economical and well regulated plantation in the West Indies, some bills will, and must be occasionally drawn, for taxes, or for the purchase of a few negroes, to keep up the stock, or on other contingent accounts; and these taken in the estimate, 12*s.* per hundred weight is by no means an overcharge.

Distribution of Proceeds from a Hogshead of Sugar of 13 *Cwt. sold, at gross Price per Cwt.* 77*s. which, in* 1805, *is at the Maximum of* 50*s. Ex-Duty,* 27*s. per Gazette Price; a further Duty attaching, if Sugar exceeds* 50*s. per Cwt.*

	1805. 77*s.* per Cwt.						1795. 77*s.* per Cwt.					
	Per Cwt.			Per Hogsh. 13 Cwt.			Per Cwt.			Per Hogsh. 13 Cwt.		
	s.	*d.*		*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*		*£.*	*s.*	*d.*
Duty, and on tare,	27	3		17	14	3	15	0		9	15	0
Freight, and on ditto,	9	1		5	18	1	7	6		4	17	6
Insurance on 25*l.*	2	0		1	6	0	2	0		1	6	0
Port charges,	0	10		0	10	10	1	2		0	15	2
Merchant's Commission, &c. &c. 3 per cent.	2	10		1	16	10	2	4		1	10	4
Total,	42	0		27	6	0	29	0		18	4	0
Stores per contra,	12	0		7	15	0	10	0		6	10	0
Planter's income nett,	23	0		*13	9	0	38	0		*25	7	0
Total,	77	0		50	1	0	77	0		50	1	0

In this table sugar is taken at the maximum of 50*s.* per cwt. from which, under the new duty imposed in May 1806, no excess of price, as far as 3*s.* per cwt. goes to the planter; the excess, from 50*s.* to 53*s.* being taken in revenue by Government.

But in fact, the Gazette price of sugar for July 1806, is, extra duty 41*s.* per cwt.; and without bringing plantation stores per contra, the account of depreciation, and loss of planters' income, will appear from the result of the following table; on which some further observations will occur on the heads of different mercantile and other charges, on the cwt. of sugar.

Prices, Charges, and Proceeds, of a Hundred Weight of Sugar, at different Periods.

	Ex-Duty.		Included Duty.		Charges.						Nett Proceeds.					Actual Sales per Hogshead, nett.					
	Gazett. Price per Cwt.		Sale Price.		Duty.		Mercantile.		Total.		Per Cwt.		Per Hogsh. of 13 Cwt.			Sugars, Tobago.			Sugars, St. Vincent's.		
	s.	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*
179..	55	0	67	4	12	4	8	6	20	10	46	6	30	4	6	0	0	0	31	8	0
1792*	57	0	69	4	12	4	8	6	20	10	48	6	31	10	6	0	0	0	32	6	0
War.																					
1793	58	0	70	4	12	4	12	0	24	4	46	0	29	18	0	21	15	0	27	16	0
1794	39	0	54	0	15	0	12	0	27	0	27	0	17	11	0	16	6	0	20	16	0
1795	62	5	77	5	15	0	12	6	27	6	49	11	32	4	7	30	0	0	35	15	0
1796	62	0	77	0	15	0	12	6	27	6	44	6	32	3	6	28	5	0	34	0	0
1797	64	0	81	6	17	6	13	0	30	6	51	0	33	3	0	30	18	0	37	0	0
1798	66	8	86	0	19	4	13	0	32	4	53	8	34	17	8	34	8	0	37	18	0
1799	55	0	75	0	20	0	13	6	33	6	41	6	26	19	6	15	0	0	23	18	0
1800	54	0	74	0	20	0	13	6	33	6	40	6	26	6	6	21	10	0	23	16	0
1801	44	0	64	0	20	0	14	0	34	0	30	0	19	10	0	19	2	0	21	4	0
1802	34	0	54	5	20	0	14	0	34	0	20	5	13	5	5	14	18	0	18	14	0
1803*	43	0	67	0	24	0	10	0	34	0	33	0	21	9	0	18	10	0	28	0	0
1804	53	6	80	0	26	6	14	0	40	6	39	6	25	15	6	22	0	0	27	10	0
1805	49	0	76	0	27	0	14	6	41	6	34	6	22	8	6	16	0	0	22	17	0
1806	41	0	68	0	27	0	15	0	42	0	26	0	16	18	0	.....			.....		

The stores sent out to the plantations, not being brought to account in sugar sales, but in yearly account current with the planter, are not inserted in the preceding table.

Other articles of mercantile charge, freight, &c. have risen progressively, as in ordinary course during war, and from enhancement of seamen's wages, and of every necessary of outfit and conveyance.

But besides the gradual rise incident to trade generally, the charges on import of sugar are subject to occasional and great advances—in freight from dearth of shipping; in insurance from dangers of navigation; in taxes imposed yearly, as a matter of course; and from a surcharge of mercantile commission on all these.

Freight—From the Leeward Islands, has risen during the war, 2*s.* the cwt. of sugar; and 1*s.* surcharge further is in view, or 10*s.* per cwt. this season of 1806; and for this, the ship-owners have in plea, the extraordinary demurrage in awaiting convoys, and the increased expence of seamen's wages and of provisioning, in addition to wear and tear of ships, and loss of time from occasional embargoes, whether in the West Indies or at Portsmouth.

Insurance.—The ordinary premium of 10*l.* per 100*l.* to return 5*l.* or 5 per cent. has occasionally risen to 20 per cent. as in May 1805, under the apprehension of a naval superiority of the enemy in the West India seas; and the frequent fluctuation of price is ever to disadvantage of the commodity insured.

Duties, from 1802, have been yearly imposed, to the preju-

dice of the just profits, or chance of profits, by the sugar planters; and latterly, in the teeth of every principle of equity respecting trade, and its losses and gain. By the duty imposed, May 1806, it is expressly said to the planter—"When your sugar is at the merely saving and moderate price of 50*s.* per cwt. if it falls 3*s.* you shall stand the *loss;* if it rises 3*s.* Government will take the *gain!*"

Commission and *brokerage*, as mercantile charges, are together 3 per cent.; but being charged on the gross sales, and the planter paying commission on all the aggravations of tax, freight, &c. to the amount of 42*s.* per cwt. he pays, in fact, 6 per cent. on his moiety of nett proceeds, when sugar is at 84*s.* gross sales; and as sugars fall to 72*s.* and lower, pays for his share and income, 8, 10, and even 12 per cent. commission, &c.

Results—

For six years, ending 1799, the medium nett value of the hogshead of sugar was - - - - -	£. 32	0	0
For six years, ending 1806, the medium nett value was - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	20	7	2
Depreciation, and loss to the planter,	£. 11	12	10
And this, on a moderate estate of 150 hogsheads, is, per annum, a loss of - - - - - -	£. 1746	5	0

Adverting to the fact of this depreciation, constant and progressive as it has been, it is adding insult to exaction, to tell the

West India planter that he does not pay the surcharges; or, in direct words, that he does not pay the whole of the seven shillings tax per hundred weight laid on sugar since January 1803.

And this 7*s.* per cwt. is, per hogshead,	£. 4	11	0
And on 150 hogsheads, is, per ann. a deduction of income, - - - - -	682	10	0

Besides this direct loss of income, at least 38 per cent., it cannot escape notice in the estimate, that *as every other* British subject, so the West Indian, yearly pays dearer for every article of subsistence: but further, he pays dearer "for his coppers, stills, nails, tools, clothing, and provisions, all purchased in Great Britain, of British produce and manufacture, for stores and supplies to his plantations in the West Indies; an export (as will be hereafter shewn) to the amount of above five millions value sterling of British produce and manufacture."

Thus have the landed West Indian's property and income fallen off, during a period in which the British landholder has, at a medium, raised his rents 10 per cent. and during which every trader has made a surcharge and profit answerable to his increased expenditure.

The facts above stated, rest on documents not to be controverted; yet say the British public, "sugar is dear, and the consumer *pays*." This to a degree is true; and the question then is, "who receives?" On inference from the following table, I leave that question between the factor, sugar-baker, and grocer.

It is premised that, on accurate experiment,

An hundred weight of sugar gives, manufactured, say at 80*s.* cwt. Refined lump, 56lb. at 1*s.* - 56*s.* 0*d.*

Bastards, -	22	8*d.* -	14 6
Melasses, -	29	4*d.* -	9 6
Dregg, - -	5		
	112lb.		80*s.* 0*d.*
15 per cent. trade, - - - - - - -			10 0
Estimate of due price, - - - - -			90*s.* 0*d.*

Now, referring to the above computation, the actual sworn prices at Grocers'-hall, in 1805-6, were as follows; and in result, the 56lb. refined pays the whole, and the melasses and bastards appear clear profit.

Prices per Grocers' Table.

	Refined Loaf per lb.		Medium per lb.	Value of 56 lb.		Paid per Cwt. for Raw Sugar.	Med. Value of Bast. & Melas. per Cwt.	Profit per Cwt.	
	d.	*d.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*s.*	*s.*	*d.*
1796	16 to	19	17½	81	4	77	24	28	4
1797	16	19	17½	81	4	76	24	29	4
1798	17	20	18¼	86	4	89	24	21	4
1799	18	22	20	93	4	91	24	26	4
1800	15	18	16½	77	0	65	24	32	0
1801	16	19	17½	81	4	79	24	27	4
1802	15	18	16½	77	0	62	24	39	0
1803	15	18	16½	77	0	62	24	39	0
1804	16	19	17½	81	4	72	24	33	4
1805	17	20	18½	86	4	80	24	30	4
1806	16	19	17	79	4	75	24	28	4

The trader's profit is in ratio with the planter's loss!

On the Subjects of Duty on Sugar, as relative to the Price of Sugar.

The observation occurs and is obvious, that the duty bears unequally ; and that under the Gazette medium valuation of the hundred weight of sugar of 50*s.* one quality of sugars selling at 60*s.* whilst another sells so low as 40*s.* the duty of 27*s.* subtracted from the sale price of 87*s.* is proportionally a less deduction than 27*s.* taken from 67*s.*

For relief, in this respect, let the planter attend to the ameliorating the process in his boiling and curing house, and attempt the bringing his sugar to a better quality, and nearer to one standard: but let him not seek a relief, most prejudicial to him in the consequences, by calling for a duty *ad valorem*. It might truly be urged, that a system of low duties, in proportion to the inferiority and badness of the article, is a premium on bad and negligent manufacture.

But to the planter I earnestly state, that the very inequality of the present duties, in their application, is his best and only security against excessive new imposition.

If the duties were to be regulated *ad valorem*, I have no doubt that, in a few years, the worst class of sugars would pay the same rate of duty which they do at present, whilst an excuse would be furnished to Government in its necessities, of gradually loading sugars of better quality to double the present amount of

tax. The late duty of 3*s.* imposed on sugars, when at the Gazette price above 50*s.* is an experiment of duty *ad valorem*, which should make the planter aware of the policy in finance, which his representations on this head may suggest; and that any equalization of duties, in reference to value, will rather be carried into effect by a proportional addition of tax on the commodity of higher price, than from any abatement on that which is of lower value.

Table of Entry of the Gazette Prices of Sugar, per Hundred Weight.

Medium of Months.	1804.		1805.		1806.		1807.		1808.		1809.		1810.	
	s.	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*
January, ...	52	0	58	3	48	6								
February, ...	52	0	56	3	47	0								
March, ...	51	0	53	0	46	9								
April, ...	52	0	51	1	47	9								
May, ...	54	0	51	2	45	8								
June, ...	57	0	50	9	44	1								
July, ...	56	0	51	0	42	11								
August, ...	58	0	52	10										
September, ...	52	0	53	3										
October, ...	53	0	50	5										
November, ...	56	0	47	3										
December, ...	57	0	49	1										

Value of an Hogshead of Sugar nett 13 *Cwt.*

[When at Gazette Prices, deduct Mercantile Charges, 15*s.* per Cwt.]

Gazette.	Gross Sale.	Nett Price per Hogsh.
s.	*s.*	£. *s.*
32	59	11 1
34	61	12 7
36	63	13 13
38	65	14 19
40	67	16 5
42	69	17 11
44	71	18 17
46	73	20 3
48	75	21 9
50*	77	22 15
53(30*s.*)*	80	22 15
55	82	24 1
57	84	25 7
58	85	26 0
60	87	27 6
62	89	28 12
64	91	30 0

Imports of Sugar to Great Britain, from Custom-House Returns made to the House of Commons, at the three Periods of 1774, 1788, *and March* 31, 1806.

First Period, Three Years, ending January, 1774.

	Duty.	Import.	Export.	Consumed.	Duty.	Drawback.	Revenue.
		Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	£.	£.	£.
1771	.....	1,425,874	179,404	1,246,470	477,000	50,999	416,111
1772	.....	1,760,345	186,356	1,553,989	562,000	48,564	513,486
1773	6*s.* 7*d.*	1,730,571	145,486	1,585,085	542,017	41,495	500,522
Avr. cwt.	.....	1,638,930	177,083	1,461,847	516,006	47,019	468,987
Avr. hogs.	.....	126,077	13,622	112,455	.....	.....	.....

* The excess of 3*s.* per cwt. is taken in duty when above 50*s.* to 53*s.*

Second Period, ending January, 1788.

	Duty.	Import.	Export.	Consumed.	Duty.	Drawback.	Revenue.
		Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	£.	£.	£.
1785	.....	1,782,431	111,308	1,671,123	1,095,529	111,308	984,221
1786	.....	1,613,956	102,033	1,511,923	992,301	102,033	802,268
1787	12*s.* 4*d.*	1,926,791	199,298	1,727,493	1,187,811	199,298	988,513
Avr. cwt.	.....	1,774,400	137,810	1,636,590	1,091,910	137,546	954,364
Avr. hogs.	.....	136,500	10,600	125,900	.....	.....	.....

Third Period, ending January, 1805; including Conquered Colonies.

	Duty.	Import.	Export.	Consumed.	Duty.	Drawback.	Revenue.
		Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	£.	£.	£.
1782	20*s.*	4,296,778	2,042,894	2,254,888			
1783	24*s.*	3,164,230	1,680,268	1,483,962	*	*	*
1784	27*s.*	3,248,726	1,090,090	2,158,636	3,515,806	1,093,137	2,422,669
Average 3 years,	.....	3,569,908	1,604,413	1,965,395	3,515,806	1,093,137	2,422,669
		274,580	124,150	150,430	.....	.....	.....

On sugar re-shipped to foreign Europe, and the export trade in the two first periods, ending 1774 and 1788, it is to be observed, that for fourteen years, to 1787, and indeed for twenty years, to 1793, the sugars exported did not yearly exceed the average of 12,000 hogsheads; and this export was not of an extent, if stopt at any time, and thrown back on the home market, to affect the sale and price of sugars much, which kept to a steady and regular value, progressive with the advancement in price of other articles of subsistence and use.

* Duties varying, admit not of an average; and in the Returns to the House of Commons, the war duties are in part omitted. They will be supplied in the general estimate, at the close of this chapter.

In 1773, the hogshead of sugar produced nett £. 17 10 0
1787, the hogshead produced - - - - 21 0 0
1791-2, the hogshead produced - - - - 30 0 0

Respecting the export trade in the third period, ending 1805, it is to be observed, that from the year 1792, the French Revolution operating to the ruin of St. Domingo, which great island heretofore supplied France and Europe with 1,490,000 cwt. of sugar yearly; the failure of that sugar colony excited the industry and speculations of the British planters, especially in Jamaica; and they extended their settlements, with the aid too of the more productive Bourbon cane, so as, in 1801, to send to Europe one-third more sugar, or nearly one million cwt. above the returns of the same article in 1787.

The home consumption, within the same period, having but little increased, an enlarged export trade was required, even for the produce of the ancient British islands, to the amount of 90,000 hogsheads of sugar, not to glut the home market, and depreciate its sale and value to the planter; and an export to this amount will henceforward be requisite.

But further, in the course of the war with France and Holland, from 1794 to 1806, some French islands, and particularly the Dutch continental sugar colonies of Demerara and Surinam, coming by conquest under the British government, sent in course their produce to the British market, which required an increased export of 30,000, in total 120,000 hogsheads. On the

eventual failure of the foreign market, and of export, in whatever proportion, to this amount, and which amount has been increasing upon us, from the (fatally for our ancient colonies) encouraging speculations of further settlements and plantations in Demerara, the home market is then glutted, and the article of sugar depreciated: of late years, and more particularly at present (1805-6), from the failure of, or embargo on, the foreign market, devised and enforced by the enemy, in respect generally to British export trade, the depreciation of sugar is such, that the hogshead of sugar, which, from 1792 to 1799, produced an income to the grower of above 30*l.* now produces (1806), on a medium price, under 16*l.* per hogshead.

A clamour has been raised against the import of sugar from the British East Indies; but has been raised probably by those speculators, who, glutting the markets from Demerara and Surinam, seek to divert the British colonist's attention from the real causes of the depreciation of his property and income.

The East India import of sugar is but little in the scale

The East Indies exported sugar to Great Britain as follows:

	Cwt.	*Hogsh. of* 13 *Cwt.*
In 1801,	61,214	4700
1802,	57,414	4200
1803,	68,296	5300
1804,	104,067	8000
1805,	53,010	4100

East India sugar included, it will appear from the following tables, that the average of sugar retained for home consumption, is for Great Britain 134,000 hogsheads, and for Ireland 10,000 hogsheads; say home consumption, 150,000 hogsheads.

The British West Indies, exclusive of conquered colonies, may be henceforward considered as producing 250,000 hogsheads of sugar yearly; and on return of peace, and cession of the conquered colonies, and at all times, the export required will be 100,000 hogsheads. At present the full export required is 140,000 hogsheads.

It should be stated, that the total of sugars, the produce of the British colonies, is shipped direct for Great Britain or Ireland, with the exception of the average of three years, ending 1805.

	Cwt.		*Hogsh.*
To the United States of America,	70,000	-	5100
To the British American colonies,	13,000	-	1000

On failure of the required export, a disadvantage belongs to the article of sugar which attaches not to any other; inasmuch as no other article is so disproportionally, and therefore heavily taxed.

In a general commercial view, a greater quantity of any article on sale than there is a demand for, will cause depreciation, and plenty produce cheapness; but that plenty (that is, the greater quantity produced) will in a certain degree indemnify the

proprietor and seller. 150 quarters of wheat at 40*s.* will return the same value as 100 quarters at 60*s.*: but for sugar, the heavy duty operates in preclusion of this resource. Supposing at a period of peace, all sugars to be from British colonies exclusively, and the over quantity to be merely an excess of occasional fertility and produce from the same British plantations:

An hundred weight of sugar, at 75*s.* deducting 27*s.* duty, leaves 48*s.* And an hundred weight at 48*s.* will be value to the owner 240*l.*

An hundred weight of sugar at 50*s.* one-third depreciation, as above, leaves 23*s.* And 150 cwt. at 23*s.* sale, leaves only a value of 147*l.* 10*s.*

Imports of Sugar to Great Britain.

Recapitulation of Averages, per Cwt. in 1773, 1787, and 1804.

	Duty.		Import.	Export.	Consumed.	Nett Revenue.
	s.	*d.*	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	£.
1773	6	7	1,638,930	177,083	1,461,847	468,987
1787	12	4	1,774,400	137,810	1,636,590	954,364
1804	27	0	3,569,908	1,604,413	1,965,395	2,422,669

Averages in 1773, 1787, and 1804, carried to Hogsheads of 13 Cwt. each.

	Import.	Export.	Consumed.
	Hogsh.	Hogsh.	Hogsh.
1773	126,000	13,600	112,400
1787	136,600	10,600	126,000
1804	274,580	124,150	150,430

The year of peace, 1802, having pressed into the British market an extraordinary influx of sugars, from the clearing all residue of produce on hand in the conquered colonies (then returning to France and Holland), for estimate of home consumption, &c. I finally take the average on the years 1803-4.

Great Britain.

	Import.	Export.	Consumed.	Nett Revenue.
	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	
1803	3,164,230	1,680,268	1,483,962	
1804	3,248,726	1,090,090	2,158,636	
Avr. cwt.	3,206,478	1,385,179	1,821,239	2,422,669*l.*
Avr. hogs.	246,650	106,550	140,100	

Ireland.

	Import.	Export.	Consumed.	Nett Revenue.
	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	
1802	160,916	1886	159,030	
1803	139,667	1444	138,324	
1804	137,776	.....	137,726	
Avr. cwt.	146,017	1110	144,907	182,526*l.*
Avr. hogs.	11,232	92	11,140	

Average of Hogsheads to Great Britain and Ireland.

	Import.	Export.	Consumed.	Nett Revenue.
	Hogsh.	Hogsh.	Hogsh.	£.
Great Britain,	246,650	106,550	140,100	2,422,669
Ireland, ...	11,232	92	11,140	182,526
	257,882	106,642	151,240	2,605,195

Average quantity imported, 257,882 hogsheads, containing 3,352,495 cwt.

Average quantity consumed, 151,240 hogsheads, containing 1,966,146 cwt.

	£.
Exclusive of, and previous to, any income to the proprietor, the quantity consumed pays to the British revenue, - - - - - - -	2,605,195
Gross import pays to insurer, at 2*s.* per cwt. -	335,250
To ship-owner, freight, at 9*s.* per cwt. -	1,508,622
To merchant-factor, at 2*s.* 10*d.* per cwt. -	476,000
To dock and port-charges, at 10*d.* per cwt.	138,750
British produce and manufacture, for return of plantation stores, at 12*s.* per cwt.	1,999,448
Value of sugar imported to British Government and trade, - - - - - - - - - - -	£. 7,063,265

SECT. II.—RUM. TRADE IN DETAIL.

The quantity of *rum* manufactured on the West India plantations in proportion to sugar, varies in different situations from different soils, and in different islands. The soil the most saccharine, and suited to give richness and consistency to the pith of the sugar-cane, renders it, from boiling, less liable to fæces; that is, to throw off less scum from the copper, and drip less melasses in the curing-house. The more saccharine and suitable to sugar the soil and temperature of the island, the less then comparatively are the materials on which to draw the distillery of rum.

Mr. Bryan Edwards, in his History, states the rum made in Jamaica to be nearly 130 puncheons, of 110 gallons Jamaica proof, to 200 hogsheads of sugar; that is, rum in proportion as 13 to 20. In the saccharine islands of St. Vincent's and St. Kitt's the rum may be estimated as only 8 to 20, and the other Leeward and Windward Islands as under 10 to 20, with the exception of Tobago, which returns in proportion as Jamaica. On the whole, I should compute the puncheons of rum at nearly half of the hogsheads of sugar; that is, for the British West Indies at 120,000 puncheons—distributed in export, or island consumption, as follows:

Average in 1802 and 1803:

	Puncheons.
To the United States of America, - -	37,000
To the British American colonies, - -	6250
To the shipping in the West India seas and fisheries, - - - - - - - - -	10,000
To garrison and island consumption, -	30,750
To Great Britain and Ireland, - - -	36,000
	120,000

The export of rum to America will be duly brought to account, with its returns of provisions and lumber for island use, under a distinct head, of American Trade and Intercourse, in this compilation.

The American market for rum is indispensable to the West India planter, under the comparative distaste and discourage-ragement of rum as an article of British consumption. The distaste of the mass of the English people comes from disuse; and disuse principally from the preference hitherto given to foreign brandies for the supply of the Army and Navy. In 1805 the British Admiralty, by contract, purchased 625,100 gallons of brandy, and only 250,000 gallons of rum.

If, in national policy, as well as in justice to its colonial and mercantile interests, the British Government would exclusively purchase rum for the supply of the soldiers and sailors, then, with

the habits and growing taste of so numerous a class, the liking and use would spread to every village and house; the import of rum to Great Britain would proportionally and yearly increase; the return per export of British produce and manufactures to the West Indies, would in a great measure supersede the necessities of intercourse and trade between America and the islands; and also put a stop to the national disputes arising in consequence; and in every view of national interest, the mother-country would be amply repaid for the protection and preference given in the sale of this article of colonial commerce.

The preference given to foreign brandies in the contracts for the British Navy, has arisen from the comparative cheapness: but what *appears* gained in this respect, is at the expence of the British ship-owner, merchant, and planter.

The cheapness of brandies, as arising from under-freight, &c. will appear from the following estimates.

Comparative Charges on Brandy and Rum.

BRANDY.

	£.		
Freight from Charente on a puncheon of 120 gallons,	2	11	0
Insurance, at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on 21*l.* per puncheon,	0	14	11
Loss per guage, two gallons leakage,	0	7	0
Charges at the London Docks,	0	1	10
	£. 3	14	9
Per gallon,	£. 0	0	$7\frac{1}{2}$

RUM.

	£.		
Freight 10*d.* per gallon, on 108 residue of 120 gallons,	4	10	0
Primage, pier-rage, and trade,	0	1	4
Insurance, at seven guineas per cent. on 18*l.*	1	6	6
Loss per guage on 12 gallons leakage, at 3*s.* 6*d.*	2	2	0
	7	19	10
Per gallon*,	0	1	6

The duties, 13*s.* 6*d.* on brandies, and 11*s.* $2\frac{1}{2}$*d.* on rum, per gallon, are not brought to account in sale to Government, being returned, or not paid.

Sales of Rum.

In 1794,	a puncheon netted	£. 9	10	0
1796,	—	17	5	0
1797,	—	21	5	0
1798,	—	14	18	0
1799,	—	10	15	0
1803,	—	20	1	0

The Jamaica superior proof, as 110 to 82, or 11 to 8, sells proportionally dearer, and saves so much on *freight*, though not on duties; being guaged in strength of spirit, Jamaica at 4*s.* 6*d.* Leeward Islands at 3*s.* 9*d.*

* In this estimate, the charge of mercantile commission, &c. is not included.

Rum is sold ordinarily before the mast, and ex-duties:

	Charge.	Per Gallon.	Per Puncheon.
	s.	*s.* *d.*	£. *s.*
At 3*s.* 6*d.* netts	2	1 6	8 5
4 0 —	2	2 0	11 0
4 6 —	2	2 6	13 15
5 0 —	2	3 0	16 10
5 6 —	2	3 6	19 5
6 0 —	2	4 0	22 0

Charges, ex-duty, 11*s.* 2½*d.*

Freight, - - - - - - - - - - - -	0*s.*	10*d.*
Insurance, - - - - - - - - - - -	0	3
Commission, &c. &c. - - - - - -	0	9
Docks, &c. - - - - - - - - - - -	0	2
	2*s.*	0*d.*

Of the rum imported to Great Britain, much the greater proportion comes from Jamaica; nearly as three-fourths, or three from Jamaica to one from all the other islands. This proportion will appear from the following table of rum imported to London in 1799.

The excess of Jamaica import to Great Britain, may in part accrue from Jamaica raising provisions, &c. and not so necessarily dealing with America; and from its laying further to the eastward, and not so advantageously dealing with the northern fisheries, and provinces to the west, which consume the greater proportion of rum.

But the preference given to the Jamaica rum in England, is chiefly to be attributed "to its higher distillery and spirit."—Query. Why do not other islands follow this example of distillery?

Imports in 1799.

	Punch. Rum.	Total Punch.
Jamaica,	17,279	17,279
Barbadoes,	65	
Antigua, and Leeward Islands,	2537	
Dominica, & Windward Islands,	1741	6609
Tobago,	1695	
Trinidad,	576	
To London,		23,886

Of rum exported from the West Indies, Jamaica supplies, for the British market, three fourths; for America, only one-fifth.

At different periods rum has been imported to Great Britain as follows;—observing, however, that in the two first periods, and before the Smuggling Acts, in 1786 and 1788, contraband was so prevalent, that the import was probably a third more than brought to account.

First Period, ending 1773.

	Import.	Export.	Home Consumption.	Duties on Home Consumption, 7*s.*
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.	
1771	2,611,469	1,311,130	1,300,339	
1772	2,086,725	543,076	1,543,739	
1773	2,124,731	828,358	1,293,373	
Average of 3 years,	2,275,308	894,188	1,379,150	482,002*l.*
Do. puncheons, of 110 gallons,	20,650	8100	12,450	

Second Period, ending 1787.

	Import.	Export.	Home Consumption.	Duties on Home Consumption, 4s 1d.
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.	
1785	1,587,981	392,145	1,195,886	
1786	1,751,093	399,334	1,351,759	
1787	2,309,244	1,467,990	841,254	
Average of 3 years,	1,882,440	753,158	1,129,282	230,281*l.*
Do. puncheons, of 110 gallons,	17,040	6800	10,240	

Third Period, ending 1804.

	Import.	Export.	Home Consumption.	Duties on Home Consumption, 11s. 2½d.
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.	
1802	4,765,273	1,336,179	3,429,094	
1803	4,049,276	680,213	3,369,063	
1804*	2,785,316	1,160,846	1,644,470	
Average of 3 years,	3,846,523	1,059,269	2,807,243	1,543,993*l.*
Do. puncheons, of 110 gallons,	35,000	9700	25,300	

Average of Three Periods of Import, from Returns to House of Commons.

		Import.	Export.	Home Consumption.	Duties on Home Consumption.
1773	gallons	2,273,808	894,088	1,379,150	482,002*l.*
	puncheons	20,650	8100	12,450	
1787	gallons	1,882,440	753,158	1,129,282	230,381*l.*
	puncheons	17,040	6800	10,240	
1804	gallons	3,886,522	1,059,269	2,807,243	1,543,993*l.*
	puncheons	35,000	9700	25,300	

* The home consumption of rum decreasing.

Imports of Rum to Ireland.

	Import.	Export.	Home Consumption.	Duties on Home Consumption.
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.	
1802	374,139	118,597	255,542	
1803	296,996	72,982	224,014	
1804	163,466	96,866	66,600	
Average gallons,	244,800	96,158	148,642	81,765*l.*
Do. puncheons, of 110 galls.	2200	900	1300	

Average of Three Years to Great Britain and Ireland, ending 1804.

	Import.	Export.	Home Consumption.	Duties on Home Consumption.	Value Ex-Duty, 4*s.*	Total Value, 15*s.* 2½*d.*
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.	£.	£.	£.
Great Britain, ...	3,866,523	1,059,269	2,807,243	1,543,993	773,309	2,317,302
Ireland, ...	244,800	96,158	148,642	81,765	48,860	130,625
Total gallons, ...	4,111,323	1,155,449	2,955,885	1,625,758	828,169	2,447,927
Ditto puncheons,	37,000	10,420	26,780			

Value of gross import, - - - - - - £. 828,169
Customs and Excise on home consumption, 1,625,758

Total value, - - - - £. 2,447,927

It appears from every official document and returns of the import of rum, that Great Britain *can* or *will* take off but a certain proportion of that colonial manufacture and produce.

In 1792-3, when the American intercourse with the islands was limited to British shipping, Great Britain took off only

3,756,800 gallons of rum, when the whole trade was at her command.

In 1804, Great Britain (13 years after) took off, on an average of three years, nearly the same quantity, 3,866,523 gallons; and this was a decrease from the import of the two preceding years.

Distribution of Gross Proceeds of a Puncheon of 110 *Gallons, at* 3*s.* 6*d. per Gallon before the Mast:* 14*s.* 8½*d. Gross Sales.*

	Gallons.		Puncheons.		
	s.	*d.*	£.	*s.*	*d.*
Ex-duty, 11*s.* 2½*d.* per gallon, or 110 gallons, ...	11	2½	56	12	11
Freight, 10*d.* ditto, —	0	10	4	11	8
Insurance, 7 per cent. 3*d.* ditto, —	0	3	1	5	0
Merchants' commission, &c. 5*d.* do. —	0	5	2	10	0
The puncheon, value 40*s.* divided by 110 galls. at 4*d.*	0	4	1	13	4
	13	0½	66	12	11
Remains to planter, ...	1	8	9	1	8
Total value of a puncheon of 110 gallons, at 14*s.* 8½*d.*	14	8½	75	14	7

Having in general terms noticed the excess of duties imposed on certain articles of colonial produce, as beyond any advance of price which the consumer will pay, and of course falling on the grower and vender, I have already exemplified the course and consequence of the surcharge in the case of sugar. In regard to *rum*, I am aware that a scheme of police is connected with that of revenue, in imposing high duties on spirituous liquors,

and that they should not be made too cheap to the commonalty, and the consumption thus be increased, with prejudice to the general health and morals of the people.

I shall therefore only contend for a fair and countervailing system of duties, protecting the article of rum (as the most wholesome at least of spirits) in its price and sale, with other articles of like description and use manufactured at home; and with a preference over gins and brandies from foreign parts. Rum is sold before the mast (1805-6) at a medium price of 3*s.* 6*d.* per gallon; from which is to be deducted 1*s.* 10*d.* for freight, insurance, and other charges, leaving only 1*s.* 8*d.* to the planter, for the expence of his husbandry and manufacture, for the interest of his capital, and for his private subsistence.

The factor, or retailer, will not give a more adequate price, whilst, whatever it may be, he hath further to pay the excessive surcharge of excise and customs, 11*s.* $2\frac{1}{2}$*d.* per gallon. The owner and vender, then, shares the duty; and in fact, within these few years, his nett receipts on a puncheon of rum of 110 gallons, has fallen from 16*l.* to 8*l.*; and, as the prices of every article of plantation stores and work are yearly enhanced, must become lower, to his further distress, and final ruin,—*if not relieved.*

SECT. III.—COFFEE IMPORTED FROM BRITISH WEST INDIES.

Coffee comes not only from the West Indies, but is imported from Turkey and the Levant; but this in greater proportion in former periods than at present. The West Indians, of late years, have not only greatly extended their plantations of coffee, but very much improved in the culture; and the West India coffee-berry, in quality, is now scarcely inferior to that of Moca: the colonial coffee has thus, in a great measure, superseded the import of foreign coffee.

Coffee is produced, in a proportionate quantity and value, by less labour and fewer negroes, and will grow on soils ill suited to sugar. Hence it was originally preferred as an article of culture by French settlers in the West Indies, who were poor; but not by British settlers, who of themselves, or from commercial connexion, were rich, or had credit and means to engage principally in the cultivation and manufacture of sugar.

In the year 1787, the coffee exported from the British West Indies, was—

From Barbadoes,	none.
Antigua and the Leeward Islands,	none.
Jamaica,	6395 cwt.
St. Vincent's,	634
Grenada,	8812
Dominica,	18,149
	33,990 cwt.

It is here to be observed, that St. Vincent's, Grenada, and Dominica, were ceded to Great Britain in 1763, and the coffee plantations on those islands had all been made by French settlers. But St. Domingo, before the French Revolution, and in 1788, supplied Europe generally with West India coffee: in that year it exported 320,000 cwt. or 32 millions of pounds. On the French Revolution reaching to St. Domingo, many of the planters of that island emigrated, and successively resorted to Jamaica; and there recommending themselves by their industry and experience in the culture of the coffee plant, were employed by the old planters, or engaged in it on their own account.

This emigration continued from the year 1790, but in greater numbers from 1796 to 1800; and the coffee plant requiring four years to come to bearing and maturity, the export of Jamaica will appear proportionally increasing; whilst, with the exception to Dominica keeping nearly to, or somewhat exceeding its former export, coffee has had no growth in our other islands.

Coffee exported from Jamaica, in 1768, - - 4203 cwt.
1774, - - 6547
1788, - - 6895
1794, - 35,307
1798, - 70,803
1802, - 155,661
1804, - 176,531
1805, - 189,161

Jamaica is said to have plantations for 400,000 cwt.

In 1793, the total import of West India coffee was 90,547 cwt.; of which Dominica, &c. 61,000 cwt.

In 1803, 152,614 cwt.; of which Dominica, 44,000 cwt.

The great increased growth of coffee is in the island of Jamaica: in Dominica the culture hath likewise, in some degree, extended; in the other British islands it seems to have given way to that of sugar: I advert particularly to Grenada and St. Vincent's, although Grenada yet grows some coffee.

Coffee Imported to Great Britain from British West Indies.

	Imported.	Exported, or bonded for Export.	Home Consumption.	Duties on Home Consumption.	Value.
	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.		
1802	214,924	208,294	6630		
1803	154,614	147,726	6888		
1804	232,809	224,216	8593		
Average,	200,782	193,445	7337		
Ireland,	2232	.....	2232		
Total,	203,014	193,445	9569	94,383*l.*	1,218,084*l.*

Home consumption duty 9*l.* 7*s.* 8*d.* per cwt.; export, 6*d.* per cwt. In 1805, ex-duty, 6*l.* per cwt.

From the result of the above table, coffee is to be considered rather as an article of trade and export, than of national consumption: teas have superseded its general use in England. Abroad, coffee is in general use; it is the beverage of all persons in Turkey; of the nobility and middle ranks of life in France and Italy; and the drink of all, to the very porters and postillions, in Germany; and to the north the demand for coffee is increasing: it is, however, a plant of no difficult culture. It is said that plantations in Jamaica alone are made, or making, which may yearly return 400,000 cwt. and finally the European market may be over-loaded, and the article depreciated, and then its further culture will be stopped.

The duties on coffee are—for every hundred weight entered and warehoused, 6*d*. No draw-back on the export of this duty on entry.

Coffee taken out for home consumption, pays—

Custom, per lb. - - - - - -	0*s*.	5*d*.	or 9*l*. 7*s*. 8*d*. per cwt.
Excise, — - - - - - - - -	1	1	
And 12½ per cent. on the above,	0	2¼	

I have taken the medium price per cwt. in 1805, at 6*l*. In 1806 it has fallen to 4*l*. 10*s*. per cwt.

SECT. IV.—COTTON, AND OTHER ARTICLES.

Cotton is imported into Great Britain from every quarter of the world; it is the growth of the East Indies, Africa, the Levant, and the south of Europe, as well as of the West Indies.

The West Indies, however, furnish to Great Britain much the greater proportion; and it is the raw material that is of the first importance.

In 1803 the export of cottons manufactured, was 6,399,709*l.* official value; and real value, above ten millions sterling.

Cotton Imported from British West Indies to Great Britain.

Return to House of Commons, March 6, 1806.

	Imported.
	lbs.
1793	9,164,893
1794	8,392,502
1795	11,675,495
1796	8,854,413
1797	6,918,153
1798	7,909,832
1799	7,529,881
1800	10,611,349
1801	11,261,014
1802	8,799,891
1803*	5,650,615
1804†	20,529,878

Very little cotton-wool exported.

* To this period reported to House of Commons, April 1806.

† To this period reported to House of Commons, March 8, 1805.

I scarcely know how to account for the extraordinary excess of cotton imported in 1804, as reported to the House of Commons, March 8, 1805.

The cotton crop and returns are indeed, from natural causes, more varying in quality and quantity, and more precarious, than any other article of West India growth. It is particularly liable to ravage from vermin, and the chenille; and at the very eve of crop it is often destroyed by blight, blast, wet, or, the pod bursting, the flax is occasionally dispersed by the winds. One good crop in four years repays the planter; the average should then be taken at four years.

Average Import of Cotton from British West Indies, for Three Years, ending 1803.

	Import.	Duty, 2*d.*	Value, 1*s.* 10*d.*
	lbs.		
Great Britain,	10,224,085		
Ireland, ...	248,333		
	10,472,418	85,302*l.*	1,047,242*l.*

In 1806, cotton has suddenly fallen to 14*d.* per lb. owing to the difficulties of the export, and sale of the article manufactured. The system of embargoes laid on British commodities throughout the Continent, and now enforced with the greatest prejudice to our trade and commerce, is too sensibly felt as a policy of the

enemy, and seems unhappily, at this period, to have more than ordinary effect, and especially in regard to the article under consideration.

Miscellaneous Articles Imported from British West Indies in 1804-5.

Return to House of Commons, March 1805.

		Price.			Duty.			Quantity.	Value.	Nett Reven.
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.		£.	£.
Arrow-root,.....	lb.	0	1	2	0	0	3	38,982	2810	992
Cocoa, ...	cwt.	7	5	0	10	5	4	3684	62,347	37,784
Ginger, ...	cwt.	7	0	0	0	17	4	3546	24,892	3013
Indigo, ...	lb.	0	8	0	0	0	1½	54,397	21,760	340
Castor-oil, ...	lb.	0	3	0	0	0	6	76,648	11,397	1912
Pimento, ...	lb.	0	1	4	0	0	7½	2,257,045	113,700	38,063
Tortoise-shell, ..	lb.	0	4	0	0	1	3	13,135	3448	1223
Elephants' teeth,	No.	30	0	0	0	0	2	45	1350	30
Turmeric, ...	lb.	0	0	7	0	0	3½	9241	231	115
Melasses, ...	cwt.	1	10	0	0	5	4	309	536	82
Tamarinds, ...	cwt.	4	0	0	.....			1551	6104	1942
Woods:										
Fustic, ...	ton	22	10	0	0	16	6	3340	73,480	2755
Lignum vitæ,....	ton	42	0	0	.....			667	22,014	279
Logwood, &c. ..	ton	27	0	0	0	6	1	9358	254,566	2797
Mahogany, ...	ton	25	0	0	5	15	0	4435	110,885	12,170
Sundries, ...	.....	.....			.....			.....	36,298	3000
Bullion, ...	.....	.....			.....			.....	29,200	.....
	....	.....			.....			.....	775,108	106,500

Of the above imports, Ireland received *only*

Cocoa, - - - - - - - - - - - - 149 cwt.
Pimento, - - - - - - - - - - - 16,439 lb.
Fustic, - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 ton.
Mahogany, - - - - - - - - - - - 439 ton.

SECT. V.—SUMMARY AND GENERAL RESULTS OF THE BRITISH IMPORT TRADE FROM THE SUGAR COLONIES.

Proceeding to exhibit a summary of the quantities, value, and disposal, of the articles of produce above enumerated, I should here state, "that the import, direct and entire, is exclusively secured to the mother-country by a system of laws, known generally as the Navigation Acts." The partial supply of rum and melasses, &c. to America, is a mere regulation and allowance in exception, and as a barter for articles of necessity and subsistence required in the plantations, which will be fully explained in the Chapter on *American Intercourse*.

This monopoly however does not, as some have supposed, constitute the primary principle of those laws, which, looking to their early scheme and provisions, from the time of Richard II and of Henry VII. down to the acts of Charles and William, seem to have been imagined and framed with a view to advantages from Navy, rather than from trade, and in many points to have surrendered advantages of trade, in favour to those of a shipping interest.

Reserving the general principle of these laws for more apposite discussion, in reference to the shipping interest of these kingdoms, I will here merely remark, that the colonial monopoly was a distinct and important graft, first imposed on the ancient policy

and system of the Navigation Acts, during the Protectorate in 1651.

Rapin, and other historians, generally attribute the enactment to Cromwell's quarrel with the Dutch. In truth, the law which forbad all import in foreign ships, but articles of the growth and produce of the countries to which they belonged, was admirably calculated to annoy that maritime power, which had no exports of its own, and had heretofore been carriers for others, and the world. All foreign traders were indeed excluded from intercourse with the British plantations; but the Dutch were then the only traders. Lord Clarendon (vol. vi. p. 458) insinuates that a further purpose of Cromwell, was, by restricting their trade, to punish the colonies for their late loyalty to the unfortunate Charles; and to ensure their future submission, by assuming an exclusive command over their supplies and very means of subsistence. Be this as it may, the system was in itself provident and wise; and immediately on the Restoration, was adopted and enforced, from the just and politic motives of national interest. The 12th of Car. II. cap. 18, may be considered as the basis of all the navigation acts of the same reign; of King William, of Anne, of George the First, and down to the manifest and register acts, of the 26th of the present King.

Reciting in this place merely what is applicable to my present subject of imports from the colonies, by the 12th of Charles II. &c. and by the 7th and 8th of William, cap. 22, and by con-

firmatory statutes since, altering the provisions somewhat in form, but no ways in substance, it is enacted generally, "that no goods shall be imported into, or exported from, the plantations, but in British-built ships, and wholly owned by British subjects, and navigated by three-fourths sailors of the same;" and by 7th and 8th of William III. cap. 22, sect. 19, "every ship or vessel sailing from any port of England, &c. for the plantations, shall give a bond of 1000*l.* and other surety, that, in case such vessel shall lade any produce or commodities at such plantations, the same shall be brought to, unladen, and delivered at some port of England," &c.

An enlarged and liberal policy hath occasionally suggested the wisdom of relaxing these restrictions on the conveyance and sale of colonial produce, with the view to an encouragement and extension of the plantations whence it came, and to the laying a foundation of future and increased resource for the commerce and shipping of Great Britain, from the growing prosperity and cultivation of its distant settlements.

The 12th of George II. cap. 30, recites: "Whereas the planters of the sugar colonies are unable to improve and carry on their sugar trade on an equal footing with foreign sugar colonies, unless some advantage and relief be given by Great Britain, &c.;" and then enacts, "that British-built ships navigated according to law, on clearing out from any port in Great Britain for the plantations, under sureties and conditions, as expressed,

may and shall receive a license to proceed and lade with sugars from the British plantations, and convey and deliver the same direct to any part of Europe south of Cape Finisterre; or to any country northward of the same, in the way touching at some port of Great Britain, and there exhibiting a manifest, duly attested by officers whence the ship came, of the amount and nature of the cargo, and of its being of sugars the produce of a British plantation." This original act of concession and encouragement to the sugar colonies, was in force until the year 1744, and then, and by successive acts, was renewed and continued, and lastly by the 4th of George III. cap. 12, was in force to the year 1771.

The revival of this License Act may not, on many accounts, be suitable to this present crisis of perplexed navigation and warfare; but I hope and trust it is reserved for better times, and to relieve and re-establish the distressed fortunes of the West India planter on the return of peace. Further, by order of His Majesty in Council, dated July 2, 1783, under provisions of an act passed the preceding month, " rum, melasses, *sugar*, *coffee*, *cocoa-nuts*, pimento, ginger, &c. might be exported direct to the United States of America, from the sugar colonies, in British ships, owned and navigated according to law." This resource to the colonies (with exception to a partial export of rum, melasses, ginger, and pimento) hath likewise been withdrawn.

Adverting to the actual and existing conditions of the trade,

to whatever extent the cultivation and produce of the colonies may arrive, Great Britain with Ireland hath the monopoly, and exclusively holds the market, whether for home consumption, or as factor for re-export, and the supply and use of foreign countries. In both these views, the advantage to the mother-country, derived from its West India colonies, is far beyond any estimate which I can here offer in detail. The summary which I shall now exhibit, of the profits to British tradesmen, merchants, and ship-owners, and of the immediate revenue to Government, from a tax on the articles of import, will yet, I trust, be such, as to impress a just sense of the value of our trans-atlantic possessions; and of the public interest and duty to foster and protect the industry and property, which so largely contribute to the imperial wealth and power of Great Britain.

But this is not all. These enumerated articles form mere items in part of account, when we take a full and comprehensive view of all the national advantages derived from the colonial imports, thus large, increasing, and secured by law.

The *cotton* and other manufactures, arising from the raw materials coming from our plantations, and spreading industry and wealth from London to Manchester, and to Paisley, and throughout every county of Great Britain; the annual building of *large* ships for the keeping up a merchant fleet of 700 sail, regularly and exclusively engaged in the carrying trade; the yearly repairs, outfit, and provisioning the *total* of such a great fleet;

and the employ and instruction of 16,000 seamen of the best and *ablest* description, ready, if required, for service in the British Navy ;—are advantages of a magnitude and extent, which, thus opened in general terms, and at large, will more forcibly occur to the British reader, than from any long and intricate details of calculation. The immediate results of the import trade, which I shall now compute, are merely such as follow in course, from the commercial tables above entered, and the heads of which it may be convenient, in the first instance, briefly to recapitulate.

Prices of Four Staple Articles in 1805, *from Prince's Price Tables.*

	Price of Ex-Duty.			Duty.			Sale Value.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Sugar, cwt.	2	10	0	1	7	0	3	17	0
Rum, gal.	0	3	9½	0	11	2½	0	15	0
Coffee, cwt.	6	0	4	9	6	8	15	6	8
Cotton, lb.	0	1	10	0	0	2	0	2	0

Home Consumption of Four Staple Articles in 1803-4.

	Sugar, Hogsh. of 13 Cwt.	Rum, Punch. of 110 Gallons.	Coffee, Cwt.	Cotton, lbs.
Great Britain, ...	140,100	25,300	7337	10,000,000
Ireland, ...	11,140	1300	2232	248,333
Total home consumption,	151,240	26,600	9569	10,248,333

Re-Export of Four Staples Articles in 1803-4.

	Sugar, Hogsh. of 13 Cwt.	Rum, Punch. of 110 Gallons.	Coffee, Cwt.	Cotton, lb.
Export,	106,642	10,600	193,445	.....

General Imports and Disposal of Four Staple Articles.

		Import.	Export.	Home Consumption.
Sugar, ...	cwt.	3,372,495	1,386,289	1,966,146
Rum, ...	gall.	3,846,523	1,059,269	2,787,254
Coffee, ...	cwt.	203,014	193,445	9569
Cotton, ..	lb.	10,472,418	270,000	10,202,418

Value of West India Imports, and the immediate Revenue derived to Great Britain, at the Prices in 1804-5.

	Quantity.	Sale Price, with Duty.	Value.	Duty, Custom&Excise.	Gross Revenues.
		£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£.
Sugar, home consump.	cwt. 1,966,146	3 17 0	7,569,662	1 7 0	2,654,297
Ditto exported*, ...	cwt. 1,386,289	2 17 0	3,950,924	0 7 0	485,201
Rum, home consump.	gall. 2,787,253	0 15 0	2,105,433	0 11 $2\frac{1}{2}$	1,563,679
Ditto exported, ...	gall. 1,059,269	0 3 $9\frac{1}{2}$	202,243	0 0 3	13,241
Coffee, home consump.	cwt. 9569	15 6 8	146,985	9 7 2	89,547
Ditto exported, ...	cwt. 193,445	6 0 6	1,165,520	0 0 6	4863
Cotton, ...	lb. 10,472,418	0 2 0	1,097,242	0 0 2	87,271
Miscellaneous articles, ...	.....	.....	775,108	.....	106,500
Tot. value and revenue, ...	.....	.....	17,002,117	.....	5,002,599

* When sugar is above 40*s.* per cent. Gazette price, only 20*s.* is allowed drawback, and 7*s.* remains of duty imposed. In 1806 sugar has fallen to the sale price of 66*s.*; coffee to 13*l.* 10*s.*; that is, 4*l.* ex-duty; and cotton from 2*s.* to 14*d.* the pound.

The Disposal of West India Imports and Income, as enumerated in the preceding Tables, may be estimated as follows:

	Articles.	Paid.	Totals.
			£.
Revenue,	Sugar,	3,139,498	5,002,599
	Other articles,	1,863,101	
Ship-owners,	Sugar, freight, &c.	1,508,622	2,008,622
	Other articles,	500,000	
Insurers, &c.	Sugar,	335,250	500,050
	Other articles,	164,800	
Merchant-factors,	Commission & brokerage, &c.	.....	539,474
Docks and port dues,	General medium,	.....	230,000
British manufacture and trade,	Plantation stores,	1,999,448	3,999,448
	Plantation and return trade,	2,000,000	
Mortgagees in England, &c.	24 million, at 6 per cent.	.....	1,440,000
Liverpool, 15,000 slaves,	3 per cent. on 500,000,	.....	750,000
Residue income,	West India Proprietors, &c.	.....	2,551,924
			17,002,117

Comparative Imports from British Colonies in 1788 *and* 1804.

	Ships.	Tons.	Seamen.	Sugar.	Rum.	Coffee.	Cotton.
				Hogsheads.	Puncheons.	Cwt.	lbs.
1787-8,	627	139,382	13,347	148,000	21,000	33,990	8,108,459
1804-5,	693	197,971	19,797	256,950	37,200	203,014	10,472,418
Increase,	66	62,684	6450	108,000	16,200	170,024	2,263,959

Recapitulation of fourteen years' increased trade:

Ships, in number - - - - - - - - 66

Ships, in size - - - - - - - - - 51 tons each.

In general tonnage, - - - - - - 62,684 tons.

In seamen employed, - - - - - - 6450

In value of imports, - - - - - 9,000,000

In revenue, - - - - - - - 3,438,000

The great and increasing value to Great Britain, of the import trade from the West India sugar colonies, will appear of more importance in a comparative view of the total imports from that and other quarters of the world.

Comparative View of West India and other Imports to Great Britain in 1802.

Return to House of Commons, 1803.

	Official Value.
	£.
From Foreign Europe, ...	9,333,666
Ireland, ...	3,170,931
United States of America,	2,315,000
British colonies in America,	494,079
Africa, ...	153,761
East Indies, ...	5,609,674
West Indies, ...	10,697,248*
	31,834,453

The official value, by subsequent returns, will, at medium, appear 60 per cent. under-rated. The proportion is all that is required for inference from this table of valuation.

It appears from the above official return, that the imports

* From British islands, ... £. 6,944,142
Conquered colonies, ... 3,460,868
Foreign West Indies, ... 352,278
£. 10,697,248

from the West Indies generally were, in 1802, a full third of the total imports to Great Britain, and from the *British* islands, nearly one-fourth of the total imports; and that the West India imports were nearly double in commercial value to those from the East Indies.

The proportion of real to official value, will appear from returns made to the House of Commons, and presented by Mr. Irving, April 8, 1806; the table of which is inserted in a future page of this Compilation. It will appear from those official returns, that the real is to the official value, as 40 to 25, or 8 to 5; which will bring the 10,697,248 West India imports as above, to tally nearly with the estimated value of imports at 17 millions, as computed in a previous table.

CHAP. VI.

SECT. I.—EXPORT TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN TO ITS SUGAR COLONIES.

THE supply of the West India colonies, if left free of controul and command by the mother-country; that is, if unrestricted by the British Navigation Acts, would in preference, and generally, be furnished from and by America.

That continent being so much nearer to the West Indies than Great Britain, and with advantages in other respects, of passage and communication, the supply would be more quickly and cheaply furnished; would more readily be subject to orders; those orders be more occasional, and earlier and better answered; be more frequent, and in quantities answering to the demand; and a less stock in hand be required of stores, many of a perishable nature, and particularly so in the tropical climates, such as bread-flour, and provisions in general.

For the supply of provisions, a direct trade between America and the West Indies, is to the latter a trade of absolute necessity.

From the year 1783, when the provinces of America were by treaty recognized as independent and sovereign, under the title of the "United States," and their people became alien in

the construction of our laws, the intercourse with the West Indies was yet deemed so indispensable for their supply, that Great Britain acquiesced in, and even encouraged, its being so furnished with certain enumerated articles, reserving, however, to its own shipping and people, the intermediate agency and carrying trade, by which the commerce was to be conducted.

Bread-flour, rice, corn, and lumber, or planks, scantling and oak staves, were the articles more particularly required and allowed as a direct import to the colonies from America; and these for ten years, from 1783, *being years of peace*, were conveyed in British shipping, under the strict letter of the Navigation Acts. In periods of war, these articles, at all times indispensable to the colonies, are rendered difficult to procure as required, by the same course of shipping and trade. And this involves a question of—Under what circumstances, and in what degree, the letter of the Navigation Acts may occasionally, and for a time, be suspended, or relaxed, without prejudice to the national trade and system?—which I shall have occasion further to discuss in the Chapter on American Intercourse.

Reverting to the immediate subject, Great Britain holds in reserve the monopoly of supply to its colonies, with the exception of enumerated articles, expressly excluding all foreign manufacture; and, with respect to America, likewise excluding produce, although the growth of its provinces, unless specified in

the terms of the proclamations by the Orders of the King in Council, or of the Acts of Parliament authorizing the import.

In the enumeration of lumber, oak staves for packing the colonial produce, in 400,000 hogsheads or puncheons, taking fifty each, and requiring annually twenty millions of staves; would take more oak than Britain could prudentially spare from its nurseries of timber for the Navy.

In the supply of bread-flour and corn, the policy of the mother-country likewise operates in its concession to the produce of America, and for the service to its colonies. Great Britain, it has been found, does not in all seasons grow corn sufficient for the subsistence of its own inhabitants; and it is from care of itself and of those at home, that it limits the proportion of corn to be supplied to the colonies by statute, as follows:

Export to the West Indies, limited to

Wheat,	1000 qrs.
Barley,	5000 qrs.
Oats,	25,000 qrs.
Beans,	20,000 qrs.
Pease,	4000 qrs.
Rye,	500 qrs.
Wheat flour,	3200 tons.
Biscuit,	950 tons.
Oatmeal,	600 tons.
Grits,	25 tons.

To shew the necessity of allowed import from America, I need only advert to the article of bread-flour, 3220 tons, equal to 32,000 barrels of 200lb. each: whereas, as far back as 1773, 132,440 barrels of flour were annually supplied to the West Indies from America alone; and the consumption is since increased to above 200,000 barrels.

But it is not of this small and necessary exception to its monopoly in trade, that Great Britain is tenaciously jealous; it is of the *carrying trade*, and its shipping interest.

In proportion to the value of the articles laden, the freight of the export is greater than that of the import trade. Charged on bulk comparatively, as on value or weight of the article, it operates to a third, to a half, or even to the full value, of sundry exports. Of hoops for binding hogsheads, all of which are supplied from Great Britain, the cost and freight are nearly equal. From examination of various and actual invoices of stores sent to the plantations, I compute the freight (in time of war) as at least one-fourth of the invoice; and on the total export, to a yearly value of six millions; the freight is then 1,500,000*l*. This is a great interest; and I think *that* of the West Indian is no ways repugnant to the just claims of the British ship-owner to hold and keep the advantage; for if he did not pay a saving freight outwards, and the ship came to the islands light, or in ballast, the planter would have a proportional surcharge to pay on the freight of his produce home. The planter has no interest in requiring, and therefore

should not be supposed to require, any articles from America, and in American shipping, but articles of immediate necessity, and which Great Britain will not supply at all, or cannot supply as wanted.

SECT. II.—EXPORT TRADE TO THE SUGAR COLONIES.

In 1804-5, the British shipping in the export trade to the West Indies, was officially returned to the House of Commons in March 1805, as follows:

	Ships.	Tons.	Average Tons each Ship.	Seamen.
From London,	350	107,100	306	8400
Outports,	257	70,532	276	5140
Scotland,	101	25,048	248	1818
Ireland,	129	33,900	275	2322
Totals,	837	236,510	.....	17,680

In this shipping, the articles exported will be enumerated under the heads of

British Produce and Manufacture,
Irish Produce and Manufacture,
Foreign Articles re-exported.

The value of articles exported has, in the official returns, been estimated, on an old custom-house price of each article, laid arbitrarily, and anciently, as in the time of Charles the Second, and, for these times, is, of course, very much under-rated.

The real value is now ascertained, by the convoy duty, *ad valorem;* and a table of general exports, as follows, on such data of real value, from Return to House of Commons, April 1806, will shew the official valuation to be under-rated above 60 per cent.

Data for Valuation of Exports, in relation of official to real Value.

Return to House of Commons, April 18, 1806.

	General Imports.		General Exports.			Total Exports.
	Official Value.	Real Value.	British Produce & Manufacture: official Value.	British Produce & Manufacture: real Value.	Foreign Produce & Manufacture: real Value.	Real Value.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1799	26,837,421	39,900,000	24,084,213	38,942,498	9,556,144	48,498,642
1800	30,570,601	45,700,000	24,304,283	39,471,203	13,815,837	53,287,040
1801	32,795,556	48,900,000	25,699,809	41,770,354	12,087,047	53,857,401
1802	31,442,318	46,400,030	26,993,129	48,500,683	14,418,857	62,919,544
1803	27,992,464	42,000,000	22,252,027	40,100,870	9,326,468	49,427,338
1804	29,201,490	44,000,000	23,935,793	40,349,642	10,515,574	50,865,216
1805	29,488,077	44,800,000	25,003,308	41,068,942	9,950,508	51,019,450

From the above table, the real value is above the official value full 50 per cent. on British produce and manufacture exported. For a still more correct estimate of the value of exports to the West Indies, Prince's City Tables of Weekly Prices Current at Market, will furnish data for 1805.

Prince's Price Tables for 1805.

	Quantity.	Value.				Quantity.	Value.		
		£.	s.	d.			£.	s.	d.
Beef	barrel, 180lb.	7	0	0	Iron	cwt.	3	0	0
Pork	barrel, 180lb.	7	10	0	Copper	cwt.	9	0	0
Butter	firkin, 120lb.	3	10	0	Pewter	cwt.	5	10	0
Tallow	cwt.	4	2	0	Lead	cwt.	1	16	0
Oil-cake	1000	14	14	0	White paint	cwt.	2	12	0
Soap	cwt.	4	18	0	Iron hoops	cwt.	5	0	0
Salt	bushel	0	3	6	Bricks	1000	2	2	0
Lamp-oil	gallon	0	5	0	Cordage	coil, 2 inch.	4	4	0
Herrings	barrel, 130 ..	2	5	0	Leather	cwt.		.....	
Porter beer	hogshead	4	10	0	.....	.....		.....	
Candles	dozen lb.	0	11	0	Blue baize, &c.	yard	0	3	0
Lime	keg	1	2	0	Osnaburgs	yard	0	0	10
Staves	1000	5	0	0	Cotton checks	yard	0	1	6
Wood hoops	1000	7	10	0	Felt hats	dozen	0	18	0
Hogsheads ..	each	1	9	0	Beaver	dozen	3	0	0
Port wine	pipe	46	0	0	.....	.....		.....	

Flour, corn, oats, &c. *vary*, and the occasional price is too generally known, to render any further detail of prices necessary.

SECT. III.—EXPORTS OF BRITISH PRODUCE AND MANUFACTURE TO BRITISH SUGAR COLONIES, IN 1804-5.

Return to House of Commons, March 1805.

		Quantity.	Official Value.	Actual Price.	Real Value.
			£.	£. s. d.	£.
Beer, ...	hogsh.	9279	26,372	4 10 0	41,478
Brass, ...	cwt.	2394	10,734	9 0 0	21,546
Candles, ...	doz. lb.	112,946	25,413	0 11 6	73,415
Coals, ...	chaldr.	18,280	20,374	3 3 0	55,040
Copper, ...	cwt.	13,364	70,960	9 0 0	120,256
Iron, ...	cwt.	96,266	248,390	3 10 0	336,931
Pewter, ...	cwt.	5119	17,916	5 10 0	28,155
Leather, ...	lb.	433,919	48,522	.....	72,745
Beaver hats, ..	dozen	11,360	45,440	6 0 0	64,160
Felt hats, ...	dozen	33,773	43,961	2 5 0	75,989
Stockings, ...	dozen	12,120	21,504	2 2 0	25,450
Soap, ...	cwt.	10,910	29,966	4 18 0	53,454
Herrings, ...	barrel	44,489	51,724	2 5 0	51,724
Printed cottons,	at large	at large.	1,411,625	50 per cent.	2,117,437
Linen, ...	ditto	.....	403,966	.....	605,941
Woollens, ...	ditto	.....	242,601	.....	363,901
Cotton yarn, ..	ditto	.....	14,580	.....	21,870
Hardware, ...	ditto	.....	409,573	.....	614,360
Provisions, ...	ditto	.....	28,289	.....	42,434
Corn, ...	ditto	.....	14,900	.....	22,800
Sundries, ...	ditto	.....	160,000	.....	240,000
Apparel, ...	ditto	.....	38,782	.....	55,133
			3,485,801		5,124,210
Above one-fourth freight and clearance, ...			871,450	.....	1,209,019
2½ per cent. merchants' commission, &c.			114,000	.....	158,627
Total value of British produce and manufacture, ...			4,471,251	.....	6,551,756

To which add convoy duty, two per cent. £. 102,000

Total value, - - - - - £. 6,653,723

SECT. IV.—EXPORTS OF IRISH PRODUCE AND MANUFACTURE TO BRITISH SUGAR COLONIES, IN 1804-5.

	Quantity.	Official Value.	Price.	Real Value.
		£.		£.
Linens, ... yard	893,396	59,743	one-third.	89,614
Cottons, ... yard	pieces.	3982	one-third.	6000
Muslins, ... yard	16,422	2745	one-third.	4119
Candles, ... cwt.	5103	10,206	4*l.* 10*s.*	20,412
Soap, ... cwt.	5375	9406	4 0	21,400
Beef, ... barrel	17,932	31,381	4 0	71,726
Pork, ... barrel	15,220	22,830	4 0	60,880
Butter, ... firkin	29,146	40,685	2 10	72,865
Herrings, ... barrel	2800	2742	2 5	5600
Sundries, ...	.....	13,229	.....	19,944
		196,949	.....	371,560
1-4th freight, ...	.....	.....	.....	92,890
2½ commission, &c.	.....	.....	.....	11,611
2½ convoy duty, ...	.....	.....	.....	6209
Total value, ...	.....	.....	.....	482,170

Pome's Dublin Price Current, June 21, 1806.

	£.	s.	d.
Butter, per cwt. - - - - - - -	3	14	0
Bacon, per cwt. - - - - - - - -	2	18	0
C. beef, per barrel, - - - - - -	4	5	0
M. pork, per barrel, - - - - - -	4	15	0
Tallow, per cwt. - - - - - - -	3	4	0
Candles, per dozen, - - - - -	0	10	0

SECT. V.—EXPORTS OF FOREIGN ARTICLES FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND TO BRITISH SUGAR COLONIES, IN 1804-5.

Return to House of Commons, March 1805.

	Quantity.	Official Value.	Price.	Real Value.
		£.		£.
Drugs, ... lb.	15,605	3214	50 per cent	4821
Wines.				
Italian, ... hogsh.	6	153	40*l.*	240
French, ... pipe	174	5276	50 per cent	7730
Madeira, ... pipe	312	7158	50*l.*	15,600
Port, ... pipe	550	9350	46*l.*	25,300
Rhenish, ...	117	312	45*l.*	765
Spanish, ... hogsh.	160	2725	30*l.*	4800
Brandies, ... gallon	13,245	3521	6*s.*	4473
Geneva, ... gallon	11,578	4856	.....	5200
German linen, pieces	4000	19,500	.....	29,750
Silesian ditto, yards	13,025	3148	.....	4674
Russian ditto, pieces	1290	12,041	.....	18,063
East India china, ...	86,700	2170	.....	3210
Teas, ... lb.	34,770	10,799	.....	16,200
Piece goods, pieces	26,859	22,671	.....	34,006
Sundries, ...	.....	26,501	.....	39,751
		133,389	.....	250,583
Freight, ...	.....	.....	.....	63,376
Commission, ...	.....	.....	.....	7758
Convoy duty, ...	.....	.....	.....	4520
Total value, ...	.....	.....	.....	326,237

SECT. VI.—SUMMARY OF EXPORT TRADE TO BRITISH SUGAR COLONIES, IN 1804-5.

Exports to West Indies in 1804.

Value of Articles to Great Britain.	Real Value.		Value.
	£.		£.
Export of British produce and manufacture,	5,124,210	articles	5,746,353
Irish produce and manufacture, ..	371,560		
foreign articles, ...	250,583		
Value surcharged in West Indies.			
Freight of exports, value one-fourth, ...	1,436,588	ditto surcharge	2,307,688
Mercantile commis. &c. $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. gross,	456,180		
Insurance, at 4 per cent. on gross, ...	300,000		
Convoy duty, at 2 per cent.	114,920		
Total value of exports, ...	.....	.....	8,054,041

In 1804, the total exports from Great Britain were—

British produce and manufacture, 40,349,642 *l.*

Of which, one-eighth to West Indies, 5,124,210 *l.*

Detail of General Export of British Produce and Manufacture in 1804.

	Real Value.		Total.
	£.	£.	£.
To foreign Europe, ...	14,866,854	10,177,576	25,044,430
Ireland, ...	3,356,466	1,462,192	4,818,658
British America, ...	2,074,767	217,971	2,292,738
United States of America,	9,696,259	221,018	9,917,277
Africa, ...	1,191,142	494,989	1,686,130
East Indies, ...	4,059,944	231,408	4,291,352
West Indies, ...	5,124,210	447,047	5,671,257
	40,349,642	13,252,231	53,601,873

Exceeds East India export 1,064,000*l.*

Of the export to foreign Europe, &c. the produce and manufacture of the British sugar colonies supply to the amount of 13,991,397*l.* official value.

Re-export from Great Britain of Colonial Produce, raw or manufactured.

Return to House of Commons, April 29, 1806.

	1803. Official Value.	1804. Official Value.	1805. Official Value.
	£.	£.	£.
Sugar, raw, ...	1,693,399	809,599	881,787
Sugar, refined, ...	1,542,212	1,084,256	1,113,725
Rum, ...	194,862	335,920	246,846
Coffee*, ...	1,229,827	1,851,247	2,416,458*
Pimento, ...	28,148	36,594	24,025
Indigo, ...	224,033	307,716	313,676
Cotton wool, ...	60,867	31,131	41,314
Cottons manufactured, ..	6,339,709	7,797,574	8,953,566
Total, ...	11,313,057	12,254,037	13,991,397

* Coffee is greatly over-valued; and this probably occurs from the scarcity and dearness of that article, at the period when the prices were originally entered, and which seem to have been continued on the books, and to the present time, rather as comparative, than as actual and distinct heads of computation.

The preceding table contains an exception to the general usage and rate of valuation in the Custom-house returns.

It would lead me into a subject of too great extent, being no less than that of the whole commerce of Great Britain, to pursue my inquiries further into the general export trade, as connected with imports from the colonies, and of which in different shapes and channels it may avail itself, for gaining the balances of commerce and *exchange*, in dealing with foreign Europe, and indeed the world.

The direct exports to the plantations, of British produce and manufacture (taken alone, and exclusive of East India and other commodities), suggest ample and sufficient matter to justify the Legislature and Ministers of Great Britain, in rigidly and cautiously securing an exclusive trade, which circulates a larger portion of the fruits and works of national industry, than any other branch of commerce, or in any other channel whatever.

But here again I must enforce the recollection, that these exports are to be repaid in value, and therefore, for their continuance and quantity, must depend on the wealth and prosperity of the countries to which they are freighted. If the colonial purchaser is impoverished, his custom will proportionally be of less value: his industry must be encouraged; his property must be secured; his profits must be competent, to enable him to deal largely, as required, and with advantage to the industry and property of those who tender the supply.

In reference to the British sugar colonies, I would amend the ancient apologue, and say, "it is not sufficient to spare the bird's life; but further, the bird must be cheered and fed, its plumage be unplucked and unbroken, and its nest be undisturbed and sheltered, to ensure its laying *a golden egg.*"

CHAP. VII.

On the Export Trade of Great Britain to its Sugar Colonies, and how far exclusive, and secured by Law.

The results of colonial commerce which close the preceding Chapter, however impressive of its extent and value, furnish matter of estimate far beyond the mere sum of figures brought to account: the sagacious reader, who is at all conversant with these subjects, will observe and trace the connexion, bearing, and influence, of each enumerated article, on collateral branches of industry, and on the whole course of British trade.

In treating of the imports from the West Indies, I have previously observed, that the advantages derived to the mother-country from its trans-Atlantic settlements, are not to be measured by any simple and unqualified detail of commodities received or supplied: it is a trade which, in furnishing raw materials, and taking manufactures in return, gives a vital spirit to every branch of art and industry throughout Great Britain and Ireland.

If it were practicable to make out a distinct case, and wholly to separate the relative considerations of import and export, perhaps those of the latter branch of trade touch nearer on the feel-

ing and concern of the numerous tradesmen, artizans, and occupiers of land, who look no further than to the orders received for their manufactures and produce: as above all, in commercial matters, it is the aggregate of private interests, which forms the public mind, and gives a direction to national choice and pursuits, and to a policy of Government coinciding with, or yielding to, the sense of the people, it may appear that the branch of colonial monopoly most at heart with Great Britain, and most tenaciously and rigidly insisted on, under provision of the Navigation Acts, is "its export trade to the plantations." But it is an error, however prevalent, and under whatever authority entertained, to suppose that the exclusive right to the mother-country, of furnishing supplies to the plantations, constitutes a direct and general provision of the Navigation Acts. This is not so; it is by these acts only collaterally and so far guarded, as the entry and use of the ports in the plantations is restricted to shipping British built, and navigated according to law. It is indeed more directly favoured and protected by other statutes of regulation and revenue, prohibiting import into the colonies of foreign manufactures and of certain enumerated articles of produce, however, in British ships; and in other cases imposing heavy duties, which may, or may not, operate to a prohibition, according to the exigency of the demand.

I shall have occasion to shew, that it hath been a *former* error of a most enlightened statesman, to conceive that the ex-

clusive supply of British produce to the plantations was wholly, and in every respect, protected by the Navigation Acts, or by any fixed and systematic code of laws whatever. As an excellent commentary and elucidation of this matter in question, I shall here insert the arguments of Mr. Eden and of Mr. Jenkinson (now Lords Liverpool and Auckland), as delivered in the House of Commons, February 7, 1785. The debate, however interesting, and on a most important subject, never having been noticed in any parliamentary report yet published, I trust the substance of these speeches, written from notes and memory the same evening, on my return from the House of Commons, and now copied from the original entry in my common-place book, will be acceptable to the reader.

On a motion directed by a previous committee, as usual for bills of trade, February 7, 1785, the order of the day was for bringing in a bill "for *confining* for a time (to be limited) the trade from the United States of America to Newfoundland, to bread-flour and live-stock, to be imported in none but British ships navigated according to law, and being cleared out from some port of His Majesty's European dominions, and with licence for the same*."

"Mr. Eden objected to the *title* of the bill, and moved that the order be discharged. He contended, that *permission* for

* Journals, vol. xl. p. 489.

enumerated articles of import, and not a *restriction* to certain articles, was a distinction most essential, and required a revision and amendment of the description of bill to be brought in, under order of the House. He observed, that a law *restrictory* to certain articles, implied a previous and existing latitude of trade between the United States of America and Newfoundland; and if with Newfoundland, then likewise with the British continental colonies remaining, and with the West India islands; introducing a principle the most dangerous, and repugnant to the system of our navigation laws, and subversive of their policy, in providing and securing exclusive advantages of trade, and a monopoly to the mother-country, in commercial intercourse with its colonies. That the idea of a direct trade between other states and our colonies, even in British ships, and navigated according to law, was equally contrary to the letter of our navigation acts, and to the spirit of our colonial trade. That, to the hour of the acknowledged independency of the United States, their vessels, by positive law, were obliged to produce, on entry into ports of Great Britain, or any of its colonies, certain dockets, certificates, and other Custom-house documents, shewing that such vessels had given bond, and performed all other legal conditions, at the place from which they had freighted, both as to cargo and destination: that these regulations were, by statute 23 Geo. III. cap. 39, dispensed with, as to Great Britain, but still remained in force as to the colonies. That the independence of America by

treaty did not alter the question. That whatever novel relation America might appear in as to political consideration, in law and in Custom-house usage, America remained in the same relation as before, unless so far as statute was superadded to treaty, and warranted other procedure in those who looked not to treaties, but to the laws of the realm; namely, our Custom-house officers. That this idea was not merely speculative: that practice warranted the argument; and no acts of the British Legislature having followed up the several treaties which settled the alienation and interchanges of sovereignty; in Custom-house usage, Riga was not recognized as Russian; Stettin, to be Prussian; or Dunkirk, French. Vessels therefore laden in the ports of the United States, not producing dockets or instruments (which indeed they could not now have and produce), would not be admitted entry to our colonial ports; and in this the law was the more observable, as, from the contingency of the case, it was brought to tally with that system of colonial monopoly in favour of the mother-country, which was broken in upon by the title of the bill. That it was the title which was alone objectionable; had it been *permissory*, and not *restrictory*, the argument would be done away; for there was no objection in the present exigency, to *bread and flour* being admitted from the United States, into Newfoundland, in British ships navigated according to law."

"Mr. Jenkinson, in reply, contended, that the title of the bill was the only proper title: that *restriction* was necessary, and

permission would be nugatory; for that the facts, as well as argument, were against what was alledged by the last speaker. As to fact, there was no commercial rule or law existing, by which the produce of Africa, or of America, might not be imported into our colonies in British ships navigated according to law: a restriction, therefore, to the articles specified in the case of Newfoundland, was the proper mode of preclusion in other respects, even on the positions urged in favour of a stricter monopoly of colonial trade:—that the reasoning on the actual state of things, and the supposition of dockets and certificates from America being yet required, was idle, and replete with absurd consequences: that the introduction of the clause relating thereto in the act of the 23d of the King, was nugatory; for that American vessels were undoubtedly admissible into our ports on a similar footing with other foreign vessels, from the date of the treaty which recognized the Americans to be independent states. That good reasons might be urged for the practice of not acknowledging in commercial relations, and by Custom-house usage, every interchange of sovereignty as the work of treaty; whilst it is considered, that the relative importance of a produce, manufacture, mart, or haven, may be much affected and altered, as belonging to a little kingdom or to a great one; as appendant to one dominion to the south, or another dominion to the north. In these points, a change may wholly do away the propriety of the place or province participating in immunities of commerce granted to

the state it passes over to; and the British Legislature will weigh the consequences ere it so allows. Such considerations probably operate as to Riga, Stettin, and Dunkirk; but these cases are no ways applicable to that of America: if deemed applicable, we must admit further, and the absurdity would occur, of American vessels being yet entitled to British draw-backs and bounties! But they are no ways applicable; for the relation of a country torn and separated from the mother-country, cannot be deemed analogous to that of a territory transferred between foreign sovereigns. That the treaty was not only all our own, but that the recognition of independence by any one act of the Legislature, was not only a direliction of future legislation, but a virtual abrogation of all past acts touching America. If still insisted that the alienation of America is merely and exclusively a work of treaty, it might yet be urged that, in a commercial view, and in the true spirit, and by the very letter of the 14th and 15th Hen. VIII. cap. 4, the Americans are to all purposes of trade become aliens; for, by that statute, a subject of England swearing fealty to a foreign prince, becomes a commercial alien, and shall pay alien duties, as by the *Charta Mercatoria* of Edward I. But all matter of casuistry apart, it is insisted, that as to the main matter in question, and actual and existing state of intercourse by trade between our colonies and America, *no rule or law* on our Statute-book whatever, precludes various produce and articles coming to our plantations from America in British ships

navigated according to law: that as to clauses in our navigation acts, touching the local growth and manufactures of the articles freighted, it may be observed that these clauses relate not to entry into our colonial ports, but only into those of England, Ireland, Guernsey, Jersey, and the town of Berwick upon Tweed: that the present *bill is the first restrictory act!* that were further argument necessary to prove that no general system of exclusion enters into our commercial code, as far as regards intercourse between Africa, America, and our colonies, we have only to revert to our tax laws: goods and produce, under the general description of foreign, have repeatedly been taxed on entry into our colonies, as well as home ports; and the inference then is, that such entry was never forbidden, from the very conditions annexed to it; for although occasionally, through weight of the impost, a virtual prohibition took place, yet that was the operation of the tax, and which might in sundry cases lose its prohibitory effect; for an extraordinary contingency of wants might overcome the enhancement of price, and gain admission to the commodity. Considering the American United States, therefore, in their true and actual relation of foreign trans-Atlantic states, our colonial commerce in British ships *is open to them*, not needing *permissions*, but requiring such *restrictions*, as British policy shall impose."

The House of Commons adopted the construction of the navigation laws, as expounded by Mr. Jenkinson, and a bill was

brought in, limiting the existing right of supplies from America for the British colonies, to certain enumerated articles.

The above discussion in Parliament, conducted by two men perhaps the best qualified of any in this commercial country to deliver just and sound opinions on a matter of commerce, is a proper and useful introduction to the subject which I have next in view—of the intercourse and trade between America and the British sugar colonies.

CHAP. VIII.

On the Intercourse of the British West Indies with America, and in particular with the British Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland.

THE islands generally described as the West Indies, appear on the map as dependencies on the Continent of America; and, in another point of view, are remarkable, as forming a chain of communication, stretching across and covering the great Gulph of Mexico, from the Floridas to the Spanish province of Cumana, and connecting and facilitating the intercourse between the northern and southern divisions of that vast Continent. In a third, and most important consideration to Great Britain, this link and line of islands opposes a frontier towards Europe, of easy and ready access, from the prevalence of the easterly or trade winds between the tropics, and exhibits a series of warehouses and *depôt* for general traffic, whether to America, north or south, or westward within the Gulph, or wherever, within the ulterior circle of coasts, British merchandize may be acceptable, or British enterprize reach.

In these several relations, and under the distinct heads of a direct trade with the Continent for the service and use of the

British islands, and of a commerce to which these islands may serve as places of deposit and factory, we will now consider the subject of the American Intercourse and Trade with the West Indies.

It has before been stated, and is too obvious to argue further, that the greater facilities of communication will influence the choice of dealing between distant nations and countries; and that the proffered advantages of more cheap, speedy, and occasional supply, must ever induce those in the West Indies to seek what is necessary to their subsistence from America, rather than from Europe.

But admitting these circumstances to operate as an influence of Nature, and paramount in force and effect over any political regulation or authority; yet a further question occurs, relative to the Northern Continent of America, as divided into British provinces and independent states.

It has been contended, that whatever is required for the use of the British islands, should be furnished in preference, or indeed exclusively, by the Canadas, Nova Scotia, or Newfoundland. On this point, the means of providing the articles required, and the comparative expedition and facilities of conveyance, recur for consideration, in like manner as on the alternative of supply from Europe, or from America at large.

The obstructions and inconveniences to commerce between the West Indies and more northern provinces of America, are

those of Nature; and will, and must operate in creating a preference from islands to the west and south, of dealing with those countries which offer a readier access and intercourse. Jamaica would never, by choice, apply to New Brunswick, for what it might procure from Philadelphia.

Moreover, to the disadvantages of longer and more perilous navigation may be added, the occasional difficulties of trading at all seasons with the Canadas at least, under embargoes from frost and climate in the higher latitudes.

But impediments or inconveniences of navigation apart, the British provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland (excepting the latter, as a fishery) are not in a state of population and settlement, or generally in a condition of country, to furnish the articles required. In the debates of the House of Commons, July 1806, on the subject of the American intercourse, it was strongly contended by an able and intelligent Member, who had lately presided at the Board of Trade, "that the British continental provinces could, and would, supply all the provisions and lumber required by the sugar colonies, if their trade was not checked by the competition allowed to the United States." I am under no necessity of arguing the matter then at issue; the assertion, or supposition, will be, on inference, completely refuted by an official document, rendering an account of all that the British provinces in question did, and therefore *could*, supply,

and actually did require for their own use and necessities, in the year 1788, when the whole trade to the West Indies was restricted to British shipping navigated according to law; when foreign America could not trade with the British islands in vessels of the country; and when the Canadas, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, had every advantage in trade over the circuitous commerce *viâ* the United States, as carried on by the mother-country.

The reader will pay attention to the items of account exhibited in the following table.

An Account of the Number of Ships, and their Tonnage, which have been employed in the Trade between the British Islands in the West Indies and the British Colonies in America, in the Year 1788, *specifying the Articles Imported from these Islands to the British Colonies in America, and the Quantity of Fish Exported to the West Indies from Newfoundland; presented to the House of Commons, March* 18, 1790.

		From West Indies to British Provinces.			To West Indies.	
Ships, inwards.	Tons.		Measure.	Quantity.	Fish, Barrels.	Fish, Quintals.
153	14,009	Indian corn, ...	bushels	335	803½	22,196
		Chocolate, ...	lb.	6767		
		Cocoa, ...	cwt.	121 cwt. 1qr. 18lb.		
		Coffee, ...	cwt.	794cwt. 10lb.		
		Ginger, ...	lb.	1470		
		Pimento, ...	lb.	582		
		Sugar, ...	cwt.	9285cwt. 1qr. 2lb.		
		Mahogany, ...	logs	51		
		Lignum vitæ, ...	tons	6¾		
		Hides, ...	number	255		
		Limes, ...	barrels	227		
		Melasses, ...	gallons	53,944		
		Pine-apples, ...	dozen ..	12		
		Pitch and tar, ...	barrels	770		
		Bread-flour, ...	barrels	281		
		Onions, ...	lb.	10,000		
		Salt*, ...	bushels	93,328		
		Rum, ...	gallons	493,844		
		Shooks, hogsheads,	number	150		
		Staves, ...	number	25,500		
		Cotton wool, ...	lb.	2250		

Supposing the item of 281 barrels of flour imported to the British continental provinces from the West Indies, to be a mere

* From the Bahama salt-pits, probably for the fisheries of Newfoundland.

casualty, and reserve of ships' provisions; yet, from this commercial return, it appears that, in 1788, the Canadas and Nova Scotia, under every advantage of trade and navigation, furnished no bread-flour to the West Indies; they could not even furnish the neighbouring fisheries of Newfoundland; or wherefore else was Mr. Jenkinson's Act (the 25th Geo. III. cap. 1) passed, to admit the import of flour from the *United States* as a resource of necessity to the people of Newfoundland?

The export of 25,500 staves from the West Indies, was probably for the package of Newfoundland fish; and this shews that even lumber was not furnished at the time by Nova Scotia, in quantities sufficient for sparing a full supply even to the great island in its vicinity, and much less to the West Indies. These northern provinces have, indeed, since become more peopled, settled, and cleared of woods; and timber has been thence exported in considerable quantities, as will appear from subsequent returns. But when we come to inspect the tables of actual supply furnished to the sugar colonies by the great countries, now the United States, and observe how small a proportion, in any one year, the largest export of lumber from the British provinces bears to the total of what was required, and supplied to the sugar colonies; we cannot prudentially—we could not, even as unfeeling and usurious brokers for the mother-country, restrict our West India planters to so scanty a resource and means of procuring an article which is indispensable for the package of their produce,

and its transport to the markets of England. But, to insist that the colonists and their negroes in our islands, should be dependent for their *provisions* exclusively on the British provinces in America, would be to lay a direct embargo on their subsistence, and to endanger not merely trade and produce, but the very root and stock of all—the maintenance and safety of our people throughout the islands!

On the medium of ten years, from 1793 to 1803, the supply to the British West Indies from the United States, was annually 164,680 barrels, each 196 lb. of bread flour; and, in the same period, the average supply from the British provinces was only 1570 barrels; whilst the supply of flour from Great Britain is limited by statute to 3200 tons, or 32,000 barrels, of 2 cwt. leaving a deficiency of this article of life, of 131,110 barrels, to be supplied by the United States, supposing even Great Britain henceforward to supply its complement, and to have sent no flour to the West Indies for years past: but the British supply taken apart, as supposed at all times, the deficiency, if left to Canada and Nova Scotia, is of 163,110 barrels of *bread*, wanting for the usual and annual consumption of planters, *British officers and soldiers*, in the West Indies!

On a view of this statement, which will be explained and confirmed by official documents, no benevolent man, no considerate statesman, no friend to his country and its colonies, will require

that they should depend for provisions, that is, for food and life, on supplies to be furnished exclusively by and from the British provinces in America.

An Account of the Quantity of Provisions and Lumber Imported into the British West Indies (exclusive of Conquered Colonies) from the British Continental Colonies.

Return to House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

		1773.	1788.	1793.	1797.	1800.	1803.
Corn, ...	bushels, ...	....	....	171	847	919	1518
Flour and meal,	barrels, 2cwt.	330	....	1656	1589	320	1374
Rice, ...	barrels, ...	....	....	20	.....	68	26
Fish, dry, ...	quintals, ...	4907	22,196	99,570	27,576	61,258	127,628
Fish, pickled,	barrels, ...	4107	803	24,827	9949	14,105	23,865
Beef and pork,	barrels, ...	57	....	349	241	181	922
Pine boards, ..	feet, ...	78,013	....	3,618,200	511,390	1,039,895	2,223,179
Scantling & timber,	tons, ...	....	....	324	39	.....	186
Shingles, ...	number, ...	61,700	....	2,929,150	464,200	424,650	915,544
Staves, ...	number, ...	9137	....	151,060	41,350	173,385	235,788

The last year of the above return, to 5th January, 1803, was a year of armistice; and the consequences of a free and open navigation, as no longer obstructed by the enemy, surcharged with war freights and insurance, or restricted, from apprehensions of the impress service, are obvious in the increased exports of lumber and of *fish:* of other provisions there were comparatively no cargoes at any time.

Fish is an article from Newfoundland, which has, and should

have, every encouragement given by the mother-country, for its production and trade. In the spring of this year (1806), a bounty has been proposed by Government, of two shillings, on every quintal of fish imported into the West Indies from Newfoundland; and a duty of two shillings, per contra, on fish from the United States, to be levied in the different islands.

In times of peace, the premium and counter-duty may operate advantageously, by securing a preference to British fish; but under the present circumstances of the war, I doubt of the efficacy and use of the measure. In fact, much of the fish which goes to the West Indies, freighted in vessels of the United States, hath been caught on *the banks* by our own fishermen, and sold at sea to the Americans, as mere factors and neutral carriers, to avoid danger from the enemy, in going further southward for the disposal of the cargo themselves. In this case, the duty to be paid will be required as an abatement on the intermediate bargain; and what is received by one part of the Newfoundland traders in the islands, will be refunded by others selling on the banks. Comparing the entries in 1800 and 1803, an absolute decline of the fishery is not to be presumed in the former period of war; but rather that a moiety of *the catch* of fish has been bartered and conveyed as I have described. The regulation, however, of premium and counter-duty, will have its good effect in competition, on return of peace; can have no bad

effect in the interval; and is altogether a measure of good policy and future use.

In regard to lumber, the price of freight on each article is so heavy in proportion to the intrinsic value of the article itself, that any surcharge on the former must greatly operate in reduction of the trade; and in times of war it will seek relief by passing to neutral bottoms. In times of peace, it appears from the returns of 1793 and 1803, that a large proportion of planks and fir may be exported from the Northern British Provinces; but the quantity of oak-staves is at all times too small, in proportion to the sum required, and supplied from other quarters, to be taken as of consequence in the estimate.

It is not alone the apprehension of a more partial and scanty assortment of supplies from the northern countries, which may induce the West Indian to prefer dealing with those of the United States, if free so to do. The less numerous and (for numbers) the less wealthy population of Nova Scotia, &c. suggest other reasons for preferring to deal with those who, for home consumption, may require, and take a greater quantity of, West India produce in return; meaning especially *rum*, which is the general medium of traffic, and to be considered as the *money* with which the sugar colonist pays for the American stores required for his estate. The West India interest must, in this view of the case, be consulted, implicated as it is with the means of cultivation, and the national resource from the plantations.

Exports from the British Sugar Colonies to the British Provinces in America, Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland.

Return to House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

	Rum.	Sugar.	Coffee.	Cotton.
	Gallons.	Cwt.	Cwt.	lb.
1787	777,360	9019	546	1500
1793	613,898	5106	603	8690
1794	525,720	4615	80	6304
1795	204,965	3320	99	1600
1796	307,124	7332	514	1550
1797	486,706	3893	427	12,850
1798	384,953	4508	802	18,250
1799	664,258	9933	1130	750
1800	186,449	10,660	775	4274
1801	569,691	10,366	935	500
1802	584,673	11,397	257	14,950
1803	792,474	13,906	1353	3250

The above returns may be referred to in a comparative view, on the taking into consideration the next branch of West India trade, namely, that with the United States of America, and which, as a matter in controversy, not less important to the mother-country than to its West India colonies, I shall discourse of more at large in the ensuing chapters.

CHAP. IX.

On the Intercourse and Trade of the United States of America with the British West Indies.

THE vast extent of America, from Penobscot to the borders of Florida, slanting from lat. 45, long. 67, to the Savannah, lat. 32, long. 80, and offering above one thousand miles of coast, with commodious harbours, and mouths of navigable rivers, for the convenience of trade, and concentrating the productions of the interior country, was, previous to the year 1775, an immense province of the British empire; and torn from its sovereignty by revolutionary wars, concluding in the recognition of its independence in 1803, now constitutes a federation of countries and governments, under the title of "the United States of America." Whilst the people of this vast tract of continent were British subjects, they shared in the full rights and privileges of the mother-country; their vessels, by the 14th Car. II. cap. 11, were recognized as English-built; and they had free access to the British West Indies, for the supplying from American produce, whatever might be required in the islands for subsistence and use, with exception to manufactures, and to certain enumerated articles, held in reserve by the mother-country.

The variety of productions, and convenient assortment of cargoes, from countries extending so widely north and south, and their facility of intercourse at all seasons, and in different tracts and channels, with the West Indies, may be presumed to have vested principally, if not exclusively, in the Americans (then subjects of Great Britain), whatever trade there was with the sugar colonies, of a description which required to be frequent and occasional, from the perishable nature of the article, and the exigency of its use and consumption: we may infer, that previous to the revolution and hostilities which commenced in 1774, America furnished to the British islands, all, or nearly all, the *provisions* wanted, and other immediate necessaries of life and industry. Having then before us a correct return, with the amount of the enumerated articles supplied for the three years, to 1773 inclusive, we may assume that for *provisions* at least, it is nearly a full and complete account of all the supplies which our sugar colonies required at the time.

Allowing for a greater or less proportion of each commodity to be required, on estimate of probable change in the population or circumstances of our West India settlements, down to the present æra, we may, from an enumeration of American supplies in 1773, compute the extent of trade in various and distinct articles, which may be assumed and insisted on by Great Britain, as within the policy and system of monopoly in commerce

with its colonies; or, which may be humanely and prudentially relinquished, in deference to the wants and necessities of its people, and for the advancement of the general interest, by rendering the resources of subsistence and industry safe and sure throughout all the dependencies of empire.

The very interesting document to which I refer, has been preserved in the Reports of the Privy Council in 1784, and reprinted June 9th, 1806, by order of the House of Commons.

An Account of the Total Import from North America into the British West India Islands, in the Years 1771, 1772, *and* 1773, *taken from an Official Account signed by Mr. Stanley, Secretary to the Commissioners of the Customs in London, dated* 15*th March,* 1775.

For Three Years, ending 5th January, 1774. N. B. Divide by three, &c. for the Yearly Supply.

		From United States.	From Canada and Nova Scotia.	From Newfoundland.
Boards and timber,	feet, ...	76,767,695	232,040	2000
Shingles, ...	number	59,586,194	185,000	.....
Staves, ...	number	57,998,661	27,350	.....
Hoops, ...	number	4,712,005	16,250	9000
Corn, ...	bushels	1,204,389	24	.....
Pease and beans, ...	bushels	64,006	1017	.....
Bread and flour, ...	barrels	396,329	991	.....
Ditto ditto, ...	kegs	13,099	.....	.....
Rice, ...	barrels	39,912	.....	.....
Ditto, ...	tierces	21,777	.....	.....
Fish, ...	hogsh.	51,341	449	2307
Ditto, ...	barrels	47,686	646	202
Ditto, ...	quintals	21,500	2958	11,764
Ditto, ...	kegs	3304	609	.....
Beef and pork, ...	barrels	44,782	270	24
Poultry, ...	dozen ..	2739	10	.....
Sheep and hogs, ...	number	13,815	.....	.....
Oxen, ...	number	3647	.....	.....
Horses, ...	number	7130	28	.....
Oil, ...	barrels	3189	139	118
Tar and pitch, ...	barrels	17,024	.....	.....
Masts, ...	number	157	.....	.....
Spars, ...	number	3074	30	.....
Shook casks, ...	number	53,857	40	141
Soap and candles, ..	boxes ..	20,475	.....	.....
Ox-bows and yokes,	number	1540	.....	.....
House frames, ...	number	620	.....	.....
Iron, ...	tons	399½	.....	.....

	Rum. Puncheons, 120 Gallons.	*Sugar.* Sugar, Hogsh. 13 Cwt.
The Americans took in return, in 1772,	32,265	3776
1773,	43,488	5328

It is by no means contended, that the preceding table of supplies furnished to the West Indies from America, previous to the war in 1774, comprises the total, in reference to every article enumerated. A limited proportion of corn and flour must at all times have been freighted from Great Britain; and a very considerable quantity of herrings from the British fisheries, was yearly furnished, for subsistence of the negroes in the West Indies. Beef and pork, too, may have made some small part of the cargoes; but it must be remembered, that it was by an act passed so late as the 20th of George III. cap. 10, that Ireland was admitted to a share in the colonial commerce: before 1780, Ireland could not export its beef, pork, and butter, direct to the British West Indies.

What I propose, as inference, from the geographical exposition and arguments in the opening of this Chapter, and with reference to the commercial returns reported by the Privy Council in 1784, is, that lumber and provisions, as in the first instance presumed, were articles generally (though with some probable exception), supplied to the British islands from America, previous to the war obstructing the intercourse and trade, in 1774; and further, that the quantities of each article returned, afford grounds of computation, as to the nature and extent of what was required at the time for the subsistence and use of the British colonists in the West Indies.

Great Britain, whilst sovereign of North America, in relin-

quishing the provision trade to the West Indies in favour of its colonial dependencies on the Continent, seemed to foster the industry and agriculture of its people in those distant provinces, and at the same time to provide for the necessities of its people at home; for it is ascertained, that the corn grown in England, is not at all times equal to the home consumption. In this, Great Britain conceded therefore a branch of export trade, which it was scarcely its interest to retain; but, what was policy, carried with it the air of liberal concession; and national pride was satisfied, that in so far relinquishing the rights of monopoly in trade with the plantations, it was a grant, and not a surrender. On the provinces of America being no longer subject, but becoming an independent and foreign power, under the name of the United States, the case was wholly altered. Immediately after the treaty of Paris, in 1783, by which the States of America were recognized as an independent and sovereign power, measures were taken in London, to regulate anew the trade between America and the sugar colonies. The Legislature passed an act in June 1803, empowering the King to issue Orders in Council to this effect, under certain limitations; and on July 2, 1803, an order, so authorized, was made, "that provisions and lumber might be carried *direct* from the United States to the British West Indies, but in British ships only, and navigated according to law."

This restriction was by the West Indians considered as a pro-

hibition. February 6th, 1804, the West India merchants in London petitioned the King and Parliament, stating, " that the planters in the sugar colonies could neither subsist their negroes, or provide package for their produce, without supplies from America of provisions and lumber; and that a circuitous voyage by British ships *viâ* America, would not only incur a surcharge of freights and commission, most heavy on the purchaser and consumer, but that occasionally the supply might altogether fail to arrive as required, from length and contingencies of the voyage:" and further representing, " that the medium of ordinary payment in the sugar colonies for lumber and provisions, was *rum*, which America did, and *would take*, but which the merchants of Great Britain would not take, to the amount required, not being an article disposable in the home market."

Government resisted all these circumstances; and from 1784 to 1793 inclusive, the trade for all supplies to the British sugar colonies was restricted to British shipping; nor in the event, during this period of *peace*, were the islands so distressed, as had been presumed by the petitioners. The wants of the planters were supplied, although certainly at a dearer rate; for intermediate trade and factory always has its charge. The enhancement of price in the necessaries of life, was, however, not the only grievance: the supplies were occasionally scanty, as well as dear; and much distress, on this account, was alledged. It has even been said, that a number of negroes in Jamaica, to the amount of 15,000,

died of famine, from default of usual and timely supply of American provisions, in a year of dearth afflicting that island. I mention this as a current report, but do not vouch as fact, what I cannot authenticate. Be this as it may: Great Britain, during a period of ten years' peace, derived advantage from the so enforcing its Navigation laws: the carrying trade was engrossed by British ship-owners; the British merchant had his profits of trade and commission on the articles supplied; and in a much more considerable proportion than heretofore, the supply was of British produce, and from the British fisheries.

The following tables will shew the state and extent of the trade between America and the West Indies, as affected by the regulations instituted in 1783, and sustained to 1793, inclusive; and evince how far Great Britain can at any, and the most favourable period, set limits to the commerce and intercourse which Nature seems to have pointed out, as suitable and belonging to the Continent of America, and the West India islands. I have no intermediate returns; but those for the year ending 5th of January, 1793, give the supplies furnished in a year of peace, and under restriction of our navigation laws, and may serve generally in comparison with the trade, when the operation of those laws was suspended in the succeeding years.

With some allowances in exception, we may admit the following table for purposes of comparison and general inference, to shew all that was required in the West Indies, as all supplied

from America in the year 1773; and all that could be subtracted from that supply, and therefore, practically, all to be furnished by Great Britain, or by its American provinces, in 1792. In a second, and other point of view, we may examine the returns, as exhibiting, from the access of trade to America in the latter years, how much of that trade Great Britain forewent and lost, by a subsequent relaxation of the letter of its Navigation Acts, under and by the instructions given by the Executive Ministers in England to governors of the colonies, that "during the war, as necessity shall require, they may issue proclamations, admitting an import to the plantations, of lumber and provisions from America, in American vessels."

Provisions and Lumber Imported into the West Indies (exclusive of the Conquered Colonies) from the United States of America.

Return to House of Commons, May 5, 1806.

	Measure.	1773.	1793.	1797.	1800.	1803.
Corn, ...	bushels	401,463	241,986	333,762	445,069	647,853
Flour and meal,	bushels	136,509	130,677	178,167	163,998	431,504
Rice, ...	do. &c.	35,081	12,797	9116	13,052	9393
Beef and pork,	barrels	14,927	140	11,306	24,503	49,203
Fish, dry, ...	quintals	7167	5025	33,934	29,169	61,124
Fish, pickled, ..	barrels	68,341	426	18,956	17,979	15,256
Pine boards, &c.	feet	25,589,232	14,647,724	10,766,826	23,161,441	29,960,623
Timber, ...	tons	.....	784	4287	6997	7807
Shingles, ...	number	19,862,068	23,471,922	22,990,300	33,280,408	39,357,828
Staves, ...	number	19,332,880	6,864,400	6,498,634	12,306,793	13,519,455

It appears from the column 1793 of the preceding return, that Great Britain or Ireland, in *times of peace*, can furnish all the *beef* and pork; and that Newfoundland and the home fisheries supply most of what is required of the important article, *fish;* but bread-flour and rice (most essential to the subsistence of the planters and negroes in the West Indies) seem in no case, and at no time, to have been fully provided, excepting from America. Of oak staves too, as it appears, England can furnish a considerable part of the supply; but I must doubt, that it is the national interest so to do. Reserving these matters for subsequent discussion, I must now advert to the carrying trade; on any change in which, the whole course of traffic seems to have shifted, whether with advantage to America, or to Great Britain supporting its colonies, or perhaps generally, and to all parties, under circumstances of the times.

In 1787, when the Navigation Acts were in force, and, with the exception of entries at the privileged free ports, the intercourse between America and the islands was restricted to British shipping, the vessels engaged in this trade, including repeated voyages and entry, were as follow.

Entry Inwards at Ports of the British Sugar Colonies.

Return to House of Commons, 1788.

	Ships.	Tons.	Each Ship.
Total ships and vessels, ...	2582	284,966	.....
Of these, there were ships direct from Great Britain, ...	547	130,865	240
To account, in direct intercourse with America, ...	2035	154,101	76
Of these from the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.	153	14,009	90
Remain to account in trade with the United States, ...	1882	140,092	73½

By a subsequent return made to the House of Commons, June 2, 1806, the *British-built* vessels belonging to the British continental provinces and West India islands, were, in the year 1792,—vessels, 1568; tons, 89,724; tons each, 57½.

Allowing for repeated voyages and entry in the former period, the vessels were probably more numerous in 1792; and supposing some few large English ships to have engaged in 1787 in the American intercourse, the tonnage of sloops and schooners then belonging to the colonies, will be reduced to the medium size of vessels in 1792. The vessels (with the exception of those from Canada, Halifax, and Newfoundland, in all but 153) were principally Bermuda-built; but few of the tonnage described can be supposed to have passed the Atlantic from England. The navigation in this trade has at all times been carried on chiefly by American and negro sailors; and (evasions in ownership apart)

this branch of the carrying trade could at no time be very highly appreciated, in comparison with that in other channels of British commerce, and in general reference to the scheme and policy of the Navigation Acts. The direct and frequent intercourse between America and the West Indies, will never, in any considerable proportion, be carried on by ships from England: the sloops and schooners of those seas are much better suited to the navigation and trade; they can run up rivers, and enter small creeks and bays; they can beat to windward amongst the islands, in search or change of market, or they can lay on and off on a windward coast; they can dispose of entire cargoes at a single plantation wharf; and have many other advantages in the traffic, which must generally operate to the exclusion of large merchant ships from the competition. In truth, the regulation in our free ports, which restricts the entry and admission to vessels having one deck, is more provident than necessary. These circumstances, however, taking somewhat from the importance of the object, leave no question in dispute as to the policy of extending the Navigation Acts to this channel of commerce. Certainly there is a shipping interest in the trade of considerable value, both from the building of vessels, and their freight; and it is of value in a national, as well as in mercantile points of view. As a general position, I am ready to admit, that Great Britain assuming an exclusive carrying trade from the continent of America, by British vessels navigated according to law, will add to its naval resources

and power; but this I must admit with a reserve for times and circumstances, when the monopoly can be so enforced without endangering the safety of the West India colonies, contributing as they do, to form, strengthen and extend, the very foundations of that naval resource and power. This consideration leads us to a review of the nature, value, necessity, and importance, of the articles to be carried, as comparative with those of the branch of carrying trade now under discussion. Referring to the last commercial returns, of the 5th May, 1806, it appears, that in 1792-3, when Great Britain might, and probably, therefore, did supply the West Indies with all of its own produce which it *could* supply, yet that it sought corn, flour, meal, and rice, the produce of America, for the use and subsistence of its people in the islands; and likewise lumber, under the different descriptions of plank, timber, shingles, and staves. These, then, we are to presume, form part of the supply which America alone can sufficiently provide, and which being articles of the first necessity, must be conveyed for the use of the islands at any rate; in British ships, if they can be so freighted; if not, in others.

Whatever resources there may be for subsisting the planters and negroes in the West Indies, by means of British trade and shipping, in times of *peace*, the case is far different in times of war. Great Britain is generally aware of the difficulties and embarrassments which may affect its commercial interests, from a too rigid adherence to its marine system at such a crisis; and in times of

war, one great naval principle of its Navigation Laws is suspended by the act of the 21st of Geo. III. cap. 11, which, in times of war, allows merchant ships to be navigated by three-fourths foreign sailors.

Could bread-flour for the subsistence of the colonists, and staves for the package of their produce, be fully supplied by Great Britain; yet, in times of war, the supply of that most essential article, flour, perishable as it is in the tropical climates, could not be furnished occasionally, and as frequently as required, under the system and policy of convoys, so often and so long delayed. But Great Britain *cannot*, directly and from itself, supply the two great necessaries of bread-flour and oak staves. In precaution for the subsistence of its own people, it is in Great Britain by law provided, that the export of corn to *all* its West India dependencies shall not, in any one year, exceed certain enumerated quantities of each species; and of bread-flour in particular, not exceeding 320 tons, or 32,200 barrels of 200 lbs. each: whereas, the quantity of bread-flour required by our colonists and garrisons in the West Indies, and actually furnished in the year 1803 by the United States of America exclusively, amounted to 431,504 barrels of flour and meal! For oak staves, computing yearly packages for 250,000 hogsheads of sugar, and 120,000 puncheons of rum, requiring, with headings, 50 staves each, and adding the package of coffee, and other articles, the yearly demand would be for 20,000,000 of oak staves, and which England could

not supply, without prejudice to its nurseries of young oak, and to the future service of its navy. Plank, scantling, and shingles, can in no adequate degree be supplied by British produce.

Under the strict letter of the Navigation Acts, these articles, then, must be taken to the West Indies *viâ* America, in British shipping; but in times of war, the surcharges of freight and insurance will not only bear most heavy on such a circuitous voyage, but the ships cannot proceed without convoy; and the difficulties and delays attending convoys must be tenfold, in application to a circuitous navigation, in so many directions, and to so many various points of destination; and a regular communication in this way, is next to impracticable.

In result, then, of political and physical necessities, the British sugar colonies must, during war, be supplied with corn, flour, staves, and lumber, from America, in American or neutral vessels. The policy of the mother-country remains to be exercised, in restricting this carrying trade to enumerated articles of supply, most necessary and indispensable. Even for a certain description of provisions, regulations may restrict, but I think not wholly prohibit, an import to the islands, from any other quarter, or by any other means, than in British ships. Thus Great Britain may encourage the export of beef, pork, and butter, from Ireland, by limiting the quantities allowed for import severally to the islands from any other quarter; but wholly to prohibit the foreign article, is to tell 500,000 slaves in the plantations, "ne-

ver, during war, shall you again taste your Christmas treat of beef!" for I do not remember, of late years, a single instance of an outward-bound fleet and convoy being so true to autumnal promise, as to admit of its arrival in the West Indies before Christmas-day. Fish is an article of which the monopoly should be most jealously maintained by the mother-country; but yet some competition in the market must be left open, to ensure the proper curing, packing, and perfection of the article, and serve the national fishery in its most essential interests, by sustaining a general estimation of its produce.

As for an illicit traffic in East India and other manufactures, said to be carried on under cover of a *provision trade* from America, the assertion remains for proof; and certainly such contraband is no necessary consequence, and may be prevented; but, on such allegation, to prohibit the trade itself for provisions and lumber, might reduce the colonists to an exigency, under which the famished negroes might rebel from work, or their work be lost, for want of package, and Great Britain, from an improvident and bigotted attachment to a mere letter of its Navigation Acts, lose the trade and very *navigation* of its now rich and flourishing colonies.

Admitting, in times of war, the intercourse between America and the West Indies to be indispensable, an important question arises, as to the mode of providing for its regulation and controul, whether by proclamations as heretofore, from 1793 to

1805, or by Order of the King in Council, to be issued as the case may require, or by settled and permanent provisions of statute: I certainly, and for strong reasons, should prefer a system of regulation *by law*.

Uncertainty awakens distrust—the preventative, or the bane and ruin, of all mercantile adventure and dealings. Commerce lives on credit, and credit on the assurance that goods will be received as required, and paid for as received. Trade allowed only for occasional and short periods, is, in either respect, matter of distrust; it is liable, from a speculation on sudden and temporary advantages, to the extremes, of being pushed to an excess, which may consequently create a glut at market, and, by the disappointment of profits, preclude future and necessary adventure; or, on the other hand, it may generally be declined, from the temporary advantages held out, not compensating the inconvenience of diverting capital and shipping from a former and usual course of engagements. In the first case, on the license of trade expiring, it combines with immediate loss the privation of indemnifications in future, and leaves an ill-humour, which, from the "*crie du commerce*," becomes national, then reaches to governments, and is the source of remonstrances, retaliations, and war. In the second instance, the few speculators make an exorbitant profit, the few purchasers are pillaged, the people at large are not supplied, and the measure, to every public use and effect, has not answered.

At any rate, if an American intercourse with the British West Indies is to be admitted and regulated by discretionary proclamations or Orders in Council, the period granted for the license should be of a duration to allow of notice in the most distant quarters of the trade, and this for its abandonment as well as for its assumption, or otherwise no merchant will engage in it a second time.

I know that the great question at issue is the *carrying trade;* and this I shall treat of in a distinct Chapter, with all the care and consideration which the importance of the subject requires. The mere barter of provisions and lumber, as a produce, being so restricted as to trade, and limited to the crisis and season which requires its license, is certainly a secondary concern to Great Britain: whatever may be the value of the supplies to the sugar colonies so furnished, it is amply repaid by America in the general balance of trade; and it can never be for the interest of Great Britain to risk a contest "of non-importation agreements and embargoes."

Trade of the United States of America with Great Britain, at different Periods.

Return to House of Commons, March 8, 1802.

	Imports.	Exports to America from Great Britain.			
	From America.	British Produce and Manufacture.		Foreign Articles.	Total Export.
	Real Value.	Official Value.	Real Value.	Real Value.	Total Value.
Medium of three years, ending Jan. 5, 1793,	£. 1,712,004	£. 3,694,398	£. 5,531,597	£. 422,724	£. 5,954,321
Medium of three years, ending Jan. 5, 1801,	2,979,792	6,232,919	9,349,380	411,840	9,761,220

By a return made to the House of Commons, 18th April, 1806, the total export of British produce and manufactures for three years, ending 1801, was, average the year, 40,056,015*l.*; of which, the export to the United States of America, as above, was 9,349,380*l.* being nearly one-fourth of the whole export. And from the above table it appears, that this valuable trade hath nearly doubled during the war in 1800-1, rendering an actual balance of trade in favour of Great Britain, to the amount of 6,781,428*l.* It matters not, in this view, whether America is wholly the consumer, or in part the mere carrier, for Great Britain.

The exports direct, of West India produce to America, in return for provisions and lumber imported, remains to shew; and with these I shall conclude the details of this important, and so much questioned, branch of commercial intercourse.

Exports direct from the West Indies to the United States of America, of Four Staple Articles.

	Rum.	Sugar.	Coffee.	Cotton.	
	Gallons.	Cwts.	Cwts.	lbs.	
1773	3,869,800	49,088	.....	.....	Before the separation of the United States of America.
1774	5,218,560	69,225	2863	202,200	
1787	1,575,105	20,127	3155	3000	British Navigation Acts in force.
1793	536,353	9336	836	.....	
1794	2,265,177	37,606	4586	74,369	Trade licensed by proclamation, in American vessels of one deck.
1795	2,106,883	67,845	22,231	49,282	
1796	3,267,280	100,033	21,828	47,400	
1797	2,197,450	54,867	13,538	86,817	
1798	1,972,985	47,172	19,421	.....	
1799	3,201,209	106,679	8093	59,400	
1800	2,761,384	90,800	7125	31,800	
1801	3,638,021	46,855	12,596	12,350	
1802	3,925,595	50,258	14,907	3000	
1803	4,198,154	113,447	19,916	.....	

Value of the above Exports in 1803.

	Quantity.	Value.
		£.
Rum, at 5*s.* cur. or 3*s.* sterl. per gallon, and joe the cask, gal.	4,198,154	708,960
Sugar, at 40*s.* sterling per cwt. nett from the plantation, cwts.	113,447	226,894
Coffee, at 4*l.* sterling per cwt. extra freight, and ditto, ... cwts.	19,916	79,664
Cotton, at 1*s.* ditto, ditto, ... lbs.	.....	.....
Sundries, melasses, pimento, ginger, &c. &c.	.....	150,000
Total value of exports, ...	.....	1,165,518

By the act passed in July 1806, in regulation of the future intercourse between America and the West Indies, under Orders to be issued by the King in Council, sugar and coffee are expunged from the list of enumerated articles before licensed for the trade. The exception so made, is a rigid, and, I think, improvident resumption, of a portion of monopoly, in its extent of little value to the mother-country, however, in the latitude formerly given, of use to the colonies in barter with America.

The Americans will never, for their home-consumption, look for coffee and sugar in the markets of London, whilst Guadaloupe and Martinique are within their reach; and that the limitation to quantities for use, was heretofore in no degree infringed, or the Americans carriers for others, appears from the yearly sum of these articles exported, as above. In whatever view, I can descry no principle of sound and enlightened policy in the late restrictions; and least of all in their effect, of obliging the West India planter, by bullion and bills of exchange, to replace the share of his produce before taken in payment.

CHAP. X.

On the Navigation Laws, and on the Shipping Interest of Great Britain, as affected by the Trade of America to the West Indies.

NEITHER the expediency nor the justice of the most strict enforcement of the Navigation Acts, in their application to colonial trade, could be a matter of question, whilst America was British; and as such, sharing the privilege of the mother-country, might, by its own vessels, furnish those articles of necessity and subsistence to the British West Indies, which its locality and means of ready intercourse best enabled it to do. But when its provinces were torn from Great Britain by those convulsions of empire fomented and supported by the rival powers of France, Spain, and Holland (all of which have dearly repented the interposition!); and when, finally, by the treaty of 1803, Great Britain abdicated its sovereignty, and these ancient dependencies became a separate power, under the title of the United States, they of course became alien and foreign, in the constitution of our law; and the usual and natural resource of supply and subsistence to the West Indies was cut off, and to be restored (as for a time it was) by the agency and carrying trade of Great Britain.

This resource was, however, more or less practicable, according to the times, and depended on circumstances of peace or war. But the service is of a nature which cannot allow of any uncertainty: some alternative of relief should ever be in view, and for ready adoption, as the case may require: the food, maintenance, and safety of a people, should on no plea of interest be put to the hazard. But here the very interest in question is implicated in the like considerations; for the means of subsistence and industry in regular supply, constitute the foundations of colonial prosperity, and therewith of the produce, commerce, and very *carrying trade* and employment, of numerous ships and sailors, which are the objects of encouragement by our code of navigation. It must therefore be the true policy of Great Britain, whenever, from circumstances of difficulty and warfare, it no longer has the ready means of supplying its distant colonies with the necessaries for subsistence and culture, to allow and encourage their being supplied from any quarter, and in whatever manner practicable.

In such case, a partial relaxation of the provisions and strict letter of the Navigation Laws, may tend to support the very purpose and spirit of their enactment, by preserving, or even enlarging, the foundations of colonial produce and trade for a future and increased engagement of ships and sailors, at a period when the monopoly may be resumed, without endangering the basis on which it rests.

In pursuance of this sound and enlightened policy (when, in 1793-4, the circumstances of the war seemed so to require), the Ministers of the Crown instructed the Governors of the West India colonies to issue proclamations, admitting into the several islands, articles of necessity and subsistence from America, in American vessels. The British Legislature has, from year to year, sanctioned this procedure with its approval; and finally, in July 1806, passed an act, for a limited time, empowering the King in Council to issue Orders, as necessity may require, for continuing open the like sources of necessary and indispensable relief. To this wise, just, and provident measure, an opposition has arisen from a body of ship-owners and ship-builders, who state themselves as aggrieved and ruined by the allowance of any goods whatever being carried in neutral bottoms from America to the West Indies.

These respectable parties have made out a case of the decline of the carrying trade, and built of shipping, which suggests matter of serious and national alarm; but the cause of the evil is other, and, I fear, much more general and operative, than that to which it has been ascribed. The complainants yet continue their meetings and publications, have gained the *cric du commerce*, and, under impressions on the public mind thus favourable to their cause, have declared their intention of resuming their application for relief at a future sessions of Parliament.

The question, as it affects the colonies, is not of a nature merely temporary, or referring only to actual and existing cir-

cumstances; it is one which may eventually and often recur at a similar crisis; and, altogether, it involves the serious and permanent interests of the State, and requires the fullest investigation of enlightened judgment and unprejudiced decision. All this it will have in due and proper time: meanwhile a preparatory discussion will have its use; and I shall presume more freely to examine the allegations of grievance, and schemes of redress, which have been set forth *ex parte* by the petitioners to Parliament.

June 5th, 1806, in the debate of the House of Commons, on the question "of lumber and provisions being imported to the West Indies in American shipping," that very eminent merchant, and well-informed Member of Parliament, Sir Francis Baring, justly observed, "that the objection to imports so conveyed, was not founded on any general principle of the Navigation Acts which did allow of import in ships from foreign countries, of articles the immediate growth and produce of those countries; but arose out of the colonial monopoly which was grafted on, and made a part of the system, yet in exception to its general provisions in this respect."

This remark leads me to a brief exposition of the principle and scheme of the Navigation Laws; which can only be construed to support the interests of any proprietary, or body of men, ship-owners, ship-builders, or others, inasmuch as they are implicated in, and consistent with, the general interests of the colonies, the mother-country, and the empire at large. A

shipping interest is a great national concern, in which the shares held by different parties within the State may be heterogeneous and repugnant; and cases will occur, when it may require the most judicious policy and management to settle the adverse claims to an open trade, and to an exclusive navigation; and to accommodate differences between the owners of goods to be carried, and of ships to carry them (co-operating as they must do to form that commerce, and therewith that basis of the *navy*, on which the power of Great Britain is founded and sustained), all narrow and partial considerations must be put aside, and a full and comprehensive view of the subject, in all its parts and bearings, must be taken, to direct the measures of Government to a wise and safe result.

So far I premise as to the application of that great and leading principle of our Navigation Laws, which has engaged the policy of this maritime nation from the earliest times.

Navigation and trade, although, in a general consideration, connected, yet may constitute separate and distinct interests in legislation: for instance, navigation may be greatly promoted by such laws as tend to procure exclusive rights of lading and conveyance, or a carrying trade; but such provisions of law adopted for the advantage and increase of shipping, may, as restrictory on the circulation and export, operate to the prejudice of agriculture and manufactures.

The Navigation Laws of Great Britain are framed in the

policy of increasing and securing a carrying trade; and further, with a view to monopoly in the building of ships so to be employed. In regard to other and general branches of manufacture and trade, Sir Joshua Child, a strong advocate for the system, admits, that the Navigation Laws operate in prejudice to that competition from open and free admission of ships from whatever quarter, which would make a raw material cheaper, and facilitate and cheapen the passage to market of the material manufactured; and that this must, in some degree, lower the profits, and thereby check the industry, of a laborious and ingenious people, such as those of Great Britain.

The Navigation Laws, therefore, must be founded on a principle more urgent, and superior in national policy and consideration, to that of interior manufacture, and the extension of mercantile connexion and adventure. It will remain to shew how far these may co-operate with the shipping interest: but reverting to the immediate subject, the principle of the Navigation Laws is the laying a foundation of a *belligerent navy;* and in this risking some portion of the national trade, on which those laws are restrictory, and eventually may be oppressive. The first enactment on the subject which I find in the Statute Book, is in the 15th of Richard II., by which, "None of the King's subjects shall export or import, save in ships of the King's allegiance." And this was in the ancient language of the statute: "*Per encrèçer la navie d'Engleterre quiel est ore moult grandement amen usez.*"

But the act of the 4th of Henry VII. cap. 10, lays the very foundations of the present system: after reciting, "that great minishing and decay hath been now of late time of the navy of this realm of England, and idleness of mariners within the same, by which this noble realm, within short process of time, without reformation be had therein, shall not be of ability, nor of strength, to defend itself;"—it enacts, "that no person inhabitant of this realm, other than merchant strangers, shall ship in any foreign vessel, out, or home, or coastwise; and that no wines, &c. shall be brought from France, but in ships whereof the King, or his liege subjects, are owners; and the *master and mariners of the same, English, Irish, or Welsh, or men of Berwick upon Tweed.*"

The 1st of Elizabeth repeals the act of Henry VII.; but the 5th of Elizabeth, cap. 5, entitled, "An Act touching Politic Constitutions for Maintenance of the Navy," revives the provisions of the statute of Henry, restricting the trade by English subjects to English ships; and then, by numerous clauses, provides for the encouragement and extension of the fisheries. Amongst other regulations to this effect, it is enacted, "that no subject within the realm shall eat flesh meat, or other than fish, on any Wednesday within the year;" adding the curious injunction (enforced by heavy penalties), "that none shall presume to say, that this ordinance is for the good of the soul of man, or

other than for support of the fisheries, and of *the navigation of the kingdom.*"

The 13th of Elizabeth, cap. 11, "for the Maintenance of Navigation," recites the advantages of increased fisheries and navy resulting from provisions of the former act, and merely explains and amends the same.

Such were the Navigation Laws to the time of the Protectorate, 1651; when, by the Parliament, or rather by the Councils of Cromwell, a law was framed, providing, that no goods or commodities should be imported into England in foreign ships, saving of the growth and produce of the countries to which such ships were belonging, and directly proceeded from; and prohibiting all foreign ships whatever, trading to or from the British plantations in America. On the Restoration of Charles II., 1660, under the auspices of that great and good statesman, Lord Clarendon, the 12th Car. II. cap. 8, was passed, adopting the principle of the ancient Navigation Acts, with a more compendious and enlightened arrangement of provisions for giving it effect, whether by restrictions to the use of English ships, or to the service of native mariners; and further grafting thereon, and regulating, the colonial monopoly, as first provided by the ordinance of 1651: then followed the 13th Car. II. cap. 7, by which, ships admitted to colonial, and other privileged navigation, were required, not only to be carried and navigated according to the

former law, but to be *British built*. By the 6th section of the statute of frauds, 14th Car. II. cap. 11, ships built in the colonies were to be considered as British; but ships of Scotland were not included in the privilege, until by the 5th article of the Union, in the reign of Anne; nor those of Ireland, till so late as the 20th of the present King: so tenacious has England ever been of this exclusive trade, and of preferring the increase of ship-building in its own ports. Other statutes, confirming this system, passed in the reign of Charles; and these were explained and enforced by the 7th and 8th of William III. cap. 22, more specifically requiring ships to be British built; and by all these statutes, the ships privileged to the trade must be manned by three-fourths of native mariners, or *subjects* of the realm. As it is obvious that the increase of sailors should be proportionate to the increase of shipping; in consistency with the general policy of these acts, by the 6th of Anne, cap. 37, sect. 20, foreign mariners (of which one-fourth might in every case be employed) who had served two years on board a King's ship, or on board any *British merchant ship in time of war*, were adjudged natural born subjects, and had privileges with the same.

Not to recapitulate more of the Statute Book than is necessary for elucidating the subject, I pass over intermediate acts, and the regulation of tonnage, and other duties, in favour of British shipping, and come to the important and conclusive measures of the Manifest and Register Acts, the 26th of the present reign,

which appear to complete and perfect the system of encouraging exclusively the building of shipping in Great Britain, of providing for the engagement and use of such ships when built, and of employing and increasing the number of native sailors, forming three-fourths of each crew, under more ancient provisions of statute. By the Register Act, the 26th Geo. III. cap. 60, in favour of the exertions of our navy in time of war, prize ships, made free and registered, are entitled as British ships; but otherwise, the privilege to the British dock-yards is so tenaciously guarded by provisions of this law, that a British built ship, if repaired in a foreign dock-yard, to the amount, in costs, of above 15*s.* per ton, loses its distinctive privilege, however otherwise retaining certain rights of trade, as owned and navigated by subjects of the realm.

In carefully examining this code of legislation, I find little that provides for any mercantile interest distinct from that of shipping; I observe, indeed, some regulations which give a preference to native produce and manufacture, but more which, by restrictions, may create an inconvenience and loss of trade.

The principle of the Navigation Acts is, by exclusive use and employment, to encourage, procure, and sustain, the greatest practical quantity of British mercantile shipping, to be manned and worked by native sailors, as constituting a resource of ships and seamen for national service in times of war, and therewith laying the foundations of naval superiority, and of imperial power.

The principle of this system, then, *is power!* Sir Joshua Child justly remarks, that it cannot be *profit:* for a competition of vessels and carrying trade by all nations, would bring more purchasers to the home market; and by lowering freight, serve the interests of the British manufacturer in his sales abroad; and further facilitating exportation, would increase commerce, and promote internal industry and national wealth.

But as co-extensive produce, manufacture, and traffic, thereof, must be necessary, in order to lade and employ the British shipping, in proportion as it is rendered numerous, under provision of the Navigation Acts, the principle in this seems to imply contradictions; or to be at variance with the restrictory provisions for its maintenance and support: and which, in their operation, tending to check and limit the quantity of merchandize, whilst they enlarge that of shipping, appear paradoxically to produce a decrease of what is to be carried, whilst they provide for the increase of means to carry it.

In times of *peace*, however, any surcharge of freight, or occasional demurrage, from the restriction to British ships navigated according to law, cannot be of an amount or difference to operate essentially in prejudice to the export and sale of the goods freighted; in times of peace, therefore, the Navigation Acts may, in every case, be strictly enforced, without injury to trade, and with advantage to the naval power of the empire.

The industry encouraged and supported by the security of property, and freedom of person; the variety of enterprise which is excited and sustained by the latitude of occupations and adventure, which have been so long thrown open as beaten roads to competency and wealth; the pursuits of trade, rendered as honourable as advantageous in the general contemplation of our people and government; the high commercial character of our nation, which hath thence arisen, and established a preference for British dealings in every market of the world; the trust which is thence given us, and the credit we are thereby enabled to return: all these advantages more than compensate any checks on our trade from the ordinary operation of our Navigation Laws.

If, however, under circumstances of the times, these checks and controuls should be greatly increased and aggravated, the adverse interests of trade and shipping will then be set forth and appear; but such struggle of parties for relief or ascendancy may be ruinous to both, and should not be suffered to continue. The wisdom of Government will interpose, and will devise such modification of the letter of the law, however temporary, and limited to the exigency of the case, as may be expedient and necessary to reconcile those interests, and *ultimately* to *support navigation*, by an *intermediate support to trade.*

In times of war, the surcharge of freights and insurance, and loss by demurrage in the awaiting convoys, may be more than

doubled, and might thus greatly, indeed, affect the trade and sale, and therewith the condition and export of British manufacture, was its export limited to British shipping, or was the import of foreign raw materials too nicely scrutinized, as to growth and produce of the parts whence they are freighted in neutral vessels.

Accordingly, at different periods of war, licenses have been issued in Council, and Acts of Parliament have passed, suspending for a limited time, or making enactments in exception to, certain provisions of the Navigation Acts.

Nay, as *national revenue* must depend upon, and be commensurate with, the resources of national industry, manufacture, and sale, and as a great naval force can, *in these times*, only be sustained by a revenue proportionate to the charge, the abandonment of a part of the British carrying trade in times of war, by favouring manufacture and commerce, may create further means of naval exertion; and thus a relaxation from the letter, support the spirit and genuine purpose of the Navigation Acts.

The subject is so extensive, and leads to so many matters of the highest consideration, that I fear to touch upon it, lest it carry me too far from the point on which my present argument turns; but, in general terms, I will suggest, that *now*, more than at any other period of our history, or crisis of our empire, the power and existence of Great Britain, as a state of indepen-

dence and consideration in Europe, rests with its Navy, and all the rest *on commerce, as connected with revenue.*

Hitherto (setting the armistice of 1802 as nought), during thirteen years of war, our commerce hath not only been sustained, but increased; and this in consequence of trade, ever ingenious in enterprise and resource, having found its way by channels unrestricted by any positive provisions of the Navigation Acts, however in opposition to their principle and tenor.

I have commercial tables by me, from the reign of Anne and the peace of Utrecht, shewing what portion of the carrying trade, under different circumstances of successive wars, has passed over to neutral bottoms. In all wars, more or less, this has been the case; but in the present (and happily so for the national interest), this has occurred to a greater degree than on any former occasion: we had been a lost nation but for this resource.

Selecting an instance of fact and practice, I will take the export trade from Great Britain to the United States of America, as carried on, the moiety by British ships, in times of peace, and almost exclusively by America, as neutral ships, in time of war.

Return to House of Commons, February 26, 1802.

Peace. Year ending 5th January, 1792.				War. Year ending 5th January, 1801.			
British.		Foreign.		British.		Foreign.	
Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
253	55,328	291	55,806	62	14,381	507	112,596

It may be proper here, and in reference to the above table, to observe, that the carrying trade in question is of no less value than 9,349,380*l.* of British produce and manufactures, exported in 1800-1, in 507 American ships, and only 62 English.

The result of the above statements and comment on the Navigation Laws, shews, that the national interest, and the special interest of its shipping and Navy, may admit of, and even require, some occasional and temporary relaxation of the system, which, in a general view, is necessary to their support; and that the timely suspension of restrictory provisions in its favour, may be of ultimate advantage to the carrying trade, by sustaining the extent of manufactures and merchandize, for the supplying its freight at an available season of returning peace.

In regard to trade at large, the British ship-owners acquiesce in a partial alienation of customers, which the interests and necessities of that trade require, and which no direct and absolute provisions of law authorize them to impugn: but for supply to the colonies, they will admit of no exception to their rights of con-

veyance, however difficult and uncertain may be the adventure; and if uncertain, distressful and dangerous in the extreme to those who look for the supply. Whilst for certain articles indispensable to the colonies, such as provisions and lumber, it is deemed right and expedient, on the part of our merchants, to forego the monopoly, the ship-owners yet insist on an exclusive carrying trade. The surcharges of freight, insurance, convoy duties, and demurrage, must operate in at least a treble proportion, when bearing on a circuitous trade to the West Indies from Europe *viâ* America, as required; yet their losses and expences in trade being obviated, or rather supposed to be so, for one party, that is, the carrier and seller, under the monopoly which he claims to be in possession of; he will not allow the buyer and consumer, that is, the colonist, who must buy at any rate and price, what is indispensable to the subsistence of himself and people, to have an interest deserving of the public consideration.

I will not argue the question of justice with the ship-owners, who would thus insist on their fellow-subjects in the colonies being bound to regulations, under which they cannot even be fed, but dearly, scantily, and perhaps not at all! But I may and do appeal to the justice and liberality of the British Nation, and of its Government, that these partial interests and narrow views should not be encouraged and abetted, with danger of want and distress to a numerous and loyal people.

The question of justice apart, I recur to that of sound po-

licy, and to the policy of that system, under which the navigation, out and home, of 700 large ships is secured to Great Britain and Ireland. This essential branch of shipping and trade may be put to the hazard, if the subsistence of the planters, and their negroes, in the sugar colonies, is made to depend on the precarious supply, which rests on the mere speculation of these shipowners, that it *may* be furnished *always*, and *as wanted*, in times of war; however liable, in so long and circuitous a passage, to be intercepted by an enemy, to be delayed for convoys, to be deferred, or altogether and occasionally to be declined, by the very adventurers; whilst the interval of want and expectation in the West India Islands, may unhappily be filled up with famine, revolt, desolation, and massacre! the colonial carrying trade may then be reduced indeed;—to the carrying soldiers, for *export* to the West Indies, and a grave; and fugitive planters, for return and *import* to the mother-country, and a gaol.

Let me not be mistaken, or misrepresented: I contend for supporting the Navigation Acts, as the basis of national security, importance, and power; I would admit of no relaxation or suspension of the least provision of these Acts, but on great and paramount necessity, and when the letter of the law may be dispensed with, in a manner advantageous to its principle and purpose; and I contend for the exception (as of this description), in allowing provisions and necessaries, of a sort which Great Britain cannot from itself fully supply, to be in times of war sup-

plied to the West Indies by the States of America, and in such vessels as alone they can be conveyed.

Great Britain will yet, and should, guard generally its monopoly in reserve, by Custom-house regulations, restricting the import to enumerated articles, and which are indispensable, and by no other means can be procured.

It is the purpose of this Compilation, to exhibit a general view of the advantages to Great Britain, derived from its West India Colonies, and thus, and so far only, to suggest the national policy of encouragement to their industry, and of attention to their welfare and safety: I do not, and could not, plead for any private or partial interest, in contradistinction to that of the empire at large: I seek no aid or advantage to the colonies from the American intercourse, which the mother-country may not safely license, and ultimately share in, from increased resources of industry, commerce, and revenue.

Least of all, would I argue for any measure which might eventually impair or diminish the basis of the British Navy; nor should I be construed so to argue, when I merely contend that the shipping interest essentially depends on the prosperous condition of the West India settlements; and that such prosperity, *most important to the interest in question*, should not be put to the hazard, by schemes of navigation which may be found impracticable, whilst in the very attempt they preclude and destroy every actual and necessary resource.

The ship-owners and builders have but too clearly proved the bad condition of their trade: certainly, at this advanced period of protracted war, many merchant-ships sail with half freight; many are wholly out of employ; and, as a certain consequence, fewer orders for new ships will be sent to the builders at private dock-yards.

But admitting the whole of the case, as stated by the petitioners to Parliament, I must contend, that they look for relief where relief is not to be had: in resorting to the American intercourse with the West Indies, they catch at a mere straw, which cannot hold them up for a moment; they ask for that which they could not avail themselves of, if granted; they seek a monopoly of carrying trade, of which they could not retain a share for more than a single season, even if it was practicable for them, under circumstances of the war, to engage in it at all. *British-built* schooners, and other small craft of Bermuda, navigated according to law, that is, as allowed in war, by three-fourths American sailors, but, in fact, principally by negro slaves, and belonging to store-keepers in the British islands, would, from under-freight, and frequency of trip, out-traffic, and soon chace from the trade, every large English ship; and not a ship-owner of London, or ship-builder of the Thames, would be benefited.

But supposing this not to occur, and supposing further, that ships of war should be ready, as required, to convoy British merchant-ships to America; and secondly, from port to port in

America, for assortment of cargo (rice from Carolina, and staves from Massachusetts); and thirdly, to convoy these circumnavigators to each and every island (for there is more danger from privateers amongst the islands than on the open seas); yet after all these strange and difficult suppositions, what can be the profit of the undertaking? What can be the freight, to compensate for so circuitous a voyage, and so much occasional demurrage?

Our merchants and manufacturers at home have given proof (as exemplified by official returns), that they prefer the export to America in time of war by neutral bottoms, to avoid the surcharges of freight and insurance, &c. The ship will then go nearly in ballast to America: let it, in the second instance, be presumed, to get a full cargo for the islands; yet for the third voyage, that is, home to England, it can have no certainty of lading: the vessels direct from Great Britain must be first served; the planter, under positive engagements, must give a preference to the vessels of his established consignee; and a surplus over the produce of the year expected and provided for, can alone fall to the chance-comer.

Like other individuals, over-distressed in life, these shipowners seem to be going, they know not where—to do, they know not what. But, say their advocates, "eminent West India merchants are ready to dispatch their ships to the West Indies, by the circuitous voyage *viâ* America, to take up supplies;" not conceiving how it can answer to carry round, and defer delivery

of the share, more or less, of British produce and manufacture, with which every outward-bound West India ship in the regular trade is in part at least laden, I must doubt the fact. But admitting it, for argument sake, I answer—" the ships will then be the same as now, merely taking a new and longer course; no more ships will be employed; no more will be built than at this very period of your grievance and complaints; and where then is your relief?"

In sad and sober truth, the evil originates in causes not to be affected by a scheme of the kind proposed; which, if it were practicable, and could succeed to the utmost extent which the most sanguine speculators entertain hopes of, would yet, in a very partial and small degree indeed, prevent the yearly diminution of mercantile shipping, which is become so serious a matter of reflection and alarm.

In the last Chapter of this Miscellany, I shall have occasion to discuss this important subject further; when I shall produce some documents, on which the actual condition of British shipping may be estimated, the causes of its decline be explained, and the remedy be suggested: I can imagine but one remedy—but of that in its place.

CHAP. XI.

The British West Indies considered as a Depôt of Foreign Trade.

THE chain of islands from the Bahamas to Tobago, covering the Gulph of Mexico, and connecting the vast Continents of North and South America, from the first discoverers received the general appellation of Ant-illas, or frontier isles; and the term truly designates their situation relative to Europe, as places of first arrival, and as posts of further enterprise.

In this view more especially, they exhibit stations for the deposit of European produce and manufactures, offering facilities of communication with the countries beyond, by the trade-winds, invariably between the tropics, blowing from the east.

The commercial spirit of the British people, and concurrent policy of their Government, could not long overlook or neglect so favourable an invitation to mercantile enterprise, as ready warehouses, easy intercourse, and extensive markets, at once tendered for acceptance.

The trade by the West Indies to the Americas, was engaged in soon after the restoration of Charles the Second; and from its very commencement, the scheme of adventure hath chiefly been directed to the Spanish Settlements, as offering the most advan-

tageous market for British produce and manufacture, and the most valuable returns of exotic dyes, drugs, raw materials, live stock, and bullion.

In order to facilitate this course of trade, the British Government hath devised the erecting certain places and harbours of its West India Settlements into *free ports*, admitting, under certain restrictions and regulations, a free entry and trade by foreign vessels.

It was considered that masters and mariners coming from those countries which were to be supplied with European articles, of whatever description, could more readily procure and bring what was desirable for barter, and in payment; and being better acquainted with the means of access, and channels of disposal on their return, might greatly extend the use and sale of British goods.

Our English merchantmen could in many cases merely hover over the creeks and inlets of an immense line of coast, which the natives might run into, with a retreat and safeguard for their cargoes, from aid of friends or accomplices, partners in their business, or dealers in their commodities; for their business, on one side, was illicit, and strictly forbidden.

The trade, however, connived at and encouraged under the British Free-port Acts, ever has been, and is, a contraband trade in view of the Spanish Government; which enforces the system of colonial monopoly with an extraordinary jealousy, and rigour

proportionate to the value of what it possesses, and to its intrinsic weakness for the conservation of it; it is a jealousy which would shut out the nations of Europe equally from a knowledge of its people, and of its riches in South America.

There is a despotism in its conduct of trade, as of sovereignty, which can be suffered only in ignorance; and its policy is to prevent the knowledge of what is to be acquired by a free and fair exchange of property, as well as of what is to be enjoyed by the rights of person, or from security in either case.

The simple fact, that the Government of Old Spain is in itself a principal merchant, or rather trading company, with New Spain, leads at once to an estimate of commerce carried on between the two parties, that of Europe in power, and that of South America in subjection. The intermediate, or private, traders, whether licensed to share in the register ships or otherwise, or dealing in the interior country by agency, or under patronage, may be supposed to indemnify themselves against exaction by extortion, and to aggravate oppressions on the industrious part of the community, who work to pay others beside themselves, and must sell as well as buy at the price of the monopolist.

Nothing but absolute and vigilant power can bind the parties to such dealing and traffic: under such circumstances, there must ever be a struggle to evade the oppression which cannot be resisted; every native of New Spain must at heart be disloyal, and seek to elude the ordinances which enact the pillage of his indus-

try, and the privation of what he requires: show him in secret what will compensate his work, and furnish to his necessities—*he is of course a smuggler!*

It is this description of people, possessing the means from a rich country, which has invited and supported a British trade.

From every information I have been able to collect, it is an error to suppose that, in any case, or under any compromise, the Spanish administration allows of a trade with its American settlements by foreign nations. It hath, indeed, admitted enumerated articles of necessity for working its mines; but with the utmost caution in excluding all others. When, at any former period, it hath relaxed in a small and fixed proportion, allowing miscellaneous imports, it was to cover and ensure the import which was indispensable; but the exception hath depended upon, and ceased with the exigency. Its assiento treaty, of ancient date, hath long expired: its dealing since for African slaves never admitted them as a passport for other commodities; if any such passport article ever existed, it was, and is, quicksilver, so indispensable for separating the ore of Potosi, and other mines; but this, I take it, hath been merely occasional, and a connivance rather than a regulation, unknown, and to be excused to the government at home, as a case of necessity, and in exception to its general system and orders.

The foreign trader can of course place no reliance on such instance of admission and traffic, proceeding, as it may have done.

from circumstances of necessity and policy, which were merely contingent, and may not operate in a future case.

The British export trade to Africa, in its details as repeatedly laid before Parliament, shews no considerable export of British manufactures beyond what are required for the purchase of slaves, or a surplusage to accompany their conveyance in any branch of trade across the Atlantic.

Under the provisions of the Free Port Acts, the admission to trade with our islands is limited to foreign sloops, schooners, and vessels not having more than one deck: such vessels are no way adapted to the carrying of slaves; and I am of opinion with the able author of "War in Disguise," that when slaves are occasionally taken on board, they hold the place of manufactures, no ways assisting the entry or sale of other articles of lading, which, on the other hand, operate to render the very negroes contraband; and that they are of disadvantage in the trade, by these small vessels so forming the assortment of cargo. That previous to the operation of the late act prohibiting the trade in slaves to foreign settlements, many negroes have been, and will be, exported from our islands, and mostly to the Spanish Main, is true; but if I am well informed, the Americans have been the principal carriers; indeed, for any considerable numbers, and in open and direct trade, neutral ships could only be so.

I must, then, consider the assertion, from whatever authority reported, "that seven or eight slaves would, in the assortment

of cargo, procure admission for 50,000*l.* value of British manufactures into any settlement of Spanish America," to be wholly unfounded in practice and fact, as inconsistent with every just speculation on the case; and that the present commerce with the Spanish Settlements, for the introduction of British goods, is unconstitutional, and altogether *contraband!* The contrary supposition might lead to a neglect of precautions; and I the more anxiously engage in the refutation of the error, as it might endanger the person as well as the property of those who offend, and then come within the reach of an arbitrary and vindictive government.

The course of this trade being, then, on the one side, illicit, and liable to check and prevention as occasionally discovered, it admits not of exposure as to its points of destination, its interior channels, and general means of success. With a view to British interests, it cannot be exhibited in detail; and I content myself with pointing to the Spanish Main, and, in general terms, recommending this branch of West India trade: I merely call the attention of the British merchant to the wealth, population, and extent of country, he may have to deal with; and to the extent of coast for his selection of adventure, where it may least be provided against and obstructed: I merely intimate the distinctions of climate and country, wanting what we produce, and producing what we want.

Mr. Bryan Edwards, in his first volume of the History of the West Indies, gives a remarkable instance of the exposure of

the details of trade between the West India free ports and the Spanish Main, and of the consequent loss to the British merchant, of much, or most, of that lucrative commerce. Mr. Edwards states, that the trade from England, *viâ* Jamaica, about the beginning of the last century, furnished the Spanish Settlements yearly with 1,500,000*l.* value of British goods; that subsequently, from the vigilance of the Spanish Government, and its guarda costas, or from other causes, the trade was on the decline; but that it was yet considerable to the year 1764. To revive and encourage this trade, free ports were established at Jamaica, and other islands, in 1766; but unwarily, and unfortunately, an order of the British Government followed, requiring of its officers at such ports, a return of entries of all Spanish and other foreign vessels, with accounts of their cargoes, to be made to Ministers at home. These accounts, however officially *marked private*, yet passing through the hands of many clerks, were by some one betrayed; and Mr. Edwards was informed by a merchant of Carthagena, that, in fact, a copy reached the Ministry at Madrid, who immediately dispatched orders to the Governments in New Spain, directing the most exemplary and cruel punishment of the parties concerned in the traffic so exposed; and enforcing greater vigilance of the guarda costas, and other measures of prevention, in future.

After this recital, any entry of such details respecting the trade as have come to my knowledge, will not be made in this

Compilation; and having given intimations of the favourable temper of the people, and of the nature of the country, as incentives to the adventure, I will merely, in general terms, repeat, that it is a trade of the utmost importance to the industry and manufactures of Great Britain, both as to export, and as to quality and use of the articles taken in return and payment. To this may be added, that the actual state of Spain, in relation to its settlements of America, seems to tender an opening, and facilities to this course of commerce, through which it may be carried to an extent scarcely calculable, regarding the means and enterprise of our ingenious and commercial people, requiring no other aid or encouragement than simply the approval and protection of the British Government.

The subject admits merely of hints and intimations: contraband is a kind of commercial warfare, in which to publish the design of attack, is to suggest the means of defence and prevention. The institution of British free ports is, however, matter of notoriety, and their stations may be severally considered as suitable, or not, to the establishment.

West India Free Ports.

The act of the 45th George III. cap. 57, enumerates and consolidates the several acts for the institution of free ports in the British West Indies: it recites—the 6th George III. cap. 49, establishing free ports at Dominica and Jamaica, for a limited period; the 13th George III. cap. 73, and the 14th George III. cap. 4, continuing the acts of 6th George III. in force to the year 1780; the 21st George III. cap. 29, leaving the privilege of Dominica, as expired, but continuing the free ports of Jamaica to 1787; the 27th George III. cap. 27, continuing the privilege to Jamaica, reviving it for Dominica, under greater restrictions, and further extending it to the ports of Nassau in the Bahamas, and to George Town, in Grenada; the 33d George III. cap. 50, adding the port of St. John's, in Antigua; and the 42d George III. cap. 102, making a free port of Road-harbour, in Tortola.

The 45th George III. cap. 57, is entitled, an act "to consolidate and extend the several laws for allowing the importation and exportation of certain goods and merchandize into and from certain ports in the West Indies." It enacts, "that wool, cotton wool, indigo, cochineal, drugs of all kinds, cocoa, logwood, fustic, and all woods for dyers' use, hides, skins, tallow, beavers, furs, tortoise-shell, hard woods, mahogany, and all cabinet woods,

horses, asses, mules, and cattle, being the growth or produce of any of the colonies or plantations in America, or of any country on the Continent of America, under the dominion of any foreign European sovereign or state; and that all coin and bullion, diamonds and precious stones, may be imported into

		Islands of
The ports of	Roseau,	*Dominica.*
	Kingston,	*Jamaica.*
	Savannah,	
	Santa Lucia,	
	Montego Bay,	
	Port Antonio,	
	Nassau, - - -	*New Providence.*
	Pitt's Town, - -	*Crooked Isle.*
	Principal port, - -	*Bermuda.*
	George's Town, -	*Grenada.*
	St. John's, - - -	*Antigua.*
	Road-harbour, - -	*Tortola.*
	Kingston, - - -	*St. Vincent's.*
	St. Josef, - - -	*Trinidad.*
	Scarborough, - -	*Tobago.*

And the above enumerated articles are to be imported in any foreign sloop, schooner, or other vessel not having more than one deck, being owned and navigated by persons inhabiting any of

the said colonies or country of America, any law, usage, or custom to the contrary, notwithstanding.

By section 2, tobacco, under certain regulations, is added to the articles allowed for import.

By section 4, foreign sugars and coffees may be imported to Nassau, in the Bahamas.

By section 7, other articles imported than those enumerated, or in other vessels than as described, incur forfeiture of ship and cargo.

By section 8, an export of rum from the above free ports is allowed, and of negroes brought in British ships from Africa; and of all goods legally imported, that is, from Great Britain, or British American Colonies, with exception to masts, yards, bowsprits, pitch, tar, turpentine, and iron: but no export can be made to a British island or settlement, unless that of live cattle; for,

By section 9, the enumerated articles, as imported, are restricted in export from the said recited free ports to Great Britain, in British ships navigated according to law, as under provision of the 12th of Charles II. &c. &c.

By section 13, East India goods are especially prohibited in this trade; and lastly, by this act all former acts are repealed.

The policy is observable in this law, which reconciles a freedom of trade with the system of colonial monopoly, and a partial infringement of the letter with the more essential spirit and pur-

pose of the Navigation Acts; which restricts the import to raw materials, and makes them payable by manufacture; and which limits the foreign carrying trade to sloops and schooners, taking the return trade in larger British ships; providing in either case, against a nursery of naval power.

The enumerated articles, with exception to cattle and live stock, and hard woods for mills and building, are ill-suited for use and home consumption in any island; and the privileged colonies are mere factors for the mother-country, with the exception stated, and with that of rum being allowed in the export: these, however, are great advantages; and to these, from the very business and factory, may be added others, of increased population, of a greater resort of shipping, of an influx and choice of British goods, of more wealthy merchants, a circulation of specie, and resource and accommodation to the landed interest.

The only provision in this law which appears objectionable, is *that* which, in certain instances, allows the import of foreign colonial produce. In countries growing the like articles, the distinction of foreign and native sugars or coffee, cannot be kept up; the protecting duty is a mere incentive to fraud; the mark on package, partially made, or not, is no security, and Custom-house oaths are unhappily proverbial. The British Colonies, restricted in both purchase and sale, to dealings with the mother-country, are entitled to a reciprocity, and to exclusive possession of the home-market, for disposal of their produce; and this they could no longer be secure of, were the imports of foreign colonial

produce, which I object to even for the Bahamas, extended to islands furnishing the like commodities.

Adverting to the free ports severally and in detail, this subject will again occur, and in the first instance, under provisions of the 6th George III. cap. 49, establishing free ports at Roseau, and Prince Rupert's Bay in the island of Dominica.

Dominica, surrendered to the British Crown by the treaty of Paris, 1763, attracted the immediate and particular attention of the British Government, from its growth of coffee, produced in a very inconsiderable degree at that time by any ancient plantation of the British West Indies; from its noble harbour, called Prince Rupert's; and from its situation between, and in sight of, the large and fertile islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique. The facility of communication with these French colonies, suggested advantages to be derived from the opening a trade, so regulated as to gain an outlet and sale of British manufactures from warehouses in Dominica, with such guards on the return trade, as might yet protect and retain the monopoly in supply to its colonies, of which Great Britain has ever been justly tenacious.

The scheme devised was a *free port*, under restrictions favourable to the national views of trade, and with a guard of its navigation system, inviting, in general terms, foreign vessels from every quarter: but the principal resort would necessarily be from places the most convenient for dealing and intercourse; and a jealousy of this institution, as inviting a clandestine traffic, to the

prejudice of its trade and revenue, might be expected to occasion remonstrance, and more than ordinary precautions, on the part of the French Government in the neighbouring islands.

But this was not the case: no alarm was taken; and even an apparent connivance with the scheme of British trade, put its good policy at least in doubt, when thus approved of by rivals in contest for advantages to accrue from the measure.

In truth, this Free Port Act was a *first essay*, and the subject was not at that time understood: the errors in the plan are thus to be accounted for, and in some sort excused; but cannot be so in the repetition.

Undoubtedly the framers of the original act had in view the circulation of British manufactures, for they were a British Ministry: but the provisions of the bill which allowed of the export of negroes, and the import of colonial produce, superseded every other branch of trade, in dealing with the planters of Martinique and Guadaloupe, who were invited to purchase slaves for the cultivation of their estates, with acceptance of the produce of those estates in payment. The French Government, I can readily imagine to have complacently winked at a practice, however illicit, which promoted the settlement and prosperity of its colonies, and the resource of its power; probably (but I know not) that Government at the same time, in compromising with its people, passed over the contraband to its ultimate advantage, under conditions more effectually preventing any further trade which might operate to its prejudice.

The above surmise is warranted by details in the following returns laid on the table of the House of Commons, March 1806, exhibiting the trade of Dominica from 1767 to 1778, during which period its Free Port Act, allowing the import of colonial produce, was in force.

An Account of the Value of British Produce and Manufactures Exported from Great Britain to the Island of Dominica, from the Year 1767 to the Year 1778, both inclusive; and of the Quantities of Sugar and Coffee Imported from the said Island in the same Period; distinguishing Foreign Produce from British, and in each Case the several Years respectively.

Years.	Value of British Produce and Manufactures Exported.			*Sugar and Coffee Imported.*								
				Sugar.						Coffee.		
				British Plantation.			Foreign Plantation.			British Plantation.			Foreign Plantation.		
	£.	s.	d.	*cwt.*	*qr.*	*lb.*	*cwt.*	*qr.*	*lb.*	*cwt.*	*qr.*	*lb.*	*cwt.*	*qr.*	*lb.*
1767	28,667	5	1	8764	1	21	23,764	3	6	5829	1	16	3597	1	3
1768	17,036	7	10	1499	2	8	46,868	1	23	15,009	0	24	.....		
1769	27,156	5	5	1560	3	26	18,611	0	17	14,163	0	15	.....		
1770	31,656	9	11	12,841	3	7	14,517	1	4	10,479	3	12	.....		
1771	53,135	18	8	10,258	0	4	9704	3	2	16,439	1	7	105	0	0
1772	56,696	13	8	10,370	2	8	14,518	0	12	20,320	3	13	3105	3	16
1773	40,770	7	9	26,705	1	5	17,423	1	2	15,709	1	15	8562	0	16
1774	44,782	14	1	53,464	2	12	.....			21,134	3	16	311	1	24
1775	59,694	16	3	40,683	1	21	.....			15,792	2	12	101	3	13
1776	57,225	10	8	39,837	1	14	301	0	0	25,165	0	26	30	0	0
1777	43,759	13	2	36,987	0	18	5	1	8	16,121	0	9	316	3	4
1778	27,152	15	7	35,022	2	17	2144	2	1	14,321	0	0	.....		

The amount of British produce and manufacture imported to Dominica during this period, in no year exceeds the quantity which might be required for home consumption in that island; and the speculations of advantage to British industry and trade

from the establishment of this free port, seem generally to have failed. From the exports of 2018* slaves to foreign settlements in 1787, and of 4653* in the year 1788, we may infer, that likewise in the preceding years, the colonial produce of Martinique and Guadaloupe was chiefly paid for by value in African negroes, of which Dominica was privileged to become the factor, for extending the cultivation of those foreign and rival countries. The ill policy of the measure hath finally been recognized, which at once aided the settlement, and opened a new market to the produce of colonies, tending thereafter to enlarge and strengthen the basis of an hostile navy; for whatever of carrying trade was substracted for a season, was to be resumed by the French in a more extended and prosperous state, as occasion might offer.

When the privilege of a free port was again allowed to Dominica in 1787, in the form it since continues, colonial produce was excepted from the enumerated imports; and the objection in this quarter is removed. Under present circumstances, I see little in the establishment at Dominica to merit a distinct consideration.

Jamaica, it has been observed, had for above a century carried on an extensive trade with the Spanish Islands and Main, under connivance of the British Custom-house, when, by the act above recited, of the 6th George III., Kingston, Savannah-

* Vide Returns, pages 7 and 8.

la-Mar, Montego Bay, and Santa Lucea, were erected into free ports; to which Port Antonio hath since been added. The 6th George III. cap. 49, did not allow to these ports, at any time, the privilege of importing colonial produce, as in the case of Dominica.

The map will show the very great advantage which Jamaica, from situation, possesses in every direction of trade within the Gulf. In its assortments for commerce, it circulated no doubt, at all times, very considerable quantities of British manufacture, printed cottons, stationary*, hardware, and India goods: but one great article of its export hath been African slaves; of which, in 1786, Jamaica exported to foreign parts 3619; in 1787, it exported 1780; in 1788, it exported 2467; and in 1803, to the number of 2402.

This branch of the trade I have already discussed, and stated what I conceive to be the impolicy of encouraging it by the British Government. I know of no instance of a Spaniard, Portuguese, or Dutchman, colonizing other than national settlements; but the English seem colonizing mad; they would colonize for the French, for the Dutch, and for the world: they settled Guadaloupe, on its capture in the Seven Years' War, and Demerara, in that of the Revolution—*and their Government looked on!*

I have been informed from high authority, and to be relied

* Stationary is a most profitable article in this trade, and prints of scriptural subjects, saints, &c.

upon, that since 1803 there has been little or no trade between Jamaica and the Spanish Settlements.

The rupture, and commencement of hostilities with Spain, was attended with circumstances of peculiar grievance and animosity; and which seems to have excited an aversion to British intercourse, even amongst the natives of South America, whence the fleet attacked and destroyed in 1803, with an instance of terrible catastrophe to a family of passengers, distinguished and beloved in their country, had proceeded. The policy of the French Emperor, now specially at war with British commerce, hath, no doubt, busily aggravated the national prejudice, and engaged a superior vigilance of the Spanish Government, aided by the distrust, and angered temper of its people, to preclude our intercourse with its trans-atlantic dominions.

But ere this, I trust, the mischief of 1803 is considered to have been partial, accidental, and no just ground of popular enmity; and against the rest, British enterprise, if duly exerted, must avail.

I must, however, suggest the necessity of a reform in our Custom-house regulations at the several free ports, and which, under present circumstances, may occasionally deter the subjects of a foreign and hostile power from engaging in the adventure: our licenses granted to their sloops and schooners have yet too much of form and publicity; being required for production, to save the vessel from capture by our British cruizers, they may expose the parties to confiscation and punishment, on discovery

by those of their own government. Surely a watch-word, or *countersign*, might be a sufficient passport for these enterprises of trade. Another mischief of form, and the preciseness of office, ill suited to such adventures, has been, the occasional seizure* of a vessel from the Spanish Main, from weather, or whatever cause, shifting its destination from the port to which the license is directed: in one instance of such procedure, a general distrust seemed to follow the confiscation, ill understood, and the trade for a time was wholly stopped.

The Bahamas command the important passage and trade by the Gulf of Florida, and the free port of Nassau, in the principal Isle of Providence, may be turned to account as a *depôt* generally for America to the mouths of the Mississippi, and to Cuba, &c. African slaves, from the very institution of this free port (1788), have been the principal article of export to foreign settlements. In 1801, the Bahamas exported 2279 negroes; in 1802, they exported 2181. The Liverpool ships may be supposed to freight in return with foreign colonial produce, which, specially by the 32d Geo. III. cap. 43, is allowed for import to the Bahamas and Bermuda, and which, indeed, can most conveniently arrive by the Gulf stream from different countries of its growth. As all sugars whatever, under the provisions of the recited act, if coming from the Bahamas, are to be deemed foreign, and to pay the extra duty, they do not, indeed, *in a direct view*,

* For reasons before given, I do not insert the name of the vessel, or other details.

interfere with the claims of the British colonist to the home market; but they do so collaterally, and to his prejudice: for when re-exported to foreign Europe, they usurp a place in that course of trade, which, shutting out a necessary export of the excess of British sugars above the home consumption, leaves the market glutted, and the article depreciated in proportion. Other free ports are established at the small Bahama Isles of Cäicos, and Crooked Isle, which chiefly trade with salt, from the salt works with the North Americans.

Tortola, the most to leeward of the islands commonly so termed, is central, and conveniently situated for dealing with Porto Rico, and other great islands to the west; and, in expectation of an extraordinary traffic with the negro people of Hayti, or St. Domingo, the free port of Road Harbour, in Tortola, has been endowed with further and unusual privileges.

By an act passed last sessions, 46th Geo. III. cap. 72, His Majesty, with the advice of his Privy Council, is authorized to permit the importation of all foreign colonial produce to Tortola, in the same manner as to the port of Nassau, in New Providence; and this, with the other Virgin Isles, being a sugar colony, guards, or attempts to guard, the export to Great Britain, by an estimate of the native produce at 5,880,000 lbs. of sugar, or 4000 hogsheads; and directs, that no greater quantity coming from Tortola, shall be admitted, on duties, as British sugars.

This, however, is much too large an allowance; the sugar, produce of Tortola, and the Virgin Isles, not exceeding, on a past average, 31,088 cwt.; viz. only 3,481,856 lbs. and 2400 hogsheads. We shall, no doubt, have to observe an happy increase of 1600 hogsheads of *native* sugars from the Virgin Islands, under the provisions of this free-port act.

An Account of the Quantities of Sugar and Coffee Imported from Tortola, from 1799 *to* 1804, *both inclusive; distinguishing each Year, and the Foreign Produce from the British.*

	Sugar.						Coffee.					
	British Plantation.			Foreign Plantation.			British Plantation.			Foreign Plantation.		
	cwt.	*qr.*	*lb.*	*cwt.*	*qr.*	*lb.*	*cwt.*	*qr.*	*lb.*	*cwt.*	*qr.*	*lb.*
1799	36,510	2	3	.....			589	2	18	.....		
1800	11,853	1	15	.....			22	2	0	.....		
1801	33,570	3	27	.....			742	2	23	.....		
1802	46,163	1	24	4857	0	0	8	0	0	.....		
1803	21,269	0	11	.....			195	1	13	240	0	0
1804	37,209	3	2	1868	0	0	81	1	4	2064	0	0

I have understood this privilege of importing colonial produce to have been given to Tortola, from a conception that Great Britain might thence acquire a carrying trade of the coffees yet gathered by the negroes of Hayti; but then it must be with prejudice to the growing settlements at Jamaica; and this, with the sugar trade, is open to all those objections, on the part of the

British Colonies, which I have before stated. But there is a further and general objection to the encouraging these imports, in respect to the immediate interests of British trade. The admission to our free ports of colonial produce, which we possess in common, and do not want, may induce such import to be, in many instances, substituted for that of articles from the Americas which we most require: we invite and take a manufacture, when a raw material might be otherwise supplied. If this act is not repealed, I can only hope, that the authority vested in the King and Council may, in the Royal wisdom, lay dormant, and without effect.

Grenada is well situated for an easy run to the island of Margarita, as a *depôt* for the Caraccas, and generally for mercantile adventure on the northern coast of South America. From Grenville Town, in this island, the trade with the Spanish Main was, in 1792, carried on to a very considerable extent; and, as the Governor-General, Matthews, then informed me, was to the amount of 600,000*l.* value in exports of printed cottons, hardware, and other British manufactures. In 1788, Grenada exported to foreign settlements 1598 African slaves; but has since dropt that branch of commerce, and is an example that the trade generally is not dependent on such an article in the assortment of cargo. The insurrection and disturbances in Grenada, in 1795-6, must, for a time, have suppressed this lucrative course of traffic;

but the station of *depôt* is so advantageous, that it cannot be long neglected.

With respect to *Antigua* and *St. Vincent's*, I have nothing of special consideration to add on the subject of advantages in trade and intercourse to be derived from the establishment of free ports. It occurs, however, that trade will often shift, and flourish in one place or another, according to the means, and spirit of adventure, distinguishing individual merchants, and so far will elude any computation founded on superior facilities and inducements, derived from mere locality and bearing as to countries the objects of traffic. In this view it may be well to consider the establishment of free ports as general, and which, in truth, it nearly is; and the rather so, as in every case it will be attended with advantage to the colonists, in admitting occasionally the supply of live stock, mules, timber, and bullion, and affording an outlet to rum, which is a refuse in the markets of the mother-country.

Having cursorily adverted to the institution of free ports; to those of Jamaica within the Gulf; and as covering that sea to those of the Bahamas, and of Grenada, forming the northern and southern extremities of the chain of British Islands; and to those of Tortola, Antigua, Dominica, and St. Vincent's, as central, I come to ports of commercial enterprise, which I have reserved as the most important, and as meriting a particular consideration.

Trinidad, in the enumeration of places adapted to foreign trade, and suited to the establishment of free ports, hath not been hitherto omitted, from my not duly appreciating the advantages which that great island possesses, from its contiguity to the Southern Continent, its port of St. Josef, in the Gulf of Paria, and its facilities of communication with the opposite country; but that immediate country is mountainous, rugged, and barren, and affords neither desirable produce or customers, whatever inlets of communication it may afford with the richer interior provinces. The first discoverer, Columbus, entering by the channel of the Boccas, into the bay covered by Trinidad, and looking to the arid and desert mountains on the opposite shore of the Continent, named it, as in the ancient charts, "Golfo Triste."

Yet, as I have intimated, Trinidad, from its free port of St. Josef, may carry on a considerable traffic with the opposite coast, for the supply of the wealthy and populous districts far inland, by a road and passage, however lengthened or intricate: under the present circumstances of difficulty in approaching the immediate coasts of Cumana and the Caraccas from the open seas, the trade hath actually taken this channel, and succeeded in a very considerable export of British goods. The traffic, to the extent it is capable of, is most practicable and safe; it is carried on in small vessels, or even in boats, traversing or coasting the Gulf of Paria; and on the continental side, running up creeks and rivers, and delivering small but frequent cargoes, and altogether form-

ing an important and valuable branch of commerce, but which, I think, may shift to another course *by sea*, as opportunity offers. For other directions of mercantile adventure, I cannot consider Trinidad as having peculiar advantages; the navigation to the southward must take an offing, and Atlantic voyage; it cannot hugg a leeward coast, rendered the more dangerous from currents influenced by the stream of the Oronooko, and other causes; and altogether, the situation for general trade is no ways so favourable as at first view, and without due consideration of these circumstances, it might appear.

Lastly, I come to an island in the vicinity, and to *windward* of Trinidad, and which possesses, from situation and nature, the means of advantageous commerce and navigation beyond any in these seas.

Tobago, by a late Act of Parliament, hath been enumerated with the Conquered Colonies, and as such excluded from the free traffic for negroes yet allowed to the British West Indies: notwithstanding this reserve, in bar of its progressive cultivation and settlement, it hath yet been provisionally endowed with a free port at Scarborough. Adverting to this free port, considerations arise, which I hope and trust may induce the Executive Ministers of the British Crown and Government, not to regard Tobago merely as a conquered colony, and to be restored in course to the former Sovereign by any treaty terminating the

present war; but to retain this island, as the most important station in the West India seas, whether as a port of commerce, or as a post of enterprise; whether as a *depôt* of merchandize, or of arms; and further, considering that every inhabitant, of whatever description, is British-born.

Tobago exhibits, from its nature of country, woods, rivers, and commodious harbours; as likewise, from relative situation, the greatest advantages to be derived from the establishment of a *free port*. In latitude 11, and to windward of Trinidad, the eastern hills of Tobago form the southern promontory or bluff-head of the great Gulf of Mexico; and thus placed, the island hath facilities of trading within the bay, from its harbour of Courland coursing south of Grenada, on Cumana and the Caraccas; whilst, on the other side, a square-rigged vessel may run, without a tack, from Queen's-bay, in Tobago, to the very mouth of the Oronooko, on the eastern coast of South America; and with equal facility of voyage, return to the free port of Scarborough; nor is any other island so conveniently placed as a *depôt*, having in view a trade with Guiana, and to the river Amazon and the Brazils, &c.

That no considerable commerce has yet taken effect between Tobago and any other country whatever, with exception to the immediate intercourse with Great Britain, is unhappily but too easy to account for: a settlement of great capitalists, and a *depôt* of wealth, cannot, and will not be made, in a country so often

shifting from one sovereign to another, and under constant apprehension of exchange by treaty, from the power which protects, to the power which may confiscate.

In all I have said of the value of Tobago, I am assuming the case of its being recognized as a British Colony, and as a permanent and assured possession of the British Crown: that in policy it should be so retained, may appear from other and most important considerations.

Tobago, in the trans-atlantic region, besides advantages for trade and communication with South America, such as I have described, hath others, in intercourse with whatever Sovereign Power in Europe it may be subjected to.

Laying in latitude 11, a course from Europe gaining the trade-winds, and between the tropics, might be taken by French vessels (supposing Tobago restored to France), in a direction southward of the ordinary navigation by British ships; and so eluding our naval force, might form *depôts* in Tobago, of arms and troops, which might be put in action before even the arrival was known to leeward, and in the British Islands.

The mountainous eastern division of Tobago has, on experience, proved to be healthy, in proportion as the low lands to westward have been found the contrary; and whilst the noble harbour in the north-east quarter of the island, called "Man o' War Bay," offers a rendezvous to ships of war and transports, with depth of water to the very beach, and tranquil as a mill-

pond; the amphitheatre of hills forming and sheltering the bay, and fertile to their very summit—render it the most healthy station, with every accommodation of wood and water, for troops that may be landed.

Considering the danger to which shipping, and therewith the Royal Navy, is exposed in the West India seas, at particular times of the year, and especially from the 1st of August to November, denominated the hurricane season, the fact is of importance, *that no instance of hurricane hath been known to affect Tobago.* In the year 1780, Barbadoes, only two degrees north, was desolated by a tempestuous whirlwind, which destroyed people, buildings, and every ship throughout the West Indies; whilst Tobago remained quiet and safe, as if clear, and southward, of the destructive vortex.

From experience, then, it may be assumed that Tobago is exempt from hurricanes, and that during all seasons of the year, ships may anchor and ride secure in Man o' War Bay, whilst in all other harbours of the West Indies, during the rainy autumnal season, they are exposed to tornados and destruction.

In the year 1782, the late Marquis de Bouillié made a most interesting report to his Government, of the importance of Tobago as a military and naval station, and which was supposed to have influenced the Court of France in so earnestly making its acquisition a condition of the then treaty. It is many years since I read this report; but it was in print, and any gentleman

who possesses a copy, will render a public service in communicating it to *the proper persons.*

With these desultory intimations I quit the subject of free ports: they are sufficient for matter of comment and inference, to those who may consider my text as important, and meriting attention; and I trust the suggestions relative to Tobago, will be particularly considered as such.

CHART
of the
WINDWARD and LEEWARD
ISLANDS.
VIRGIN ISLANDS
LEEWARD CARIBBEE ISLANDS
NORTH CARIBBEE ISLANDS
SOUTH CARIBBEE ISLANDS
Anegada
VIRGIN GORDO
ANGUILLA
St MARTIN
St BARTHOLOMEW
St CRUZ
St EUSTATIUS
BARBUDA
St CHRISTOPHERS
Nevis
ANTIGUA
Redonda
Monserrat
Deseade
GUADALOUPE
Basseterre
MARYGALANTE
Saints
Trade W
Trade W
Hurricane Season
Winds
prevail
DOMINICA
Roseau
MARTINICO
Port Royal
Castrie
St LUCIA
St VINCENT
Kingstown
Bequia
GRENADINES
GRENADA
BARBADOES
Bridgetown
Tortuga Salada
MARGARITA
Cariaco
Barcelona
PARIA
GULF of PARIA
TRINIDAD
TOBAGO
Serpents Mouth
Mouths of the Orinoco
CUMANA

Reference to the Map of the Islands.

	Miles in Length.	Miles in Width.	Places Free Ports, F.	Latitude.		Long.	
Barbadoes, ...	21	14	Bridge Town, ...	13	5	59	48
Tobago, ...	32	9	Scarborough, F.	11	0	60	46
Trinidad, ...	90	60	St. Josef, F.	10	27	61	42
Grenada, ...	28	15	St. George's, F. ..	12	2	61	53
St. Vincent's, ...	24	18	Kingston, F.	13	9	61	23
Dominica, ...	28	13	Roseau, F.	15	21	61	32
Antigua, ...	20	18	St. John's, F.	17	6	61	55
Montserrat, ...	8	5	.....	16	46	62	27
St. Kitt's, ...	20	9	Basseterre, ...	17	19	62	54
Nevis, ...	8	6	Charlestown, ...	17	9	62	47
Tortola, ...	....	....	Road-harbour, F.	18	28	64	43
Jamaica, ...	140	60	Kingston, F.	18	1	77	2
New Providence,	....	....	Nassau, F.	25	3	77	56
Crooked Isle, ...	....	....	Pitt's Town, F. ..	22	32	73	54
Bermuda, ...	....	....	Principal port, F.	32	15	64	45
St. Lucie, ...	23	12	North end, ...	13	56	61	6
Martinique, ...	60	30	St. Pierre, ...	14	44	61	10
Guadaloupe, ...	45	38	Basseterre, ...	16	2	61	57
St. Eustatius, ...	12	8	South side, ...	17	53	63	0
Santa Cruz, ...	30	10	North, ...	17	48	64	50
Porto Rico, ...	100	49	Porto Rico, ...	18	27	66	15
St. Domingo, ...	450	150	Port o' Prince, ..	18	36	72	30

CHAP. XII.

Navigation to and from Great Britain and the West Indies, and with Convoys, in time of War.

IN times of peace, the navigation to and from the West Indies, dependent on winds and weather, will be conducted with all the advantages of safety and expedition, to be expected from the skill, resolution, and experience, of British seamen. Not presuming to make any observation on the passage of the Atlantic at such season, when mercantile adventure may freely choose its time, and the master of the vessel take his departure, and shape his course, as may best suit his cargo, ship, and destination, I will merely trace on a small chart, the ships' course out and home, as taken, in the years 1792 and 1802, by two most excellent and experienced officers, Captains George Young, and William Johnson, commanding the ships Delaford and St. Vincent's, severally, in the passage out, making Barbadoes ;—and homeward, adapting the course to a departure, as usual for the packets, from Tortola.

Numerous as are the publications of the tracks of voyage on the ocean, this in particular, for the West Indies, seemed wanting, and was the more desirable, from the many merchants,

planters, and others, interested in observing the probable course, and arrival of ships, from so general a *depôt* of business, residence of friends, and station of British officers and troops. A map for occasional reference, and the noting vessels spoke with in particular latitudes, and at certain dates, cannot but be convenient and satisfactory to many persons; and in that which is here inserted, the track is taken from the log-books on the voyages I have mentioned; and the ships' course having been free, as in times of peace, and wind and weather moderately favourable, the line may be considered as that of the usual passage to and from the West Indies;—that from Jamaica is supplied by Mr. Arrowsmith.

Navigation to and from the West Indies.

Passage Outward.—Having cleared the British Channel, a westing is to be preferred, or W. S. W. course, to long. 12, to clear Cape Finisterre, and avoid the being embayed in Biscay, or afterwards, under contingency of westerly gales, closing on the coast of Portugal, where the West India fleet, under convoy of the Apollo, was in great part wrecked and lost in 1804. Having made long. 13, lat. 44, steer east or west of Madeira; the latter, wind serving; but holding southing in preference, for gaining the easterly or trade-winds, prevalent from lat. 24, but general and

certain between the tropics, from lat. 22, and southward. Trades gained, course direct for Barbadoes, lat. 13. 5, long. 59. 48.

Passage Homeward.—Packets or convoys taking departure from Tortola, lat. 18. 28, long. 64. 43, take northing, to clear the trade-winds; safest to prefer northing to lat. 30, for variable winds, and westerly probable; then run N. W. to lat. 40, long. 45. Clear of the great bank of Newfoundland, and thence catching prevalent westerly winds, hold course W. N. W. to north of Azores, or Western Isles; and from lat. 43, long. 30, slant N. N. E. to open British Channel, in lat. 49, long. 12; long. 8, heave the lead, &c. &c.

Numerous fleets under convoy, in time of war, from bad-sailing vessels, and others going less near to the wind between the tropics, will take a more direct northing, or may even lose a degree of longitude, whilst clearing the trades; and if easterly, then prevalent, may near the banks of Newfoundland, and encounter heavy seas and gales: this the Jamaica convoys are most exposed to. Packets, and single merchantmen, according severally to the ability of ship and crew, will make easterly from their departure. A passage homeward of the packet may be estimated at five weeks; of a single laden ship (as in the chart), at six weeks; and of convoy, at eight weeks.

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On Convoys.

In times of war the navigation is subjected to obstruction and delays, on which I shall venture to remark, as more than necessarily resulting from the occasion, and as greatly affecting the charge of freight, and likewise the convenience of timely supply to the colonies.

In times of war, the national as well as private venture in ships and cargoes, requires precaution against capture by an enemy, and the protection of merchant-ships by others of force, as understood by the term *convoy*.

It is to convoys, and to the conduct of London merchants in application for convoys being appointed, and then for their being deferred;—it is to the mischiefs of reciprocative influence between wealth and power, operating in prejudice to the West India Colonies, and their timely supply, and shipments in return, that I shall now briefly advert.

From the tables of shipping in the West India trade, page 37 of this Compilation, it is observable, that from the year 1787, the ships have severally increased in tonnage and dimension. The same crew will navigate a few tons more, and in stowage, and other respects, mercantile economy finds its account in the larger vessel. On these computations the increase of size is yet growing, and I must term it a growing evil to the West India colonist. Occasional, frequent, and successive supplies, are a

great personal convenience and comfort to the planter, as well as of advantage to his negroes and estate: now let us suppose a single vessel of 1600 tons, as an Acapulco or register ship, once in each year to reach a West India island from England, instead of five vessels of 320 tons each coming at different times and seasons of the year. This may be an extreme case; but, as such, it illustrates my objection. Making the application, I observe, that if, since the year 1787, four ships have taken the place of five, from increased capacity of cargo by greater size and tonnage;—then so far proportionally, even in times of peace, the voyages outward must be less numerous, and, in course, the supplies be less frequent and occasional.

So far I premise, having especially in view the frequency of supplies to our sugar colonies, as aided or obstructed by the regulation and management of convoys in time of war.

Of late years, the convoys appointed at Portsmouth for October have not sailed until December; and those appointed for January have not taken their departure till March, wind and weather favouring in the intervals.

When this has been complained of, the charge of want of punctuality hath been shifted from the Admiralty to the Exchange of London; and in fact it is well known, that the procrastination, and afterwards the convenience of certain leading merchants, hath often operated in the delaying convoys, till their ships were cleared out, and got round to join at Portsmouth; and possibly

the fault of connivance may, by some persons, have been imputed to Government, as lending itself to city influence, and to partial interests; however assuming, as they ever will, the language and character of general and useful accommodation to trade. But supposing every transaction to be fair, and as represented, it is not for a temporary and contingent case of trade, it is for a paramount consideration; it is for timely and necessary supply to the plantations, that I contend; and, to this effect, convoys should take their departure at known and certain periods; especially the first autumnal convoy from Portsmouth and from Cork, should peremptorily, wind and weather permitting, weigh anchor the 20th of October; not to risque contrary winds to the end of the month.

The importance of this fleet's arrival before Christmas-day, carrying out the Irish beef and provisions for the annual treat of 500,000 negroes at that season, and freighted with their new clothing for the festivity, cannot, to any humane person, and who knows, as I do, the anxiety of each poor negro on the plantations for the timely arrival of these his holiday comforts, be regarded lightly, or as not to be provided for. The planter's domestic supply, and that of his white servants, is another consideration; and if all attention to the comforts of our fellow-subjects, and fellow-creatures, in so distant a quarter, is neglected; I then appeal to the flinty economist, on computation of loss, by retarding, in many instances, the commencement of crop, whilst awaiting the

arrival of teatches, coppers, stills, mill machinery, and whatever is necessary from England, for turning colonial produce to effect and use.

Let ships of war appointed for convoy, sail peremptorily at the time fixed; and mercantile vessels will then be ready and punctual to the appointment; but as long as the sailing is uncertain, many will presume on the uncertainty. Then wealthy, and perhaps more objectionable influence, will step in, to make *uncertainty certain;* that is, to give a general impression, that the time first named, will in no case be the time of rendezvous required. The speculator will compute the saving in demurrage, by not being manned and provisioned before his time: the least punctual will gain the most; and, like to the conditions of an ass-race on the village-green, the last who comes in is the winner. Under such system, or rather incertitude, and surrender of all system, is it wonderful that merchant-ships are often not ready, and cleared out, punctually to meet their convoy at the port of rendezvous?

On the next occasion, let the ships of war, if with but five outward-bound merchant vessels ready for their convoy, sail on the day appointed; and Government may be assured of the most punctual attendance in each future instance—to the general advantage, eventually, of the British merchant and ship-owner, of the West India planter, and of the commercial interests of the nation at large.

I have said that supplies of a certain description should be occasional and frequent: to this effect, the outward convoys from England and Ireland should not be less than four in the year, to take departure, punctually as may be, the third weeks severally of October, December, February, and April; the last outward convoy in April being allowed eight weeks to probable arrival before the end of June, and with five weeks for discharge of cargo, and shipment of colonial produce, before the double insurance of the 1st of August.

The convoys for return must depend on other circumstances, but, I should think, need not exceed three in the year; that is, three severally from Jamaica and from the Leeward Islands; the first homeward convoy taking its departure from Tortola in April, and the others as the circumstances of the season may require.

The month of August being taken as the commencement of the rainy and hurricane season, during which ships, from occasional tempests and tornados, are exposed to more than ordinary danger on the West India station, it is provided in each policy of insurance, that the ship homeward-bound shall weigh anchor and sail for Europe *on or before the 1st of August*; in default of which the premium is forfeit, and the vessel and cargo at open risk. Adverting to this condition, it has been the uniform practice for convoys to await, and sail precisely on the *last day*. Why this should be so, I know not: the crops have been long finished, and the produce been some time on board; and I am

sure the last and general convoy from the Leeward Islands might with greater advantage take its departure the middle of July. From the 1st of August, if eight or nine weeks on the passage, as a large fleet will be, to reach the Thames, the arrival, taking delays of entry at the London Docks, will be too late for an export trade of colonial produce to the North, where the frosts may be setting in; and certainly the ships cannot discharge, and then clear outwards with a cargo, in time for the ensuing crop in the plantations.

I advert not to the late and crouded convoy of this year; I know the extraordinary circumstances of warfare which contributed to its delay, and I am willing to consider it as a case in exception.

But here I must observe, that with a view to the naval defence of the West Indies, an ulterior advantage will attend a certain, frequent, and periodical departure of convoys from Europe: it will admit of successive relief of ships of war from the West India station, and obviate the lassitude and exhaustion to which their crews are liable, from remaining too long in those climates, and which constitute the pre-disposing cause that has rendered the yellow fever so prevalent and fatal to our people. It will hold out to our colonists a constant view of resource; and as it will give a spur to their industry, in preparation for the arrivals of merchant-ships; so will it give confidence to their courage, and animate their defence, in expectancy of aid and relief, when assailed by an enemy.

The subject of naval defence, as, under various circumstances, applicable on the West India station, is not for me to discuss; I have merely, in this view, intimated a purpose to which a regulation of convoys may be applied.

On this head I will, however, venture to suggest, that numerous well-armed Bermudian schooners, serving as cruizers and convoys between the Windward and Leeward Islands, would be a protection to the colonial intercourse, of the highest accommodation. From having often sailed in these vessels, I have experience that they will beat to windward, in a manner which those who have sailed only in square-rigged vessels, can have no conception of; they can of course evade superior force, whilst the ordinary privateers of Guadaloupe can neither fight, or escape them; and I humbly presume to suggest an increase of this branch of naval establishment in the West Indies, as at once cheap and useful.

CHAP. XIII.

On the Military Defence of the West Indies.

INTRODUCING the subject of this Chapter, it is not my purpose to discuss military tactics, or to examine the conduct of generals and armies in the West Indies. I shall in no degree so presume; I shall state merely, and in general terms, what occurred to me when visiting the islands in the year 1802, on *actual view* of how much my own property in St. Vincent's, with that of all around me, had suffered from repeated devastation by the enemy, and in anxious contemplation of the future events of war: I merely assert pretensions, in common with every Englishman, to take a general view of what has been done, and may be done, for my own security, and that of my country.

The scene of nature in the West India islands, and the mixed population of slaves, tenfold in number to the freemen which hold them in subjection, suggest, in either case, the necessity of measures adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the country, whether for defence against a foreign enemy, or for interior police and security.

Never having visited Jamaica, and considering that great island as, from its extent of country, forming a distinct and se-

parate case; and offering scenes of protracted campaign, rather than of mere enterprises of assault and capture, to which the smaller Windward Islands are liable;—I shall confine my observations to the latter.

The Windward and Leeward Islands admit severally of a distinct and various description, with the exception of Barbadoes and Antigua, both anciently settled, and progressively cleared of woods, and inhabited throughout. The Charribbee Islands may be generally represented as—some, shewing a volcanic pinnacle towering in the centre; others with mountains checquered alternately by rocks and woods; and all as lofty and rugged in the interior, with the country sloping in occasionally broken or regular descent towards the sea, and exclusively on the border of the coast, displaying the fertility, settlement, and wealth, which there at once invite, and are exposed to—attack and depredation by the enemy.

Taking my first impressions, on viewing the West Indies as the seat of war, I should represent the mass altogether *as a country of coasts*, to be attacked only from the sea, and requiring only a naval force for prevention and safety.

Were this the case, and that a competent fleet of English ships of war could at all times be stationed or cruizing in these seas, to check or frustrate any expeditions of the enemy, my subject would be narrowed to mere considerations of police, and of the means for preserving peace and good order amongst the negroes:

but, from fatal experience, it has appeared, that Great Britain cannot, or will not, in its distribution of the public force, spare squadrons and fleets, such as to ensure a command of the West India seas, in all seasons, as required in war; and that the protection of the islands must occasionally devolve on British troops stationed for their defence.

At these periods of abandonment by the British Navy, the settled and extensive coasts of the West Indies would not only be liable to ravage and insult, but frequently an island be captured by a *coup de main*, if the inhabitants had not means of stopping the progress of an enemy, which the fortified stations in each colony afford to the regular troops and militia, and of which they have so often and honourably availed themselves, to retain the sovereignty to the British Crown, as exemplified in St. Vincent's and Grenada, and still more recently in Dominica.

To a brave and loyal people, the fastnesses of the interior country may afford an immediate and temporary resource; but composed of rocks and woods, as already described, these situations afford no means of sustenance, and are tenable rather for purposes of honourable capitulation, than of protracted defence. A fortified place of arms and retreat, commanding an open communication with the sea, can alone empower the few militia and troops in any island to preserve its sovereignty for the Crown of Great Britain, whilst awaiting that succour and relief which ships only can supply,—whether conveying provisions and warlike

stores for the maintenance of the post, or military reinforcements, finally to subdue or expel the invaders.

A *fortress*, then, is a necessary and indispensable provision of defence for each island; and British regiments are required for the garrison. So far I premise in reference to seasons of war; but further, in times of peace, and at all times, the great disproportion of white and negro population in each island, requires that there should be some post of arms and retreat; and a competent military force for its guard, and to keep the slaves in awe. A spirit of insurrection is ever to be awakened by facilities of revolution; and if the master of slaves has no resort for command and power, he will soon have no power, and not long be master: let not the precaution be objected to, as appropriate to lordly planters in the West Indies;—it belongs conditionally to lords of every country in Europe, or the world: the authority of the few over the many rests every where on the resources for sustaining and enforcing it. On every principle of sound policy and government, in the ruling a province four thousand miles distant from the seat of empire, some military establishment of subjects and natives of the mother-country would be deemed fitting and proper; but here it is most indispensable, from the nature and system of the colonies to be governed and protected, from the circumstances of their community and interior state, and from those of their exposure to attack from rival and hostile settlements in the vicinity. The usual and required proportion of six white men, could not superintend and

direct the labour of three hundred negroes on a plantation, if there was not in view some post of power and controul, to which the eye of the overseer and of the slave is equally directed; of the one with the feelings of confidence in his authority; of the other with those of subjection and necessary obedience.

Recurring to times and circumstances of war: the military force required in the islands, and particularly in Jamaica, must depend on the course which hostilities may take from Europe; and above all, on the command of the West India seas being that of the British flag. With so much of coast, and so many points open to attack, a naval force is the only efficient protection, and which may warrant us in the dispensing with numerous guards and garrisons for the defence of our colonies. Looking to the extensive and commanding Navy of Great Britain, I must, and will suppose, that any deficiency of fleets competent to afford protection to the West Indies, can be only occasional, and for a short season; that no rendezvous of hostile force can be formed, and no systematic plans of operation and attack be laid and carried on by the enemy in that quarter:—but the worst which may happen, be the predatory invasion of some island,—to be withstood by a garrison, and by the colonists themselves resorting to their citadel, and encouraged to hold out by expectation of relief, on the arrival of a British squadron in those seas.

I must, however, express my hopes, that some arrangement of our naval force may be devised, so as to allow of a more sta-

tionary and constant superiority of fleets in the West India seas; and that our plantations, in future, may be secured from depredation, and our towns from the insult and charge of ransom; and that it will not be thought sufficient to have relieved a fortress, prevented the final surrender of an island, and to have substituted rescue for protection.

When a British fleet is no longer stationary or cruizing in the West Indies, and each small island is abandoned to self-defence; it is not, perhaps, in this secure and powerful country easily conceived, how much anxiety pervades every class of people, and disturbs the peace of every family; how many out-looks are by day, how many watches kept by night; how much the proclamation for martial law, summoning every planter, servant, and tradesman, to arms, is ruinous to business, as destructive of comfort; how great are the private expences and loss from military array; and how heavy follow the colonial taxes for its maintenance and arrears!

Surely the prevention of these disquietudes, losses, and burthens, oppressing our colonists, will be in the future contemplation of those who direct the disposal of the British Navy; and the Windward and Leeward Islands have no more to dread from a flying squadron of France or Spain!

Recurring to the military branch of the subject under discussion;—with the exception of a *depôt* of troops, for enterprise or reinforcement, placed in Barbadoes, as being to windward, the

garrisons need not be numerous: a British regiment in each island, with its full and usual complement in times of war, or as reduced in seasons of peace, may, at each relative period, be sufficient, adding always the resource of an island militia.

Adverting to the militia, and its return of numbers relative to the white population in each island, as reported at different periods by the Governors, the remark occurs, that in a very great and more than ordinary proportion, referring to the countries of Europe, the population consists of *men capable of bearing arms.* Comparatively with any county of England, there are few aged white persons, women, or children, in any Windward or Leeward Island, Barbadoes perhaps excepted. Many of the proprietors live in England; and those who occasionally visit their estates, leave their young children behind at school. The adventurers in trade, or service on the plantations, who have resided and survived the age of fifty, then return to England or Scotland with the fortunes which they may have acquired. There are scarcely any white women of the menial and lowest condition; there are very few of the middling class; and the very respectable and well educated ladies in the higher rank of life (happily in some islands numerous), send their children, when very young, to profit by the like education in the seminaries of the mother-country, which they and their husbands have had, and which renders society in the colonies, from every accomplishment of liberal manners and improved minds, equal to that of the first gentry of England.

White children, then, in the West Indies, there are few or none: "men, high-minded men, there constitute a state." So wrote the philosopher and poet Sir William Jones; and such men form the bulk and bulwark of West India population, two-thirds of which in each island I should conceive to be capable of bearing arms. On the premises of West India population, and the explanations I have offered, I venture the following estimate of native and regular military force as suited to each island.

	War Establishment.			Peace Establishment.		
	Regular Troops.	Militia.	Total.	Regular Troops.	Militia.	Total.
Jamaica, ...	4500	9500	14,000	2000	9500	11,500
Barbadoes, ...	800	4000	4800	600	4000	4600
Ditto *depôt**, ...	3000	.....	3000	1000	.....	1000
Antigua, ...	1000	700	1700	700	700	1400
St. Christopher's,	500	400	900	300	400	700
Dominica, ...	1000	600	1600	600	600	1200
St. Vincent's, ...	700	500	1200	500	500	1000
Grenada, ...	700	500	1200	500	500	1000
Tobago, ...	700	400	1100	500	400	900
Trinidad, ...	1500	2000	3500	1000	2000	3000
	14,400	18,200	32,600	7700	18,200	25,900

The militia doth not comprise the total number capable of bearing arms; but in times of danger, and martial law, with the exception of persons in particular situations and offices, the whole are called forth, and required to serve. In the above estimate I have not included the Negro, or "*Black Corps.*" There is something in the temper and constitution of these negro regiments which ever has been, and not unreasonably, matter of distrust

and jealousy to the colonists. The subject is of an invidious nature, and as such, I would avoid the discussion of it at large. One circumstance of objection I will however state, from personal observation of the mischief, on my own estate. There being no women attached to these corps, the negro soldiers frequently intrude upon the plantations; and from this, and other causes, there is a growing animosity between them and the slaves, which, in one obvious point of view, the planters consider as advantageous; it may be carried to an extremity, and have consequences, which make me doubt if it is wisely so considered; yet, in the alternative of favourable reception, and domestication with the negro families, a connexion and common cause with armed men, at some critical period, might not be safe; and in the ordinary course of Nature and events, a rising generation of children, born and remaining slaves, with relation to a soldier-father, might at some time awaken feelings, and create consequences, endangering the whole colonial system. On this very delicate subject I will venture no further remark than to add, and most earnestly represent, that the military defence of an island should in no case be left exclusively to a negro regiment; they must be held, and kept subordinate to, and have before them the example of, British troops; they cannot be entrusted with *an island fortress*.

It is certainly true, and it will appear from military returns of mortality in the ensuing Chapter, that negro soldiers, under a climate natural and congenial to their temperament and habits,

will go through the fatigues of service in the West Indies with less liability to sufferance, disease, and premature death, than Europeans; but admitting this to be, as it is, a most important consideration, the question yet remains, whether the advantage does not apply to other corps of the like description of personal frame and qualifications, and in other respects less objectionable? I allude to ranger corps, formed of the active slaves on the plantations, as in the years 1795 and 1796, during the Charaib war in St. Vincent's. Under my gallant friend, Major Josiah Jackson, and other brave colonists who volunteered as officers, these negro rangers served with a courage and fidelity which greatly contributed to the preservation of the island: not a negro deserted his officer and master during eighteen months' warfare, so inveterate on the part of the Charaibs and French, that no quarter was given. On a favourable termination of the contest, these faithful slaves contentedly returned to labour on the plantations; were rewarded in numerous instances with gratuities, and honourable notice by the Island Legislature; were satisfied, and proud in returning home to their houses, gardens, and families, on the estates preserved by their bravery; and where they yet retain an honourable distinction of dress, and moreover, of favour and respect; and are ready, as rangers, again to take the field with their masters, should any emergency require it.

A negro militia of such description, I must pronounce, on experience, to be most valuable, and on every account to be pre-

ferred for island defence. The negro corps in the King's service, being ready for exterior expeditions and enterprise, have that advantage in their establishment, and that alone. Certainly, in times of peace, they will be found rather an incumbrance on the island service, and a charge to Government, without much use—to say no worse.

From all I have observed, and from all I have stated, the inference is clear and decided, that a proportion of regular troops, in times of peace, as well as of war, is indispensable for the security and defence of the sugar colonies; and that British regiments can alone form safe and suitable guards and garrisons, severally, for the islands in the West Indies. The health of our men, their condition, effective force, and recruiting on that station, will be the subject of the following Chapters.

CHAP. XIV.

On the Mortality of Troops serving in the West Indies, and the Means of Prevention, or Remedy, to be suggested.

EXAMINING the military returns of British infantry serving in the West Indies, the effective force comparative with the loss by usual mortality on that station, and the reinforcement yearly to be required, are matters of interesting inquiry and consideration.

If taken only in this point of view, the following tables may be of use, in affording some *data* whereon to compute the number of recruits annually to be provided in peace or war, for the sustaining any complement or specific force in the West Indies; adding to the loss by deaths, an estimate of invalids from casualties, or age, and of men periodically to be discharged, under the new regulations of limited service. But my purpose in exhibiting these official and interesting returns, goes far beyond any calculations of reinforcement and supply; and I shall be grievously mistaken and disappointed indeed, if the representation of dreadful mortality which I shall produce, does not impress on those in power, and whose concern it is, a sense and anxious feeling of duty, which shall direct their immediate at-

tention to the providing some remedy for so great an evil, and to the adopting measures which may conduce to the better preservation of health and life, for our soldiers in the West Indies.

TABLES,

Shewing the Mortality of Troops in the West Indies (exclusive of those who fell in Action) during Seven Years, from 1796 *to* 1802 *inclusive, compiled from Regimental Returns collected by John Sayer, Esq. Commissary in the Windward and Leeward Islands during that Period.*

No. I.

	European Soldiers.				Negro Soldiers.			Officers.
	Largest Force.	Medium Monthly Returns.	Dicd.	Per Cent.	Force.	Died.	Per Cent.	Died.
1796, April,	19,676	15,881	6484	40¼	2495	75	3	226
1797, April,	13,627	11,503	3766	32¾	3080	118	4	99
1798, April,	9192	8416	1602	17½	3055	252	8	38
1799, Feb.	7654	7202	876	11¾	3354	258	7¾	24
1800, Feb.	8840	7890	1221	15½	4320	286	6½	58
1801, Feb.	11,745	10,315	2340	22¾	4604	276	6	104
1802, Feb.	10,198	9038	990	11	3840	199	5	41
Original army,	19,676	.....	17,173	....	....	....	....	590

Remarks on the above Returns.

In 1796-7, on opening the campaign, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, with the great reinforcements then arrived in the West Indies, the troops were generally unseasoned to the climate; the duties of fatigue and service, especially in St. Lucia and Grenada, were immediate and excessive, and barracks and hospitals were unprepared, or insufficient; and to these, with other causes, may be attributed the very extraordinary mortality in the two first years.—1798, &c. the second period of four years, may afford premises for estimating the mortality of troops in the West Indies, under exposure to climate, and duties of fatigue on active service.—1802, the last year, affords grounds of estimate, when a year of peace admits of care of the soldiery, in avoiding exposure to night dews, and meridian suns, in regulating diet, and in mitigating fatigue. In reference to the black corps, I should observe, that the two first years (1796-7) they were newly raised, and probably not yet engaged in the hardships of service, and which accounts for the very few negroes lost in those years.

No. II.

Comparative Mortality of Troops in the West Indies, in different Months and Seasons of the Year.

		European Soldiers.						Negro Soldiers.					
		Force.	Died each Month.	Died each Season.	On Medium Force.	Rate each Year.	Per Cent.	Force.	Died each Month.	Died each Season.	On Medium Force.	Rate each Year.	Per Cent.
Dry and Healthy Season.	December,	7248	49	....	....	....	....	3292	13	....	....	....	....
	January,	7170	44	....	....	....	....	3277	14	....	....	....	....
	February,	10,198	110	....	....	....	....	4275	18	....	....	....	....
	March,	10,195	94	....	....	....	....	4232	17	....	....	....	....
	April,	10,133	67	....	....	....	....	4220	9	....	....	....	....
	May,	10,065	53	....	....	....	....	4114	17	....	....	....	....
	June,	10,000	55	....	....	....	....	3903	14	....	....	....	....
	July,	9731	48	520	9800	780	8	3825	17	119	3892	180	$4\frac{1}{4}$
Rainy Season.	August,	8880	82	....	....	....	....	3759	28	....	....	....	....
	September,	8759	183	....	....	....	....	3719	27	....	....	....	....
	October,	8385	105	....	....	....	....	3461	7	....	....	....	....
	November,	8024	100	470	8512	1410	17	3448	18	80	3597	240	$6\frac{3}{4}$
	Medium of the year,	9038	....	990	....	....	11	4000	....	199	....	....	5

Remarks on the above Table.

In the months of February and March of this year, the British troops appear to have suffered unusual mortality. In February, the army having been reinforced from 7170 to 10,198 men, the extra deaths may be attributed to the recent arrivals of raw troops, particularly affected by the change of climate: yet, as an arrival of new troops must be occasional, I leave this contingency with the general computation, and take the result as it stands; that is, for a year of peace, and when extraordinary exposure to fatigue and climate is not required, the mortality of British regiments, during eight months of dry and healthy season, at 8 per cent. and during four months of hurricane and rainy season, at 17 per cent. and for the year together, at deaths, 11 per cent.

The negro regiments, or black corps, lose in the first period 4 per cent., in the latter about 7 per cent., and medium for the year, 5 per cent.

In seasons of war and active campaign, the European troops lose, by deaths, 17 per cent., and the negroes 7 per cent.; each description of troops suffering about one-third additional loss, from exposure to climate, and fatigues of service.

The returns of mortality refer to the islands generally; but the result of deaths, in proportion to numbers, is very different in different islands, or stations of the same island.

Barbadoes is, comparatively, a healthy island; so too, on personal observation, I can represent St. Vincent's to be. When I was in that island in 1792, the 66th regiment, stationed on Berkshire-hill six years, had in that time buried only 72 men, not exceeding 4 per cent. on their number returned for any one year; and in my presence, the 37th regiment, after two years' station in St. Vincent's, embarked, January 1803, for Trinidad, not leaving a sick man behind, or in the hospital. The same regiment, two months after their arrival in Trinidad, had lost many, both officers and men, and, as I was informed, when in March I was at Tobago, had then 200 men in the hospital.

Tobago and Grenada are generally unhealthy, at least in situations where troops have been usually stationed. In Tobago, the French garrison, from its arrival in October 1802, in six months was nearly extinct; of 42 of Sahuguet's grenadiers, only two were surviving in March 1803. In Grenada, in 1792, the 48th regiment, under the command of Major (now General) Manningham, in the old Spanish fort by the Carenage, within three years had buried a number equal to its complement.

Respecting the mortality in Grenada and St. Lucia, the following remark is copied from a note of my worthy brother-in-law, Mr. Sayer, in reference to the first table of military returns: "The mortality this year (1796) was most prevalent in the islands of St. Lucia and Grenada: in *St. Lucia*, the 31st regiment, in the month of May 1796, was 776 strong; and by November, that is, in less than

seven months, only fifteen were returned fit for duty. In the same island, the 44th, 48th, and 55th regiments, and the York Fusileers (in May 1796, all strong regiments), lost by far the greater number of their men within the year. In *Grenada*, from June 1796 to February 1797, the 27th regiment lost 20 officers, and 516 men. In the same island, and within the same period, the 57th regiment lost 15 officers, and 605 men."

What a havock of death is this! what plague, pestilence, or famine of the East can be compared, in the effects of almost extinction of the human race, within a certain pale, and of a particular description of people? can the attention of medical science and art be better directed, than to regulations preservative of our soldiers in these countries? can Government more beneficently and wisely exercise its functions of patronage and authority, than by instituting commissions of inquiry into the extent and causes of the evil, and administering reform and remedy in every practicable way? Whilst I was within this circle of disease and death, assailing the military force in Tobago, I saw little of prevalent fever, or unusual mortality, affecting the societies I was inmate with, or even amongst the young Scotch apprentices on the plantations; and myself, a new comer from England, had never an hour's illness; I cannot therefore but imagine, that precautions have been wanting, observing the mortality of soldiers to be so out of proportion to that of every other class of people in the West Indies.

It is principally with a view to remonstrance on this subject, and to suggestions of what may conduce to the future health and comfort of the British soldier, that I have been induced to insert a Military Chapter in this Compilation. In earnestness of honest feeling, and with a sense of duty, I cast aside all imputations of presumption or insufficiency, whilst I contribute my mite, even the least, with the purpose of kindness and advantage to the brave men who are enlisted in the service of this country, and engaged in the protection and defence of its West India colonies.

I have mentioned, that in 1792, when I was in Grenada, the 48th regiment had suffered most severely from sickness in the old Spanish fortress on the beach: I will add, that at the same time the 67th regiment, stationed on the heights behind the house of my friend General Matthews, the Governor, where I resided, had been generally healthy, and lost very few men: and this leads me to suggest some observations on the station of troops in the islands generally, and the regulations and reform in this and other respects, which may be conducive to the health and comfort of the soldier in that quarter of the empire; and reduce the mortality which hath hitherto excited regret and terror in the breast of every relative of those destined for service in the West Indies.

I recommend, in the first place, that, in times of peace, regiments and recruits should so embark, as to make their arrival

in the West Indies as nearly as possible to the commencement of the dry and healthy season in December, so that they may have full time to be acclimated, and prepared to encounter the rainy and unhealthy months at the fall of the year. In the rainy autumnal season, the atmosphere is not only less pure and salubrious, but further, the ordinary place of disembarkation, and first reception, is least of all favourable to health at such a period of the year.

The chief towns in the islands, for the convenience and purposes of trade, are situated in bays to leeward, as suitable to shipping, both for shelter and ready departure: these bays, for the most part, are formed, and closed in, by an amphitheatre of hills; and the town on the beach is backed by some portion of plains, or lowlands, running to the foot of the surrounding heights. In the wet yet sultry season, and when the air is least salubrious, it here loses all vital elasticity and circulation; and, shut up from the eastern current of the trade winds, animating more open situations, oppresses with closeness and languor even those most accustomed to the climate and country: but further, the lowlands to the back of the town are, in the rainy seasons, to a degree inundated by drippings from the surrounding hills, and form beds of mud and marsh, which, under the sultry heats, emit vapours pestilential to the vicinity.

Lowland towns, then, are not the proper stations for European troops; nor are posts, however high up the country,

which are to leeward of wet and marshy plains, the exhalations from which, by the course of the trade winds, bear directly on the garrison: and this remark applies especially to the fortress adjoining Scarborough, in Tobago, which is affected and poisoned by the marsh of Bacolet, contiguous to windward.

Dry situations, with a free current of air, are of the first importance to the health of troops in the West Indies: and the objections to such selection of spot, which may arise from the necessity of guards, and posts of vigilance and defence, near to the seat of government and trade, might, to a great degree, be obviated, by furnishing detachments, and frequent reliefs, for the duty required; reserving the main body, and head-quarters, at a station chosen with a regard to health.

In new and mostly unsettled countries, such as Trinidad, the selection of military stations, with regard to health, may be difficult, but is most important. The large tracts of uncleared wood cover, as it were, one general marsh: the foliage of the trees not deciduous, or ever re-vegetating, and fully supplied, lets through the rain, and shuts out the sun, shading and protecting the bog which hath thus been created; and thence, in the autumnal evening, from the platform of every grove, a fetid vapour is swept on by the easterly wind, or land breeze, as may be, and in every quarter to leeward is to be smelt, tasted, and felt, as a poison to life.

In such countries, without any deference to the Commissary,

and the situation of his stores, and to his or any other person's convenience whatever, concerned in furnishing supplies to the soldiery,—every other consideration should give way to that of the health of the main body in garrison, and the station most suitable in this respect should at all events be preferred.

In times of peace, and at all times, as far as is consistent with the service, the principle of sacrificing all other considerations to those of health, in the selecting military stations, being admitted, its application must be the result of inquiry and experience: I merely suggest and plead for its more general adoption.

Our excellent officers in command will ever, as far as depends on them, take necessary precautions for the health and comfort of the soldier; but in many cases, barracks have been already ill built, and stations already ill chosen;—there they are: no other place of reception is provided; and thither the officer *must* march his men,—to die, where others have died before!

On the management of men conformably to the climate, and the avoiding exposure to meridian suns, and to night dews, it is unnecessary for me to remark; it will, by every good officer, be regulated and attended to, as far as may be consistent with the service.

On the article of diet, it hath often occurred to me, that people in the West Indies do not live as West Indians should do: for I cannot consider hard salted meats as a natural and proper

food of the country: in those climates, and with a relaxed tone of stomach, the eating of what is most indigestible is followed, as of course, by drinking what is most stimulating; and in the end, both co-operate to disease and death. I cannot but think, that rations of salt beef and pork should be more sparingly issued to the soldiery: and with views of analogy, looking to the habits of life amongst the *indigeni* of the East Indies, I must suppose that in the West, under nearly the same latitudes and climate, yams, plantains, rice, and above all, fish, with the condiments for each food of spices and capsicum, which the providence of God hath provided for our sustenance and health in the West Indies, were not provided in vain. In every island, a pen with a flock of sheep, for hospital use at least, should be attached to each garrison; and a fishing boat, seins, and nets, should be part of each regimental store. The drink of the soldier in the West Indies, particularly requires correction. It is insisted with the contractor, that the rum furnished to the troops should be of good quality, and at least one year old. It is notorious, that hot and raw spirit from the still is coloured, and cooked up in a few weeks, or even days, and sold to the troops as old rum. It is of the utmost consequence to the health of the soldier that this should be corrected; and is easily so corrected by immediate purchase, under certain regulations, superintended by a committee of the Governor and Council, directly from the planters in each island.

On the subject of clothing, what is conducive to comfort and

health is now well understood; and I shall say little on this head. A regimental store of thin and light flannels is, above all, necessary. Suddenly checked perspiration is the most frequent cause of disease in the tropical climates; and flannel next the skin, and worn at all times, is the best preservative: I believe it is already in general use.

Adverting to the station of troops in the West Indies, it has been observed, that dry and airy situations are to be preferred: the facing and apertures of the barracks should be accommodated to the situation. Open galleries and sheds should shelter every passage and communication, covering the windows from the beating in of the rains, and preventing the soldier's exposure to the meridian sun, in every case, when actual service and duty do not require it. Not only each sentry walk, but the very parade should be covered. The barracks being properly built, and adapted to a certain number of men, should on no occasion receive beyond the complement: above all, the apartments for sleep should never be crouded; in itself it is most prejudicial to health; but further, in consequence of a chamber being occasionally so crouded, the stifled soldier's resource, and a fatal one it may prove, is to throw open the windward casements, and let in the heavy night dews on those in sleep, which, checking the perspiration so necessary to health and life in those climates, may occasion fevers, fluxes, and the whole train of tropical disorders.

I presume not to discuss the subject of hospitals, but yet on this head I must venture one remark, which I made whilst in the island of St. Vincent's, in 1792, and which I now copy from the entry in a little journal which I kept at the time.

" Some islands being much more healthy than others, and certain stations in those islands having been found more advantageous than others, not only to actual health, but to the recovery of invalids ;—it occurs to me, that a *depôt* for military invalids and convalescents should be established in some one island ; and the place be selected by medical commissioners, having before them military returns, and every document of past and comparative health, added to such personal inspection and observation as may best direct their judgment, and choice of situation, for a *general hospital of recovery.*

" Such place of *depôt* being chosen and prepared, soldiers from every regiment, and whatever island, after tedious intermittents, liver complaints, and other chronical cases, or consequent debility, should be sent for the re-establishment of health and strength, before the constitution is wholly broken and enervated by the disorder, or its effects. My information, in the first instance, would direct to Dorsetshire Hill, in the island of St. Vincent's."

I am aware, in having discoursed so much at large on this subject, that I am liable to the imputation of having trespassed on the province of those exclusively entitled to discuss the mat-

ters in question from professional education and practice: but my motives of affection and regard for the British soldiery, guard me from any disquietude at the censure of presumption in this respect; and if any one observation which I have made shall be selected as worthy of attention, and the measures thereon adopted shall conduce to the better health and comfort of troops in the West Indies, the most fastidious reader will, in such case, I trust, pass over what remains of mistaken or superfluous remark with indulgence and excuse.

CHAP. XV.

Observations on Limited Military Service, as applicable to Troops serving in the West Indies.

A MEASURE hath been lately proposed and adopted in Parliament, and is now "a law of the land," by which each British soldier for the infantry, is in future to be enlisted for the limited term of seven years; and at that period of service, has the option of re-engagement at an advanced pay, or of then claiming his discharge.

One of the leading objections taken to this wise, humane, and altogether excellent regulation, proposed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Windham, arose from the difficulties which were argued, as attending its application to British regiments in the West Indies; and the opposers of the measure insisted on the embarrassments to the service, and on the expence to the public, which the frequent reliefs, and exchange of recruits for discharged men, would occasion, under the circumstances of distance, and contingencies of service, peculiar to the West India station.

A case was then stated in reference to the negro troops, or black corps, and a question arose, of how far these soldiers should, or could, be comprised in the regulation proposed.

I shall suggest another special case, not adverted to in Parliament, namely, that of *foreign soldiers*, having more particularly in view those of the six battalions of the 66th regiment, usually stationed in the West Indies. I shall first submit my observations on the general subject, and then consider these cases distinctively.

From the military returns entered in a former page, the mortality of troops on the West India station appears to be great, and truly deplorable; but that mortality hath yet been exaggerated in the public opinion, by the observation of—how few soldiers have heretofore returned from service in that quarter of the empire. The inference of almost certain death to those who embark for the West India station, hath probably arisen from the effects of the paltry economy and cruel practice of drafting regiments, when nominally relieved, and turning over whatever remained of effective soldiers, to serve in the regiment newly arrived, or, in plain terms, to continue in the West Indies till they died.

It has been stated to me, that since I was in the islands, this practice hath been reformed: but the system of keeping regiments on the West India station for a greater number of years, than the European constitution can resist and survive exposure to military fatigue in these climates, hath done away much, if not all, of the good consequences to be expected from a reform in the practice

of drafting the men, and which could not be too strongly reprobated.

British regiments have heretofore remained on the West India station eight, ten, and even fourteen years, and till their complement was exhausted, or reduced to non-commissioned officers and invalids. On their return to England, not even these ghosts of the departed regiment were seen; they ranged only within the pale of Chelsea; or if, in exception, some one poor spectre of a man stalked forth to his native village, he was greeted (as usual on ghostly appearances) with more of terror than of affection, whilst he the "secrets of his prison-house revealed." The exposure to service in that country, "from whose bourne no traveller returned," could not but operate in prejudice to the general recruiting of our armies; and the removing this objection from the English villager's mind, is surely no light recommendation of the measure of limited service, in regard to the facility of recruiting, whilst it hath the higher value of justice and humanity, in consideration of those who may actually enlist.

But some regulation of military station in the West Indies is yet further required, before the measure of limited service can have all the good effects of which, in this view, it is capable. In conformity with the leading principle of limited service, and applying it further, and to those actually enrolled, as far as relates to their service in the West Indies, I venture to propose, that in

future no British regiment should remain on the West India station more than four years.

In result of the observations which I made during a residence in the islands at different periods in 1791 and 1802, I am persuaded that such regulation as I suggest, would be of advantage to the service, in every public and military point of view; and therewith may be comprised, that it would not only contribute to the health and preservation of the soldier actually serving, as I shall clearly explain; but furnish an inducement for others to enlist, which a view of the early and effective returns of those who have served, must naturally produce.

It is true that Europeans, on their first arrival in the West Indies, are liable to fevers, and other disorders, from a climate and habits of life so new to them; and in the West India phrase, "they require a seasoning," before their health can be confirmed and depended upon.

But it is equally true that Europeans, after a certain number of years' residence, fall into relaxed habits and chronical complaints, which may shew more invalids proportionate to numbers, in the regimental returns of a seventh, or eighth year, though perhaps not more deaths, comparatively, than in the year of arrival. In particular, ulcerated ancles, and diseased legs, are prevalent in regiments which have over-stayed the period of the European constitution's resistance to a tropical climate; and a military return of effectives, instead of invalids, is amongst

the good consequences to be expected from earlier exchange and relief.

The limiting the stay of regiments in the West Indies, is not only conformable to the principle, but warranted, and called for, by the specific provisions of that plan of limited service which its able and worthy author hath so well devised, with the happy combination of advantage to his country, and of individual comfort and resource to every brave subject that enrolls in its service. The removing the terror which hangs over the long continuance of a regiment on the West India station, will be in aid of an essential provision of the plan, by removing a principal objection to re-enlisting in such regiment: it will give to the inducements of increased pay, and of higher character in the line, all the desired effect which could scarcely otherwise on the West India station be expected, save in some solitary instance of military enthusiasm.

Six months under the actual regulation being added to the term enlisted for, in case the soldier, at the expiration of his seven years, should be serving in the West Indies; and four years (as I have ventured to propose) being the utmost continuance of his regiment on the station, from the date of its arrival; I do not conceive that the *miles emeritus* would hasten to quit his battalion on the West India station, more than on any other; but re-enlist, and this even with some preference for awaiting the return home with his comrades, at a period so early in view. And here I

venture a strong and decided opinion, that the re-enlisting after the first term of engagement for seven years is expired, will be very general. From what I have observed of men, and especially of bodies of men, I infer, that although the quitting a regiment at the expiration of seven years, and whilst in health and the prime of life, will be no desertion under the Mutiny Act, yet it will be a kind of desertion, and a disgrace, in the eye of comrade-soldiers; and I doubt not, in many regiments, an *esprit du corps* will arise, to substitute fourteen years of service, as a sort of regulation amongst themselves.

I must then contend, that those who will claim their discharge in the first instance, may be very few; and those who, at the expiration of fourteen years, *should have* their discharge, cannot, under the casualties of so long service, be numerous; and in either case, for their return home from the West Indies, above six hundred trading vessels offer annually a ready passage; and the expence of hired transports can scarcely, on this account, be necessary.

It will be for Ministers and the War Office to decide, whether regimental recruits shall from time to time embark from England, to restore the complement of a diminished corps, or whether entire regiments shall go out, to sustain the general return of West India guards and garrisons, leaving particular regiments there stationed, on reduced musters; with the recruits pre-

pared, and training at home, ready to join, as successively each regiment shall return to Europe.

Times of war, and expeditions in the West Indies, have been stated as forming a special case, in objection to the measure of limited service, when applied to our military establishment in that quarter of the empire. Extending even, as I propose, the principle of limited service to the destination and stay of entire regiments, I yet cannot descry any thing in this, or other objection, which is not to be met, and over-ruled, by advantages of greater and paramount consideration.

In times of war, more troops will of course be required for colonial garrisons, as generally for defence in other parts of the British dominions. As to a disposable force for enterprise and attack, the objections to limited service, if any, apply not more in the West Indies than in Germany, Italy, or Egypt.

Specifically as to colonial service, the objection alone remains of the expence of transports, and employ of convoys: for the latter, Great Britain, pre-eminent and commanding in naval power, must, at all times during war, cover the seas with its ships in divers directions; and looking to the occasionally defenceless state of our islands, and their want of convoys for the produce home, during the two last summers, I may venture to suggest, that British squadrons more frequently passing the Atlantic, in the track of reinforcements to the West

Indies, far from a misdirection of force, may be turned to account in the general system and management of warfare: this presumes merely sagacity and enterprise to characterize the national councils: and if this is not so, surely neglect or misuse is no criterion of fault in any institution, or to be impleaded against its use and merits. As to the mere expence of vessels of burthen, or transports, a set-off will be hereafter shown, more than compensating any national charge in that respect.

In the regulations of limited service, well and wisely carried into effect, and with such auxiliary measures as Government shall devise for adapting the military establishment to various cases and circumstances, I foresee no disadvantage or difficulties whatever in regard to the colonial service; but on the contrary, I look forward to regiments on the West India station more efficient, as not broken and worn down by corruption of temperament, and lassitude of habit, and with sores and debility crouding to the island hospitals,—Chelsea and the grave. Advantages of health and life will follow, too, from the soldier's *mind* being cheerfully directed to relief at fixed periods.

I have often had occasion to observe, how greatly the spirits of hope and confidence fortify against disease in the West Indies; and from analogies in domestic life, I may presume, that the soldier having early relief, and a return home to his native country, in view, will be cleared from that predisposing cause of malady and death, of which, in those climates, languor and dejection of spi-

rits are too commonly the forerunners. Low spirits and low fever, if not synonymous, are little distant, in the countries I am mentioning: and the best physicians there consider despondency as the worst of symptoms, even when the man is otherwise in apparent health.

Many a British grenadier, "careless of life as hopeless of relief," has sunk into feverish depression, and been carried to an untimely grave in the West Indies; who, had he been enlisted for limited service, and with limitation, too, of his regiment's stay under that climate which oppresses him, would have borne up with an animation resisting its fatal influence, and have lived to re-embark.

No one who has visited the West Indies will object to me as fanciful, in ascribing these effects of life and death to the relative and predisposing influences of alacrity or dejection. It is in these above all other countries, that good spirits are not less the promoters than the symptoms of health: and I augur, that under the new regulations of limited service, the mortality in regiments on the West India station will not only be less, but the survivors will be more contented, cheerful, healthy, and efficient soldiers.

My mind hath been so strongly impressed with the interest of this subject, that I have been led to a discussion of it at greater length than I at first proposed: dismissing the general question of limited service, as applied to troops in the West

Indies, I recur to the special cases which I premised, and which I shall now more briefly consider.

Adverting to the "*Black Corps*," I find the subject full of difficulties; but these are rather belonging to their original establishment, than to any operation of the scheme of service in question.

In fact, few, if any, of the negroes in the Black corps have been enlisted as British soldiers; they have been mostly slaves bought, and enrolled; and, however enrolled, are yet slaves in the consideration of the legislature and courts of judicature in the West Indies: when in the island of St. Vincent's, I remember an instance of a negro corporal being, by his officers, brought forward to give testimony on a question of riot and assault, when his evidence was deemed inadmissible, and as such rejected by the Chief Justice, Mr. Ottley, on the grounds of his being a slave.

To legalize any manumission, and constitute a free negro, it is most humanely provided by colonial law, that security must be entered into, and lodged with the Public Treasurer of whatever island, for an annuity of ten pounds sterling, for provision and subsistence to the negro so made free. Without such surety being given (and how it is to be given I know not), the discharge of a negro soldier, at the expiration of seven, or any number of years, would throw him on the public as an "*outcast slave*:" and this with much embarrassment and difficulty on the civil

department of Government in the colonies, which could scarcely distrain on the Colonel, and would unwillingly distress the soldier.

The case of the Black Corps does not, then, come within the regulation in question: the negro soldiers have not been, and generally cannot be, procured by the ordinary modes of recruiting: they have not been, and cannot be, enlisted; and therefore cannot, on any terms of enlistment, claim their discharge, but must continue to serve until unfit for service.

From these statements it is, however, obvious, that some regulations, especially adapted to these corps, are necessary; and the more so at this advanced period of their establishment, and when a provision and retreat for invalided and aged negro soldiers may be soon required:—or are they, one and all, to be admitted in-pensioners of Chelsea? Could even such an accommodation be given, a single English winter would, I fear, be a sufferance to the aged negro, which no comforts of that excellent institution could compensate.

Lastly, I advert to the regulations of limited service as applicable to the six battalions of the 60th regiment, usually stationed in the West Indies, and consisting chiefly of soldiers enlisted from Germany.

Not being apprized of how far it is proposed that the regulation should apply to these regiments, I will, for argument's sake,

presume that it doth apply, and suppose, that German soldiers will in future be enlisted on like terms as British. As far as the case is similar, I will avoid any repetition of suggestions or remarks which I have before stated: but as, in reference to these battalions, it may be of advantage to our colonial establishments, and for the public interest, that the measure of limited service should be carried to its very letter; I will admit the extreme and improbable case which I rejected in the first instance, and will suppose every German soldier to claim and have his discharge at the expiration of seven years.

Whether from more phlegmatic constitutions and patient temper, or from more frugal habits of diet, or from whatever cause, the foreign soldiers of the 60th regiment appear to suffer less from the West India climate than the British troops generally do. Many circumstances may, in combination, account for this difference of health: emigrant from their native country, these Germans seem to have lost all regard for their former homes; their minds and nerves are not shook with regrets and a longing for Europe; they are generally satisfied with where they are, and are ready to become settlers, and domesticate in a West India colony, as opportunity shall offer, and as, in occasional instances of discharge, they have already done.

Government then, in this case, may avail itself of dis-

charges, under the regulation of limited service, to convert disbanded soldiers into the most valuable settlers; and to form the basis of a population and militia, adding gradually to the cultivation, settlement, and internal strength of each colony; and progressively admitting of a reduction of the establishment of British troops for colonial security, at least in times of peace, by such substitution of native force.

In many islands, but particularly in Jamaica, Trinidad, Dominica, Tobago, and St. Vincent's, lands at the disposal of the Crown might be granted out, in small lots of ten or more acres, to each discharged German soldier. Pursuing this system, in the course of a few years much of the interior of these islands would be occupied by gardeners, and rearers of porkers, poultry, and other stock, and the coasts with fishermen; all of a loyal and industrious race, adding wealth and security to the colonies, and increasing and cheapening provisions and live stock for the supply of the mercantile shipping, and for those of the navy and armies of the mother-country, at any time detached to that quarter of the British empire.

Having enumerated these and other advantages likely to accrue from the measure of limiting the duration of military service in the West Indies, whether of individual soldiers, or of *entire regiments*; I shall revert to the objections which have been

made, and particularly to that of the national expence to be incurred by additional transports. The objection in itself is light, of little moment, and easily answered; but it leads to collateral subjects deserving of the most serious consideration, and the discussion of which, in the following Chapter, will conclude this Miscellany.

CHAP. XVI.

The Transport Service an essential Resource to the Shipping Interest of Great Britain in times of War.

IT hath been observed in a former page of this Miscellany, that it is indispensable to the fair competition and sale of British produce and manufactures, that they should pass to the foreign market clear of those surcharges of freight, insurance, convoys, and demurrage, which, in times of war, are necessarily imposed on cargoes conveyed by British ships; and that, in cases of naval warfare, a proportion of the carrying trade hath usually passed over to neutral bottoms, as a temporary resource of commercial economy, and therewith of national interest. In the present instance, the amount of the carrying trade so transferred, will appear from the following table, printed by Order of the House of Commons, May 8, 1806.

Comparative Account of the Number and Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels which entered the several Ports of Great Britain, at different Periods of Peace and War.

	British Ships.		Foreign Ships.	
	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
1791, year of peace, ...	12,030	1,587,645	2477	304,074
1801, year of war, ...	10,347	1,378,620	5497	780,155
Reduction of British shipping,	1683	209,095	....	.....
Increase of foreign ships, ...	....	.....	3020	476,081

Supposing each foreign ship to return with a full cargo, the export carrying trade, which hath passed over to neutral vessels, is 476,081 tons of merchandize, in 3020 ships. As this greatly exceeds the reduced tonnage of British shipping, we may place some part to the account of increased manufacture and trade: but a further inference is, that many British merchant-ships yet keeping the seas and in employ, are to amount, in part at least, of this excess by foreign shipping deprived of their freight; and that being thus distressed by incomplete lading, a further abandonment of the trade and reduction of British shipping may yearly be expected.

In truth, the resort to neutral bottoms, if other than temporary and occasional, is full of danger to the vital interests of the State: in long protracted wars, this resource for our manufactures and commerce is not safe for our Navy.

In July 1806, in the debates of the House of Commons on the American Intercourse Bill, it was forcibly urged, "that the carrying trade being reduced, and, as apprehended, further diminishing from year to year, during a long period of war, it would be difficult, from deficiency of shipping, to resume it on return of peace; as, whilst the old merchant-vessels were falling into decay, and many yet were out of employ, the ship-builders would have no orders, and no vessels be ready, or even on the stocks, preparing to supply their place." The worthy Members for the City of London supported these allegations by petitions from the ship-owners, stating their heavy loss from ships out of employ; and by others from the ship-builders, representing that their business was on the decline; that for the year 1806 scarcely any orders for building had been received; and that the few ships lately built on speculation, and to retain their workmen, had been sold at a loss, or remained on hand.

The importance of these statements has induced me to inquire into their validity, and with this view carefully to examine the voluminous report of all decked vessels, of whatever dimensions, from five to 1200 tons, built in the several ports and yards of Great Britain at the periods of 1790 and 1791, compared with those of 1804 and 1805.

My analysis of these official returns (if here inserted at length) would too far disjoin and interrupt the subject of this essay; but I ought not to with-hold from the public, a document and autho-

rity on which so many important considerations arise, and I shall place it in an Appendix to this Chapter; a summary of the totals will answer my present purpose.

No. I.

Comparative Return of all Decked Vessels and Ships built in the Ports of Great Britain at different Periods of Peace and War: each Period Two Years.

Return to House of Commons, June 24, 1806.

	1790-1.	1804-5.	Increase.	Decrease.
Vessels under 100 tons, ...	994	918	....	76
Ships ..... 100 tons to 200,	244	327	83	....
Ditto ..... 200 — to 300,	102	99	....	3
Ditto ..... 300 — to 400,	53	45	....	8
Ditto ..... 400 — to 500,	5	23	18	....
Ditto ..... 500 — to 650,	3	7	4	....
India ships 800 — to 1200,	5	7	2	....
Total ships, ...	1406	1428	22	....
Total tonnage, ...	122,827	151,207	28,380	....

No. II.

Comparative Summary of Ships built in the Ports of Great Britain the Two last Years, 1804 *and* 1805.

Return to House of Commons, June 24, 1806.

	1804.	1805.	Increase of Small Vessels.	Decrease of Large Ships.
Vessels under 100 tons, ...	432	486	54	.....
Ships ..... 100 tons to 200,	175	152	.....	23
Ditto ..... 200 — to 300,	61	38	.....	23
Ditto ..... 300 — to 400,	27	20	.....	7
Ditto ..... 400 — to 500,	13	10	.....	3
Ditto ..... 500 — to 650,	4	3	.....	1
India ships 800 — to 1200,	2	5	3	.....
Total ships, ...	714	714	57	57
Total tonnage, ...	79,612	71,495	.....	8117

On referring to the Tables at large, as exhibited in the Appendix, many subjects of interest will occur to an attentive examiner of the articles of which they are composed. For my present purpose it is merely necessary to note one article of detail, and to direct my reader's observation to the fact—that severally in these Tables, in proportion as the building of smaller vessels has increased, that of larger ships has diminished; and thereon to suggest, that not mere numbers, but rather the tonnage and dimension of ships taken with numbers, is the just criterion of the extent and prosperity of the shipping interest of the country.

Observing on the different periods of 1791 and 1805, it occurs that, in years of peace, the building of ships is annually required to an amount which may fully replace losses by wreck or weather, or vessels in decay from long service, and broken up, as likewise to accommodate an increase of trade, should such be the case. In years of war, the loss by captures is further to be supplied; but, on the other hand, prize-ships made free and registered, may more than furnish that supply. Under every consideration, the addition of 28,380 tons of shipping in 1804-5, or above 14,000 tons by the year, more than was built the year preceding the war, may be presumed hitherto to have kept up the complement of British shipping, and to have preserved the mercantile basis of the British Navy yet unimpaired. So far the public mind may be relieved from anxiety, as to the actual state of this national resource.

Referring again to the more compendious Tables, I cannot but remark on this part of the subject, that a misapprehension has arisen and excited alarm, from the narrowing an attention to what is nearest to us, and particularly to the outcry of—London and the Thames! From 1790-1 to 1804-5, London, Bristol, and Liverpool, have decreased in ship-building (for those periods of two years each, taken comparatively) 69 ships, and 7696 tons: but then Newcastle, Whitehaven, and above all, Sunderland, have in the same period increased their ship-building, by 55 vessels, and 15,967 tons. In truth and fact, the trade *shifting its*

ground, the losers have been loud in their complaints, whilst the gainers, as usual, have been silent; but the nation, as a sharer with each party, and fairly apprised of the balance in account, will resume its confidence in the general firm.

Yet considering the second Table of ships built in 1804-5, and taking a more enlarged view of the subject, the apprehensions may be too well founded, of probable and progressive decline of the merchant-shipping, from the date of this æra of the war; when the policy of the enemy directs his hostilities more especially against the vent of our manufactures and intercourse with the markets of Europe, and therewith against the carrying trade and shipping interest of this country.

In the long duration of political contests there is ever some crisis, some point of time and circumstance, on which revolution turns. The British Statesman, watching over the interests of our naval establishment, will anxiously observe the minutest tendency to mis-direction or decline; being well assured that, without timely check, and on the very outset, the course to loss and ruin will be accelerated, and with an increased momentum, baffling intervention and resistance at a future period. In political cases, antidotes oftener avail than remedies; the pre-disposing cause to evil may be controuled, but the malady coming on, be incurable.

When we recur to a former Table in this Chapter, exhibiting, as an effect of nine years of war, the transfer in 1801, of 476,081

tons of carrying trade to foreign shipping, we cannot but listen to with anxiety, and accredit the complaints of the British ship-owners in 1806, " of their further and progressive loss from ships out of employ." When we observe the decrease of above 8000 tons of shipping, being so much less built in 1805 than in the preceding year, we cannot without alarm hear the ship-builders deplore, " that they have scarcely any orders for ships in 1806, whilst many built heretofore on speculation, yet remain on hand." Moreover, the united evidence is but too consistent, for if fewer ships are employed, fewer, in course, will be required and built.

These statements afford matter of serious consideration indeed; nor, in the dilemma between repugnant interests of manufactures to be carried, and of ships to carry; of merchandize, and of merchant-ships; of wealth to sustain naval force, and of the navy itself—does any solution of the difficulties occur, which may fully obviate the fear of deterioration, and final loss of that shipping basis, on which alone the Imperial Navy can be supported; for if, to the return of peace, the mercantile shipping is not kept up, and ready to engage and employ the crews then to be discharged from the ships of war, as likewise to receive others, and educate a succession of seamen, for the future service of their country, the naval power of Britain is gone for ever.

Reverting to the immediate subject prescribed in the title of this Chapter, I must suggest, that an increased transport service is an increased carrying trade, and, as far as it goes, may, in times

of war, compensate for the partial alienation of mercantile cargoes, by employing a proportion of shipping in the carrying of troops, and so retaining it effective for freights of another sort, whenever the surcharges which obstructed its employ shall be taken off, on return of peace. In this view, the transports to be required for the conveying additional reliefs to and from the West Indies, will afford a temporary resource to our shipping interest; and the charge of more frequent passage will be amply repaid by such return of national advantage. This rests not on mere speculation; the ship-builders' letters from Hull directly advert to their resource from contracts for the conveyance of troops; and of the extraordinary number of 82 ships built at Sunderland in 1804-5, from their dimension and tonnage, a part may be presumed to have been expressly provided with a view to Government service. Yet it may be justly observed, that the assistance of the carrying trade afforded by the transport service must be occasional, and cannot have the effect of an entire relief: but what can have it, in the case adverted to? Peace alone can have the effect; and peace cannot have a certain and full effect, if too long delayed.

The evil is the result of long protracted war, and with such war, must continue, increase, and gain head and strength, and from year to year become less remediable.

Long protracted wars ever have been, and ever must be, pregnant with mischief and disorders to every condition of people and government so unhappily engaged; but most of all, will they

fatally affect a commercial people, and a free government, such as ours.

Long duration of war must, in its nature and course, divert from social duties and occupations; must depress industry, and obstruct commercial intercourse; must corrupt manners and morals; and, finally, must effect a change, not only in the characters and conduct of men, but in the character and constitution of the state itself: for at the same time that long habits of military dissipation and distinctions must cast in oblivion, or impair the domestic virtues and gradations of society, the military principles of despotism and subjection will creep in to vitiate, and ultimately to supersede those of regulated government and liberty.

Commerce, and a carrying trade, is but one of the losses, and not the most important loss, to be apprehended, from an over-protracted state of war.

Justin, speaking of the continued war with the Peloponnese, says, "non erant Athenienses vi victi, sed fortunæ varietate *debellati*" — Industry was warred down, commerce was warred down, the sense of virtue and freedom was warred down, and all finally was lost.

I have heard the language, and in societies where I should have expected better and wiser consideration, "that war is to be preferred to *any* peace with the present enemy of Great Britain." Vain, light, and improvident indeed is the language, which objects not to terms of peace, but to peace itself; as if a state of

perpetual war was a fitting condition of civilized society, and so to be preferred, and by a people and government such as ours. The intimations with which I have introduced this important subject, lead to far other inference.

In any negotiation for peace, may our Ministers peremptorily require conditions of honour, justice, and security; as I trust my country hath yet the further means to contend for these her rightful pretensions by force of arms: but let us remember, that no war is, or can be just and wise, which is not waged with views to peace.

On good and fair conditions, I pray to God that peace may speedily be restored to my country! and with this earnest and heart-felt prayer I close this Miscellany.

Comparative Return of Ships Built in Great Britain at a period of Peace, Two Years, 1790-1, and at a period of War, 1804-5; being analyzed from Returns to the House of Commons, June 24, 1806.

Ships Built in England.

Ships. Built at	1790-1. Under 100 Tons.	100 to 200 Tons.	200 to 300 Tons.	300 to 400 Tons.	400 to 500 Tons.	500 to 650 Tons.	800, &c. India Ships.	Total Ships.	Total Tonnage.	1804-5. Under 100 Tons.	100 to 200 Tons.	200 to 300 Tons.	300 to 400 Tons.	400 to 500 Tons.	500 to 650 Tons.	800, &c. India Ships.	Total Ships.	Total Tonnage.
London,	84	10	9	8	2	1	5	119	16,372	77	5	3	2	2	1	7	97	12,680
Aberystwith,	14	1	....	....	....	....	....	15	596	20	2	1	....	....	....	....	23	1594
Arundel,	3	2	....	....	....	....	....	5	285	4	2	....	....	....	....	....	6	627
Barnstaple,	5	1	....	....	....	....	....	6	345	7	4	....	....	....	....	....	11	1116
Beaumaris,	38	3	1	....	....	....	....	42	1782	55	11	....	....	....	....	....	66	3620
Berwick,	5	2	....	....	....	....	....	7	481	7	6	....	1	....	....	....	14	1690
Bideford,	10	1	....	....	....	....	....	11	551	10	9	1	....	....	....	....	20	2149
Boston,	19	....	....	....	....	....	....	19	629	11	1	1	....	....	....	....	13	854
Bridgewater,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	3	....	1	....	....	....	....	4	488
Bridlington,	....	1	1	....	....	....	....	2	364	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......
Bristol,	21	1	8	....	1	....	....	31	3071	4	1	....	....	3	....	....	8	1623
Cardiff,	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	140	5	1	....	....	....	....	....	6	450
Cardigan,	20	1	....	....	....	....	....	21	826	17	1	....	....	....	....	....	18	708
Carlisle,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	12	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	207
Chepstow,	3	3	....	....	....	....	....	6	589	9	4	....	1	1	....	....	15	1778
Chester,	11	4	....	1	....	....	....	16	1488	11	5	1	1	1	....	....	19	2498
Colchester,	17	....	....	....	....	....	....	17	425	11	....	....	....	....	....	....	11	308
Chichester,	6	2	1	....	....	....	....	9	690	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	264
Cowes,	32	1	....	....	....	....	....	33	983	24	1	....	....	....	....	....	25	861
Dartmouth,	31	2	....	....	....	....	....	33	1379	32	7	1	....	....	....	....	40	2656
Deal,	5	....	....	....	....	....	....	5	138	13	....	....	....	....	....	....	13	577
Dover,	43	1	....	....	....	....	....	44	1699	19	3	....	....	....	....	....	22	1237
Exeter,	8	3	1	....	....	....	....	12	1129	22	5	1	....	....	....	....	28	1981
Falmouth,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	41	2	1	....	....	....	....	....	3	274
Feversham,	20	....	....	....	....	....	....	20	208	20	....	....	....	....	....	....	20	233
Fowey,	18	4	....	....	....	....	....	22	1109	27	6	....	....	....	....	....	33	2347
Gloster,	20	....	....	....	....	....	....	20	567	21	4	....	....	....	....	....	25	1595
Harwich,	6	1	....	....	....	....	....	7	250	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	108
Hull,	48	23	6	5	....	....	....	82	8193	46	19	10	4	1	2	....	8[illegible]	10,839
Ilfracombe,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	84	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	234
Ipswich,	12	....	1	1	....	....	....	14	944	5	....	....	1	....	....	....	6	513
Lancaster,	11	2	....	1	....	....	....	17	1325	6	2	2	1	....	....	....	11	1469
Liverpool,	26	23	6	3	1	....	....	59	6710	23	5	5	....	1	1	....	35	4154
Looe,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	6	2	....	....	....	....	....	8	625
Llanelly,	11	....	....	....	....	....	....	11	417	10	3	1	....	....	....	....	11	1000
Lyme,	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	92	7	....	....	....	....	....	....	7	408
Lynn,	4	3	....	....	....	....	....	7	350	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	378
Maldon,	21	....	....	....	....	....	....	21	296	7	....	....	....	....	....	....	7	141
Milford,	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	87	6	3	....	....	....	....	....	9	634
Newcastle,	10	16	22	10	1	....	....	59	12,444	6	18	16	13	6	2	....	61	15,054
Pembroke,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	40	5	....	....	....	....	....	....	5	229
Penzance,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	117	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	103
Plymouth,	37	4	1	....	....	....	....	42	2400	13	3	1	....	....	....	....	17	1266
Poole,	5	7	....	....	....	....	....	12	1168	3	2	1	....	....	....	....	6	741
Portsmouth,	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	62	7	....	....	....	....	....	....	7	245
Rochester,	42	1	....	....	....	....	....	43	1342	26	....	....	....	....	....	....	26	1087
Rye,	10	....	....	....	....	....	....	10	406	8	....	....	....	....	....	....	8	419
Sandwich,	8	3	1	....	....	....	....	12	832	3	3	....	....	....	....	....	6	505
Scarborough,	6	7	2	12	....	....	....	17	2476	4	4	6	....	1	....	....	15	2690
Shoreham,	5	1	....	....	....	....	....	6	299	2	1	1	1	....	....	....	5	912
Southampton,	11	2	3	....	....	....	....	16	1203	10	2	....	....	....	....	....	12	608
Southwold,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	154	1	3	....	....	....	....	....	4	266
Stockton,	5	2	....	2	....	....	....	9	1072	5	1	2	....	....	....	....	8	998
Sunderland,	4	14	4	2	....	....	....	24	3951	5	65	12	5	....	....	....	87	14,198
Swansea,	10	1	2	....	....	....	....	13	927	5	1	....	....	....	....	....	6	392
Wells,	....	2	....	....	....	....	....	2	237	2	3	....	....	....	....	....	5	492
Weymouth,	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	158	4	1	1	....	....	....	....	6	551
Whitby,	5	13	14	17	....	....	....	49	11,915	9	12	7	9	6	....	....	43	9939
Whitehaven,	10	16	5	....	....	....	....	31	3630	8	21	10	2	....	....	....	41	6750
Wisbech,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	252
Woodbridge,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	64
Yarmouth,	19	26	....	....	....	....	....	45	4302	41	14	4	....	....	....	....	59	5242
Total England,	793	210	88	52	5	1	5	1154	104,010	743	267	89	41	22	6	7	1175	127,901
Aberdeen,	20	3	....	....	....	....	....	23	1508	17	23	1	2	1	....	....	44	5658
Air,	4	2	1	....	....	....	....	7	744	1	5	....	1	....	....	....	7	1047
Alloa,	8	1	....	....	....	....	....	9	516	14	2	....	....	....	....	....	16	1379
Anstruther,	8	2	....	....	....	....	....	10	514	6	1	....	....	....	....	....	7	387
Banff,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	10	1	....	....	....	....	....	11	582
Bo'ness,	17	....	....	....	....	....	....	17	901	12	1	....	....	....	....	....	13	808
Dumfries,	8	....	....	....	....	....	....	8	231	9	....	....	....	....	....	....	9	385
Dunbar,	2	....	1	....	....	....	....	3	347	4	1	....	....	....	....	....	5	296
Dundee,	4	2	....	....	....	....	....	6	411	15	3	....	....	....	....	....	18	1343
Glasgow,	19	3	3	....	....	1	....	26	2591	10	....	2	....	....	....	....	12	1093
Greenock,	25	1	....	....	....	1	....	27	1677	13	3	1	2	....	1	....	20	2783
Inverness,	15	....	1	....	....	....	....	16	939	10	1	....	....	....	....	....	11	664
Irvine,	6	3	1	....	....	....	....	10	1130	4	4	....	....	....	....	....	8	785
Kirkaldy,	7	5	4	1	....	....	....	17	2399	15	2	2	....	....	....	....	19	1485
Kirkwall, &c.	13	....	....	....	....	....	....	13	497	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	111
Leith,	18	10	2	....	....	....	....	30	2696	4	6	3	1	....	....	....	14	2068
Montrose,	8	....	....	....	....	....	....	8	323	11	7	1	....	....	....	....	19	1663
Perth, &c.	6	2	1	....	....	....	....	9	811	10	....	....	....	....	....	....	10	531
Stornoway,	5	....	....	....	....	....	....	5	200	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	76
Stranraer, &c.	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	294	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	76
Wigtoun,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	91	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	66
Tot. Scotland,	201	34	14	1	....	2	....	252	18,817	175	60	10	4	1	1	....	253	23,306
Tot. England,	793	210	88	52	5	1	5	1154	104,010	743	267	89	41	22	6	7	1175	127,901
Tot. Gr. Brit.	994	244	102	53	5	3	5	1406	122,827	918	327	99	45	23	7	7	1428	151,207

Summary of Ships Built in 1790-1 and 1804-5.

	1790-1.	1804-5.	Increase.	Decrease.
Vessels under 100 tons,	994	918	....	76
Ships, 100 to 200 tons,	244	327	83	....
Ditto, 200 to 300 tons,	102	99	....	3
Ditto, 300 to 400 tons,	53	45	....	8
Ditto, 400 to 500 tons,	5	23	18	....
Ditto, 500 to 650 tons,	3	7	4	....
Ditto, 800 and upwards, India ships,	5	7	2	....
Total ships,	1406	1428	22	....
Total tonnage,	122,827	151,207	28,380	....

Comparative Return of Ships Built in the Years 1804 and 1805; analyzed from Returns to the House of Commons, June 24, 1806.

Ships.	1804.									1805.								
Built at	Under 100 Tons.	100 to 200 Tons.	200 to 300 Tons.	300 to 400 Tons.	400 to 500 Tons.	500 to 650 Tons.	800, &c. India Ships.	Total Ships.	Total Tonnage.	Under 100 Tons.	100 to 200 Tons.	200 to 300 Tons.	300 to 400 Tons.	400 to 500 Tons.	500 to 650 Tons.	800, &c. India Ships.	Total Ships.	Total Tonnage.
Ships Built in England.																		
London,	35	2	3	1	2	1	2	46	5989	42	3	....	1	....	....	5	51	6691
Aberystwith,	7	1	....	....	....	....	....	8	528	13	1	1	....	....	....	....	15	1066
Arundel,	3	1	....	....	....	....	....	4	387	1	1	....	....	....	....	....	2	240
Barnstaple,	3	3	....	....	....	....	....	6	736	4	1	....	....	....	....	....	5	360
Beaumaris,	28	6	....	....	....	....	....	34	1799	27	5	....	....	....	....	....	32	1821
Berwick,	4	3	....	....	....	....	....	7	752	3	3	....	1	....	....	....	7	938
Bideford,	6	6	1	....	....	....	....	13	1434	4	3	....	....	....	....	....	7	715
Boston,	5	1	1	....	....	....	....	7	542	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	312
Bridgewater,	2	....	1	....	....	....	....	3	420	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	68
Bristol,	1	1	....	....	1	....	....	3	627	3	....	....	....	2	....	....	5	996
Cardiff,	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	182	2	1	....	....	....	....	....	3	268
Cardigan,	9	1	....	....	....	....	....	10	495	8	....	....	....	....	....	....	8	215
Carlisle,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	120	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	87
Chepstow,	2	2	....	....	1	....	....	5	807	7	2	....	1	....	....	....	10	971
Chester,	8	4	....	....	....	....	....	12	1195	3	1	1	1	1	....	....	7	1303
Colchester,	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	189	5	....	....	....	....	....	....	5	119
Chichester,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	264
Cowes,	13	1	....	....	....	....	....	14	643	11	....	....	....	....	....	....	11	216
Dartmouth,	14	4	1	....	....	....	....	19	1361	18	3	....	....	....	....	....	21	1295
Deal,	10	....	....	....	....	....	....	10	513	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	64
Dover,	8	1	....	....	....	....	....	9	543	11	2	....	....	....	....	....	13	694
Exeter,	13	3	....	....	....	....	....	16	1038	9	2	1	....	....	....	....	12	943
Falmouth,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	40	1	1	....	....	....	....	....	2	234
Feversham,	11	....	....	....	....	....	....	11	121	9	....	....	....	....	....	....	9	112
Fowey,	17	2	....	....	....	....	....	19	1322	10	4	....	....	....	....	....	14	1025
Gloster,	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	147	17	4	....	....	....	....	....	21	1448
Harwich,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	108
Hull,	17	10	4	4	1	1	....	37	5700	29	9	6	....	....	1	....	45	5139
Ilfracombe,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	8	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	226
Ipswich,	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	98	2	....	....	1	....	....	....	3	420
Lancaster,	1	2	2	....	....	....	....	5	840	5	....	....	1	....	....	....	6	629
Liverpool,	3	2	4	....	....	1	....	10	2167	20	3	1	....	1	....	....	25	1989
Looe,	2	2	....	....	....	....	....	4	305	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	320
Llanelly,	5	1	....	....	....	....	....	6	344	5	2	1	....	....	....	....	8	656
Lyme,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	67	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	341
Lynn,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	138	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	220
Maldon,	7	....	....	....	....	....	....	7	141	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......
Milford,	4	2	....	....	....	....	....	6	503	2	1	....	....	....	....	....	3	131
Newcastle,	2	10	12	8	3	1	....	36	9083	4	8	4	5	3	1	....	25	5969
Pembroke,	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	154	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	75
Penzance,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	103
Plymouth,	6	2	1	....	....	....	....	9	751	7	1	....	....	....	....	....	8	515
Poole,	1	1	....	....	....	....	....	2	207	2	1	1	....	....	....	....	4	534
Portsmouth,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	13	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	232
Rochester,	10	....	....	....	....	....	....	10	423	16	....	....	....	....	....	....	16	664
Rye,	5	....	....	....	....	....	....	5	298	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	121
Sandwich,	2	3	....	....	....	....	....	5	488	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	17
Scarborough,	2	1	3	....	1	....	....	7	1430	2	3	3	....	....	....	....	8	1260
Shoreham,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	58	1	1	1	1	....	....	....	4	854
Southampton,	4	1	....	....	....	....	....	5	351	6	1	....	....	....	....	....	7	257
Southwold,	....	2	....	....	....	....	....	2	107	1	1	....	....	....	....	....	2	159
Stockton,	3	....	2	....	....	....	....	5	748	2	1	....	....	....	....	....	3	250
Sunderland,	4	36	7	4	....	....	....	51	8228	1	29	5	1	....	....	....	36	5970
Swansea,	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	178	1	1	....	....	....	....	....	2	214
Wells,	....	3	....	....	....	....	....	3	338	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	154
Weymouth,	3	1	....	....	....	....	....	4	253	1	....	1	....	....	....	....	2	298
Whitby,	8	7	2	5	3	....	....	25	5128	1	5	5	4	3	....	....	18	4811
Whitehaven,	4	11	8	....	....	....	....	23	3733	4	10	2	2	....	....	....	18	3017
Wisbech,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	91	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	161
Woodbridge,	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	64
Yarmouth,	14	6	3	....	....	....	....	23	2452	27	8	1	....	....	....	....	36	2790
Total England,	339	145	53	22	12	4	2	579	66,768	404	122	34	19	10	2	5	596	61,133
Ships Built in Scotland.																		
Aberdeen,	9	11	1	2	1	....	....	24	3575	8	12	....	....	....	....	....	20	2083
Air,	1	2	....	1	....	....	....	4	663	....	3	....	....	....	....	....	3	384
Alloa,	8	1	....	....	....	....	....	9	729	6	1	....	....	....	....	....	7	550
Anstruther,	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	195	2	1	....	....	....	....	....	3	192
Banff,	6	....	....	....	....	....	....	6	343	4	1	....	....	....	....	....	5	239
Bo'ness,	7	....	....	....	....	....	....	7	377	5	1	....	....	....	....	....	6	431
Dumfries,	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	4	162	5	....	....	....	....	....	....	5	223
Dunbar,	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	90	2	1	....	....	....	....	....	3	206
Dundee,	6	1	....	....	....	....	....	7	460	9	2	....	....	....	....	....	11	883
Glasgow,	5	....	1	....	....	....	....	6	554	5	....	1	....	....	....	....	6	539
Greenock,	8	3	....	1	....	....	....	12	1413	5	....	1	1	....	1	....	8	1368
Inverness,	3	1	....	....	....	....	....	4	297	7	....	....	....	....	....	....	7	367
Irvine,	1	3	....	....	....	....	....	4	436	3	1	....	....	....	....	....	4	349
Kirkaldy,	7	....	1	....	....	....	....	8	537	8	2	1	....	....	....	....	11	948
Kirkwall, &c.	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	100	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	11
Leith,	4	3	3	1	....	....	....	11	1615	....	3	....	....	....	....	....	3	473
Montrose,	5	5	....	....	....	....	....	10	778	6	2	1	....	....	....	....	9	885
Perth, &c.	7	....	....	....	....	....	....	7	377	3	....	....	....	....	....	....	3	154
Stornoway,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	20	2	....	....	....	....	....	....	2	56
Stranraer,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	70	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	......
Wigtoun,	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	45	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	1	21
Tot. Scotland,	93	30	6	5	1	....	....	135	12,844	82	30	4	1	....	1	....	118	10,362
Tot. England,	339	145	53	22	12	4	2	579	66,768	404	122	34	19	10	2	5	596	61,133
Tot. Gt. Brit.	432	175	61	27	13	4	2	714	79,612	486	152	38	20	10	3	5	714	71,495

Summary of Returns of Ships Built in Great Britain the Two last Years, 1804-5.

	1804.	1805.	Decrease	Increase.
Vessels under 100 tons,	432	486	....	54
Ships, 100 to 200 tons,	175	152	23	....
Ditto, 200 to 300 tons,	61	38	23	....
Ditto, 300 to 400 tons,	27	20	7	....
Ditto, 400 to 500 tons,	13	10	3	....
Ditto, 500 to 650 tons,	4	3	1	....
India ships, 800 to 1200,	2	5	....	3
Total ships,	714	714	57	57
Total tonnage,	79,612	71,495	8117	....

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